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Karika, verse 4.1
The proposition regarding Advaita (as the Supreme Truth) has been based upon scriptural evidence, by determining the nature of Aum. That proposition has been established by proving  the unreality of the distinction implied by the external objects (of experience). Again the third chapter dealing with Advaita has directly established the proposition on the authority of scripture and reason with the concluding statement  that “This alone is the Ultimate Truth”. At the end of the previous chapter it has been hinted that the opinions of the dualists and the nihilists, who are opposed to the philosophy of Advaita which gives the true import of the scriptures, bear the name of true philosophy. But that is not true because of their mutual contradictions and also because of their being vitiated by attachment to their own opinions and aversion to those of others. The philosophy of Advaita has been extolled as the true philosophy on  account of its being free from any vitiation (referred to above regarding the theories of the dualists and nihilists). Now is undertaken the chapter styled Alātasānti (i.e., on the quenching of the fire-brand) in order to conclude the final examination for the establishment of the philosophy of Advaita, by following the process known as the method  of disagreement, which is done by showing here in detail that other systems cannot be said to be true philosophy. For there are mutual contradictions implied in them. The first verse has for its purpose the salutation to the promulgator  of the philosophy of Advaita, conceiving him as identical with the Advaita Truth. The salutation to the teacher is made in commencing a scripture in order to bring the undertaking to a successful end. The word “Ākāśakalpa” in the text means resembling Ākāśa, that is to say, slightly different from Ākāśa. What is the purpose of such knowledge which resembles Ākāśa? By such Knowledge is known the nature of the Dharmas   (i.e., the attributes of Atman). The attributes are the same as the substance. What is the nature of these Dharmas? They also can be known by the analogy  of Ākāśa, that is to say, these Dharmas also resemble Ākāśa. The word “Jñeyābhinna” in the text is another attribute of ‘Jnanam’ or Knowledge and means that this knowledge is not  separate from the Atmans (Jivas) which are the objects of knowledge. This identity of the knowledge and the knowable is like the identity of fire  and heat and the sun and its light. I bow to the God, known as Nārāyaṇa,  who by knowledge, non-different from the nature of Atman (the object of knowledge) and which resembles Ākāśa, knew the Dharmas which, again, may be compared to Ākāśa. The import of the words “Dvipadām Varam” (Supreme among the bipeds), is that Nārāyaṇa is the greatest of all men, characterised by two legs, that, is to say, He is the “Puruṣottama”, the best of all men. By the adoration of the teacher it is implied that the purpose of this chapter is to establish, by the refutation of the opposite views, Advaita which gives the philosophy of the Ultimate Reality, characterised by the identity of the knower, knowledge and the object of knowledge.

Karika, verse 4.2
Now salutation is made to the Yoga taught by the Advaita Philosophy, in order to extol it. The word Asparśayoga in the text means the Yoga which is always and in all respects free from sparśa or relationship with anything and which is of the same nature as Brahman. This Yoga is well known as the Asparśayoga to all Knowers of Brahman. This Yoga is conducive  to the happiness of all beings. There are certain forms of Yoga such as Tapas or austerity, which though conducive to the supreme happiness, are associated with misery. But this is not of that kind. Then what is its nature? It tends to the happiness of all beings. It may however be contended that the enjoyment of certain desires gives pleasure but certainly does not tend to one’s well-being. But this Asparśayoga conduces to both  happiness and well-being. For,  it never changes its nature. Moreover, this  Yoga is free from strife, that is to say, in it there is no room for any passage-at-words, which is inevitable in all disputes consisting of two opposite sides. Why so? For, it is non-contradictory  in nature. To this kind of Yoga, taught in the scripture, I bow.
Karika, verse 4.3
How do the dualists quarrel with one another? It is thus replied: Some disputants, such as the followers of the Sāṃkhya system, admit production as the effect of an entity that is already existent. But this is not the view of all the dualists. For the intelligent followers of the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika systems, that is to say, those who believe that they possess wisdom, maintain that evolution proceeds from a non-existing cause. The meaning is that these disputants, quarrelling among themselves, claim victory over their respective opponents.

Karika, verse 4.4
What do they, by refuting each other’s conclusions and quarrelling among themselves, really establish? It is thūs replied:—No  entity which is already in existence can again pass into birth. The reason is that as entity, it already exists. Ft is just like the Atman, which already being in existence, cannot be born again as a new entity. Thus argues the supporter of evolution from non-ens (i.e., from a non-existing cause) and refutes the Sāṃkhya theory that an existing cause is born again as an effect. Similarly, the follower of the Sāṃkhya theory refutes the supporter of the non-ens view regarding creation by a non-existing cause. He declares that a non-existing  cause, on account of its very non-existence, cannot, like the horns of a hare, produce an effect. Thus  quarrelling among themselves, by supporting “existent” and “non-existent” causes, they refute theirs respective opponent’s views and declare, in effect, the truth that there is no creation at all.

Karika, verse 4.5
We simply accept the view of the Ajāti or the absolute non-causation declared by them  and say,“Let it be so”. We do not quarrel with them by taking either side in the disputation. In other words, like them, we do not quarrel with each other. Hence Oh ye pupils, know from us the Ultimate Reality as taught by us, which is free from dispute.

Karika, verse 4.6
The word “disputant” in the text includes all the dualists, viz., those who believe that evolution proceeds from an existing cause, as well as those who believe its opposite. This verse has already been commented upon.

Karika, verse 4.7-8
These verses have already been explained. They are repeated here in order to justify our view that the disputants mentioned above only contradict each other.

Karika, verse 4.9

Even  the nature of a thing in ordinary experience does not undergo any reversal. What is meant by the nature of a thing? This is thus replied:—The word “samsiddhi” means “complete attainment”. The nature of a thing is formed by such complete attainment as in the case of the perfected Yogis who attain to such superhuman powers as Aṇimā,  etc. These powers thus acquired by the Yogis never undergo any transformation in the past and future. Therefore these constitute the very nature of the Yogis, Similarly, the characteristic quality of a thing, such as heat or light of fire and the like, never undergoes any change either in time or space. So also the nature of a thing which is part of it from its very birth, as the flying power of the bird, etc., through the sky, is called its prakṛti. Anything else which is not produced by any other cause (except the thing itself); such as the running downwards of water is also called prakṛti. And lastly, anything which  does not cease to be itself is known popularly to be its prakṛti. The purport of the Kārikā is that if in the case of empirical entities, which are only imagined,  their nature or prakṛti does not undergo any change, then how should it be otherwise in the case of the immortal or unchanging nature regarding the Ultimate Reality, whose very Prakṛti is Ajāti or absolute non-manifestation.

Karika, verse 4.10
What is the basis of that Prakṛti whose change is imagined by the disputants? What, again, is the defect in such imagination? This is thus replied:—The words “Free from senility and death,” in the text signify freedom from all changes  characterised by senility, death, etc. Who are thus free (from all changes)? These are all the Jivas, who are, by their very nature, free from all changes. Though the Jivas are such by their very nature, yet they think, as it were, that they are subject to senility and death. By such imagination  about their selves, like the imagination of the snake in the rope, they (appear to) deviate from their nature. This happens on account of their identification, through thinking, with senility and death. That is to say, they (appear to) fall from their real nature by this defect in their thought.

Karika, verse 4.11
How is it that the Sāṃkhyas, who believe in the evolution of an existing cause, maintain a view which is irrational? It is thus replied by the followers of the Vaiśeṣika system: Those who say that the cause, that is to say, such material cause as clay, is, in itself, the effect; or in other words those disputants who assert that the cause itself changes into the effect, maintain, as a matter of fact, that the ever-existent and unborn cause, namely the Pradhāna, etc., is born again as the effect, such as Mahat, etc. If Pradhāna be born in the form of Mahat, etc., then how can it be designated as birthless? To say that it is unborn, i.e., immutable and at the same time born, i.e., passing into change, involves a contradiction. Further, the Sāṃkhyas designate Pradhāna as eternal. How is it possible for Pradhāna to be eternal if even a part of it be affected by change? In other words, ordinary experience does not furnish us with the instance of a jar, composed of parts, which, if broken in any part, can still be called permanent or immutable. The purport is that a contradiction is obvious in the statement that it is affected partly by change and at the same time it is unborn and eternal.

Karika, verse 4.12
This verse is meant to make the meaning of the previous one clearer. If your object be to maintain that the unborn cause is identical with the effect, then it necessarily follows that the effect also becomes equally unborn. But it  is certainly a contradiction to say that a thing is an effect and at the same time unborn. There is a further difficulty. In the case of identity of the cause and the effect, how can, according to you, the cause, which  is non-different from the born effect, be permanent and immutable? It is not possible to imagine that a part of a hen is being cooked and that another part is laying eggs.
If the identity of cause and effect be maintained then it may be asked if the cause be identical with the effect or if the effect be identical with the cause. In the former case of identity, the effect becomes unborn and in the latter case the cause becomes something born and loses its immutable and permanent character.

Karika, verse 4.13
Moreover, the disputant  who says that the effect is produced from an unborn cause, cannot furnish an illustration to support his view. In other words, it is consequently established that nothing is born from an unborn cause as there is no illustration to support this view. If, on the other hand, it be contended that the effect is born from a born cause, then that cause must be born from some other born cause and so on, which position never enables us to reach a cause which is, in itself, unborn. In other words, we are faced with an infinite regress.

Karika, verse 4.14
The Śruti, in the passage, “When all this has, verily, become his Atman” declares, from the standpoint of the Ultimate Reality, the absence of duality. From this standpoint of the Scriptural text, it is said: The cause, i.e., the merit (Dharma) and the demerit (Adharma), etc., has, for its cause, the effect, viz., the aggregate of the body, etc. Similarly, the cause,  viz., merit and demerit, etc., is the cause of the effect, viz., the aggregate of the body, etc. How can disputants  who maintain this view, viz., that both the cause and the effect are with  beginning on account of mutual interdependence of the cause and the effect, assert that both the cause and the effect are without beginning? In other words, this position implies an inherent contradiction.  The Atman,  which is eternal and immutable, can never become either the cause or the effect.

Karika, verse 4.15-16
How does the contention of the opponent imply a contradiction? It is thus replied:—The admission that the cause is produced from an effect, which is itself born of a cause, carries with it the contradiction which may be stated to be like the birth of the father from the son.
If it be contended that the contradiction, pointed out above, cannot be valid, then the opponent should determine the order in which cause and effect succeed each other. The opponent has to show that the “cause” which is antecedent, produces the “effect” which is subsequent. For the following reason also, the order of “cause” and “effect” must be shown. For, if cause and effect arise simultaneously, then they cannot be related as the cause and the effect, as it is impossible to establish the causal relation between the two horns of a cow produced simultaneously.

Karika, verse 4.17
How can there be no causal relation? It is thus replied: The cause cannot have a definite existence if it is to be born of an effect which is, itself, yet unborn, and therefore which is non-existent like the horns of a hare. How  can the cause contemplated by you, which is, itself, indefinite and which is non-existent like the horns of a hare, produce an effect? Two things which are mutually dependent upon each other for their production and which are like  the horns of a hare, cannot be related as cause and effect or in  any other way.

Karika, verse 4.18
Though any relation between cause and effect has been found to be an impossibility, yet it may be contended by the opponent that the cause and the effect, though not causally related, yet depend upon each other for their mutual existence. As a reply to this contention we ask: Which of the two, the cause and the effect, is antecedent to the other, upon the previous existence of which, the subsequent existence of the other is dependent?

Karika, verse 4.19
If you think that this  cannot be explained then this inability shows your ignorance, that is to say, it demonstrates that you are deluded regarding the Knowledge of Reality. Again, the order of succession, pointed out by you—that the effect comes from the cause and the cause comes from the effect—is also inconsistent. Thus is shown the impropriety of the causal relation between the cause and the effect. This  leads the wise among the disputants, by showing the fallacy in each other’s arguments, to declare, in effect, the non-evolution of things (which is our opinion).

Karika, verse 4.20
Objection: We have asserted the causal relation between the cause and the effect. But you have raised mere verbal  difficulties to show the inconsistency in our statement and made a caricature of our standpoint by pointing out its absurdity like the birth of the father from the son or a causal relation between the two horns (of a bull), etc. We do not, for a moment, admit the production of an effect from a cause not already existent or of a cause from an effect not established.
Reply: What is, then, your contention?
Objection: We admit the causal relation as  in the case of the seed and the sprout.
Reply: To this we reply as follows:—The illustration of the causal relation existing between the seed and the sprout is itself the same as the major term in my syllogism, that is to say, the  illustration itself is to be proved.
Objection: It is apparent that the causal relation of the seed and the sprout is without beginning.
Reply: It is not so. The beginning of all antecedents must be admitted, as is the case with the consequents. As  a sprout just produced from a seed is with beginning, similarly the seed also, produced from another sprout (existing in the past), by the very succession implied in the act of production, is with beginning. Therefore all antecedent sprouts as well as seeds are with beginning. As every seed and every sprout, among the seeds and the sprouts, are with beginning, so it is unreasonable to say that any one of these is without beginning. This is also equally applicable to the argument of the cause and the effect.
Objection: Each  of the series of the seeds and the sprouts is without beginning.
Reply: No. The unity or oneness of such series cannot be justified. Even those who maintain the beginninglessness of the seed and the sprout, do not admit the existence of a thing known as the series of the seed and the sprout apart from the seed and the sprout. Nor do they admit such a series in the case of the cause and the effect. Therefore it has been rightly asked, “How do you assert the beginninglessness of the cause and the effect?” Other explanations being unreasonable, we have not raised any verbal difficulty. Even  in our ordinary experience expert logicians do not use anything, which is yet to be established, as the middle term or illustration in order to establish relation between the major and the minor terms of a syllogism. The word Hetu or the middle term is used here in the sense of illustration, as it is the illustration which leads to the establishment of a proposition. In the context illustration is meant and not reason.

Karika, verse 4.21
How do the wise assert the view of Ajāti (Ajati) or absolute non-evolution? It is thus replied:—The  very fact that one does not know the antecedence and the subsequence of the cause and the effect is, in itself, the clearest indication of absolute non-evolution. If  the effect (Dharma, i.e., the Jiva) be taken as produced (from a cause) then why cannot its antecedent cause be pointed out? It goes without saying that one who accepts birth as a fact must also know its antecedent cause. For, the relationship of the cause and the effect is inseparable and therefore cannot be given up Therefore the absence of knowledge (regarding the cause) clearly indicates the fact of absolute non-evolution.

Karika, verse 4.22
For this reason, also, nothing whatsoever is born. That which is (supposed to be) born cannot be born of itself, of another or of both. Nothing,  whether it be existing or non-existing, or both, is ever born. Of such an entity, birth is not possible in any manner whatsoever. Nothing is born out of itself, i.e., from its own form which in itself has not yet come into existence. A jar cannot be produced from the self-same jar. A thing cannot be born from another thing, which is other than itself, as a jar cannot be produced from another jar, or a piece of cloth from another piece of cloth. Similarly, a thing cannot be born both out of itself and another, as that involves a contradiction. A jar or a piece of cloth cannot be produced by both a jar and a piece of cloth.

Objection: A jar is produced from clay, and a son is born of a father.
Reply: Yes, the deluded use a word like “birth” and have a notion corresponding to the word. Both the word and the notion are examined by men of discrimination who wish to ascertain whether these are true or not. After examination they come to the conclusion that things, such as a jar or a son, etc., denoted by the words and signified by the notions, or mere verbal expressions. The Scripture also corroborates it, saying, “All effects are mere names and figures of speech.” If the thing is ever-existent, then it cannot be born again. The very  existence is the reason for non-evolution. A father or clay is the illustration to support the contention. If these objects, on the other hand, be non-existent, even then they cannot be said to be produced. The very-non-existence is the reason. The horns  of a hare are an illustration. If things be both existent and non-existent, then also, it cannot be born. For, such contradictory ideas cannot be associated with a thing. Therefore it is established that nothing whatsoever is born. Those  who, again, assert that the very fact of birth is born again, that the cause, the effect and the act of birth form one-unity, and also that all objects have only momentary existence, maintain a view which is very far from reason. For a thing immediately after being pointed out as “It is this,” ceases to exist and consequently no memory of the thing is possible in the absence of such cognition.

Karika, verse 4.23-24
In accepting the beginninglessness of the cause and the effect you are forced to admit the absence of birth regarding them. How is it so? The  cause cannot be produced from an effect, which is without beginning. In other words, you do not certainly mean that the cause-is produced from an effect which is, itself, without beginning and free from birth. Nor do you  admit that the effect, by following its own inherent nature, (i.e., without any extraneous cause) is produced from a cause which is unborn and without beginning. Therefore  by admitting the beginninglessness of the cause and the effect, you, verily, accept the fact of their being never produced. It is because we know from common experience that what is without beginning is also free from birth which means a beginning. Beginning is admitted of a thing, which has birth, and not of a thing which has none.

An objection is raised in order to strengthen the meaning already stated. The word Prajñapti in the text signifies “knowledge”, i.e., the experience of such notions as that of sound, etc. This (subjective) knowledge has a cause, i.e., an (external) agent or object corresponding to it. In other words, we premise that knowledge is not merely subjective but has an object outside the perceiving subject. Cognition of sound, etc., is not possible without objects. For, such experience is always produced by a cause. In  the absence of such (external) object, the variety and multiplicity of experiences such as sound, touch, colour, viz., blue, yellow, red, etc., would not have existed. But the varieties are not non-existent, for these are directly perceived by all. Hence, because: the variety of manifold experiences exist, it is necessary to admit the existence—as supported by the system of the opposite school—of external objects which are outside the ideas of the perceiving subject. The subjective knowledge has one characteristic alone, i.e., it is of the very nature of illumination. It does not admit of any variety within itself. The variety of experiences of colour, such as blueness, yellowness, etc., cannot possibly be explained, by merely imagining a variety in the subjective knowledge, without admitting variety of external objects which are the substratum of these multiple colours. In other words, no variety of colour is possible in a (white) crystal without its coming-in contact with such adjuncts as the external objects which possess such colours as blueness, etc. For this additional reason also one is forced to admit the existence of external object,—supported by the Scripture of the opposite school,—an object which is external to the knowledge (of the perceiving subject): Misery  caused by burns, etc., is experienced by all. Such pain as is caused by burns, etc., would not have been felt in the absence of the fire, etc., which is the cause of the burns and which exists independent of the knowledge (of the perceiving subject). But such pain is experienced by all. Hence,  we think that external objects do exist. It is not reasonable to conclude that such pain is caused by mere subjective knowledge. For, such misery is not found elsewhere.

Karika, verse 4.25
To this objection, we reply as follows:—We admit that you posit a cause of the subjective experience on account of such arguments as the existence of the variety (in the objective world) and because of the experience of pain. Stick for a while to your argument that reason demands that an external object should exist to produce a subjective impression.
The opponent: Please let us know what you (Advaitin) are going to say next.
Reply: Yes, the jar, etc., posited by you as the cause, that is to say, the cause of the subjective impression, are not, according to us, the external cause, the substratum (of the impression); nor are they the cause for our experiences of variety.
Objection: How?
Reply: We say so from  the standpoint of the true nature of Reality. When the true nature of clay is known a jar does not exist apart from the clay as exists a buffalo in entire independence of a horse. Nor does cloth exist apart from the thread in it. Similarly the threads have no existence apart from the fibres. If we thus proceed to find out the true nature of the thing, by going from one cause to another, till language or the object denoted by the language fails us, we do not still find any (final) cause.

“Bhūtadarsanāt” (from the true nature of the thing) may be “Abhūtadarsartāt” (from the unreality of the experiences). According to this interpretation, the meaning of the Kārikā is that we do not admit external objects as the cause on  account of the unreality of these (external) objects, which are as unreal as the snake seen instead of the rope. The (so-called) cause  ceases to be the cause as the former is due to the illusory perception of the perceiver. For,  it (the external world) disappears in the absence of such illusory knowledge. The man in dreamless sleep and trance (Samādhi) and he who has attained the highest knowledge do not experience any object outside their self as they are free  from such illusory cognition. An object which is cognised by a lunatic is never known as such by a sane man. Thus  is answered the contention regarding the causality based upon the arguments of the perception of variety and the existence of pain.

Karika, verse 4.26
Because there are no external objects as cause, the mind does not relate itself to external objects which are supposed to be the cause of the subjective impression. Nor is the mind related to the ideas which appear as external objects, as the mind, like  the dream-mind, is identical with such ideas. It  is because the external objects such as sound, etc., perceived in the waking state, are as unreal as dream-objects, for  reasons stated already. Another reason is that the ideas appearing as external objects are not different from the mind. It is the mind alone which, as in dream, appears as external objects such as the jar, etc.

Karika, verse 4.27
Objection: The mind appears as the jar, etc., though such objects are non-existent. Therefore there  must exist false knowledge. Such being the case, there must be right knowledge somewhere (in relation to, or as distinguished from, false knowledge which we point out).
Reply: Our reply to this contention is as follows:—The mind certainly does not come in contact with a cause—an external object—in any of the three periods of time, past, present or future. If the mind had ever truly come in contact with such objects then such relation would give us an idea of true knowledge from the standpoint of Reality. And in relation to that knowledge the appearance of the jar, etc., in the mind, in the absence of the jar, etc., could have been termed as false knowledge. But never does the mind come in contact with an external object (which does not in reality exist). Hence how is it possible for the mind to fall into error when there is no cause for such an assumption? In other words, the mind is never subject to false knowledge. This  is, indeed, the very nature of the mind that it takes the forms of the jar, etc., though in reality, such jar, etc., which may cause the mental forms, do not at all exist.

Karika, verse 4.28
The verses of the Kārikā from 25 to 27 give the views of a class of Buddhistic thinkers, known as the Vijñānavādins (the subjective idealists) who thus refute the views of those who maintáin the reality of external objects. The  Advaitic teacher (Gauḍapāda) approves of these arguments. Now he makes use of these very arguments of the Vijñānavādins as the ground (middle term) for refuting the conclusions of the subjective idealists. The Kārikā has this end in view. The subjective idealist admits that the mind, even in the absence of the (external) jar, etc., takes the form of the jar, etc. We also agree with this conclusion because this is in conformity with the real nature of things. In like manner, the mind, though never produced, appears to be produced and cognised as such. Therefore the mind is never produced, as is the case with the object cognised by it. The Vijñānavādins who affirm the production of the mind and also assert that the mind is momentary, full of pain, non-Self in nature, etc., forget that the real  nature of the mind can never be understood by the mind fas described by them). Thus the Vijñānavādins who see the production of the mind resemble those who (profess to) see in the sky foot-prints left by birds, etc. In other words, the Vijñānavādins are more audacious than the others, viz., the dualists. And the Nihilists  who, in spite of the perception of the visible world, assert the absolute non-existence of everything including their own experiences, ate even mote audacious than the Vijñānavādins. These Nihilists take the position of those who claim to compress the whole sky in the palms of their hands.

Karika, verse 4.29
For reasons already stated it is established that Brahman is one and unborn. This verse summarises, the conclusion of what has already been stated in the form of proposition. The unborn mind, which  is verily Brahman, is imagined by the disputants to be born. Therefore (according to them) the ever-unborn is said to be born. For, it is unborn by its very nature. It  is simply impossible for a thing, which is ever unborn by nature, to be anyhow born, that is to say, to be anyhow otherwise than what it is.

Karika, verse 4.30
Here is another defect in the arguments of those who maintain that the Atman is, in reality, subject  to both bondage and liberation. If the world (i.e., the state of bondage of the Atman) be without beginning or a definite past, then its end cannot be established by any logical reasoning. In ordinary experience, there is no instance of an object which has no beginning but has an end.
Objection: We  see a break in the beginningless continuity of the relation of the seed and the sprout.
Reply: This illustration has no validity; for,  the seed and the sprout do not constitute a single entity. In like manner, liberation cannot be said to have no end if it be asserted that liberation which is attained by acquisition of knowledge has a (definite) beginning. For, the jar, etc., which have a beginning have also an end.

Objection: There  is no defect in our argument as liberation, not being any substance, may be like the destruction of a jar, etc.
Reply: In that case it will contradict your proposition that liberation has a positive existence from the standpoint of the Ultimate Reality. Further, liberation being a non-entity, like the horn of a hare cannot ever have a beginning. This Kārikā gives us the reason for the statement that Atman is ever-pure, ever-free and ever-existent. Atman, conceived as such, is not a theological dogma, nor is it based upon the intuition of the mystic, but it is a metaphysical fact.

Karika, verse 4.31-32
These two verses have been explained before in the chapter on Illusion (Chapter II. 6, 7). They are quoted here again in connection with the topics which are discussed in relation to the unreality of the universe and liberation.

Karika, verse 4.33
This and the following verses are meant to explain in detail one of the previous Kārikās which states that the (so-called) cause (of the opponent) is, really speaking, no cause at all. (Ref. Verse 25, Chapt. IV.)

Karika, verse 4.34
The time and space involved in undertaking a journey and in coming back, have a definite and fixed standard in the waking state. These are seen to be reversed  in dream. On account of this inconsistency it can be positively said that the dreamer does not actually go out to another place during his dream experiences.

Karika, verse 4.35
A man, in dream, holds conversation with his friends, etc. But, on being awake, he finds it all as unreal. Further, he possesses in dream gold, etc., but, in the awakened state he realises all these possessions to be unreal. Though he goes to other countries in dream, he does not, in reality, make any such journey.

Karika, verse 4.36-37
The body, which appears to be wandering in the dream, is unreal; for, another body, quite different from it, is seen in the spot where the dreamer lies. As the body perceived in the dream is unreal, so also all that is cognised by the mind, even in the waking state, is unreal; for, all these perceived objects are mere different states of the mind. The significance of this chapter is that even the waking experiences, on account of their being similar to the dream experiences, are unreal.

Karika, verse 4.38
Objection: Though the waking experiences are the cause of the dream ones, still the former cannot be unreal like the latter. The dream is extremely evanescent whereas the waking experiences are seen to be permanent.
Reply: This  is true with regard to the people who do not possess discrimination. Men of discrimination do not see the production  or the birth of anything, as creation or evolution cannot be established as a fact. Hence all this is known in the Vedāntic books as unborn  (i.e., non-dual Brahman). For the Śruti declares, “He (the Atman) is both within and without and is, at the same time, unborn.” If you contend that the illusory dream is the effect of the real waking state, we say that your contention is untenable. In our common experience, we never see a non-existing thing produced from an existing one. Such non-existing thing as the horn of a hare is never seen to be produced from any other object.

Karika, verse 4.39
Objection: It is you who stated that the dream is the effect of the waking experience. That being the case, how do you refute causality?
Reply: Listen to our explanation of the causality, referred to in that instance. One perceives in the waking state objects which are unreal like the snake imagined in the rope. Being deeply impressed by such (illusory) perception, he imagines in the dream, as in the waking; state, the subject-object relationship and thereby perceives (dream) objects. But though full of the unreal seen in the dream, he does  not see those (unreal) objects, over again, in the waking state. The reason is the absence of the imaginary subject-object relationship (one experiences in dream). The word “cha,” “moreover” in the text denotes that the causal relationship between the waking and the dream states is not always observed. Similarly,  things seen in the waking state are not, sometimes, cognised in dream. Therefore the statement that the waking condition is the cause of the dream is  not made from the standpoint of the Ultimate Reality.

Karika, verse 4.40
From the standpoint of the Ultimate Reality, things can, in no way, enter into causal relation. How? An unreal cannot be the cause of another unreal. An unreal entity such as the horns of a hare, which may be said to be the cause of another unreal entity such as a castle in the air, has no existence whatsoever. Similarly, an object like a jar, which is perceived and which is the effect of an unreal object like the horns of the hare, is never existent. In  like manner, a jar which is perceived and which is the effect of another jar that also is perceived to exist, is, in itself, non-existent. And  lastly, how is existence possible of a real object as the cause of an unreal one? No other causal relation is possible nor can be conceived of. Hence men of knowledge find that the causal relation between any objects whatsoever is not capable of being proved.
The causal relation between the waking and the dream states has been stated from the empirical standpoint alone. But it cannot be established from the standpoint of Truth. Further, no causal relation, whatsoever, is admissible.

Karika, verse 4.41
This verse intends to remove the slightest possibility of the causal relation between the waking and the dream States, though both are unreal. As in the waking state, one, through want of proper discrimination, imagines the snake seen in place of the rope as real—the nature of which, in fact, cannot be really determined,—so also in dream, one, through want of discrimination, imagines as if one really perceives such objects as elephant, etc. These dream objects, such as elephants, etc., are peculiar to the dream condition alone; they are not the effect of the waking experiences.

Karika, verse 4.42
Wise men, i.e., the exponents of Advaita Philosophy, have, no doubt, supported causality. But they have done so only for those who have little discrimination but who are eager (to know the Truth) and who are endowed with faith. These people assert that external objects exist as real because they perceive them, and also because they cling to the observances of various duties associated with the different Varṇās   and Āśramas? instructions regarding causality are only meant for them as  a means to (some) end. Let them hold on to the idea of causality. Rut the students who practise disciplines in accordance with Vedānta philosophy will, without such belief in causality, spontaneously get the knowledge  of Self, unborn and non-dual. Causality is declared not from the standpoint of the Ultimate Reality. These students, who  believe in Scriptures, and who are devoid of discrimination, fear the idea of absolute non-manifestation on account of their gross intellect, as they are afraid of the annihilation of their selves. It  has also been stated before that these Scriptural statement (regarding creation) are meant as a help to our higher understanding of Reality. (In Reality, there is no multiplicity.)

Karika, verse 4.43
Those who on account of their perception (of the phenomenal objects) and attachment  to the various duties of caste and other stages of life, shrink from the non-dual and unborn Atman, and believing in the existence of dual objects, go away from the Self, that is to say, pin their faith to duality,—these people who are thus afraid of the truth of absolute non-manifestation, but who are endowed with faith and who stick to the path  of righteousness, are not  much affected by the evil results consequent on such belief in causality. For, they also try to follow the path of discrimination. Even if a little blemish attaches to such persons, it is insignificant, being due to their not having realised the Supreme Truth.

Karika, verse 4.44
Objection: Objects answering to the features of duality do exist, on account of such evidence as our (direct) perception of them and also on account of the possibility of our dealings with them.
Reply: No, this objection is not valid. For, direct perception and the possibility of dealing practically with objects do not always prove the existence of objects.
Objection: How do you say that our contention admits of irregularity?
Reply: It is thus stated: The elephant conjured up by a magician, is, verily, perceived as the real elephant. Though unreal, it (the magic elephant) is called the (real) elephant, on account of its being endowed with Such attributes of an elephant as the possibility of its being tied up with a rope or being climbed upon, etc. Though unreal, the magic elephant is looked upon as (a real) one. In like manner, it is said that multiple objects, pointing to duality, exist on account of their being perceived and also on account of the possibility of our dealing practically with them. Hence the two grounds, adduced above, cannot prove the existence of (external) objects establishing the fact of duality.

Karika, verse 4.45
What is that entity—the Ultimate Reality—which is the substratum  of all false cognitions as causality (creation), etc.? It is thus replied:—Though unborn fit appears to be born. As for example, we say that Devadatta is born. Again it appears to move (though it is free from all motion): as we say, “That Devadatta is going”. Further, it appears as an object in which inhere certain qualities. For instance, we say “That Devadatta is fair and tall”. Though from the standpoint of the Ultimate Reality, Consciousness  is ever unborn, immovable, and not of the character of material objects, yet it appears as a. Devadatta who is born, who moves and who is known to be fair and tall. What is that entity which answers to these descriptions? It is Consciousness which, being free from birth, change, etc., is all peace and therefore non-dual.

Karika, verse 4.46
Thus, that is to say, for the reasons stated above,, the mind is free from birth. Similarly the Dharmas> that is, the Jivas9 are also unborn. This is the statement of the Knowers of Brahman. The  word “Dharmāḥ” (i.e., “Selves”) is metaphorically used in the plural sense,, in consequence of our perception of variety which is, in rëálity, the appearance of the non-dual Atman as different, corporeal beings. Those who know the consciousness,  stated above, which is the essence of the Self, non-dual and free from birth, etc., and, accordingly, renounce the hankering after all external objects,—they do not fall any more into this ocean of the darkness of Avidya. The Śruti also says, “Where is grief or delusion for the one that realises non-duality?”

Karika, verse 4.47
In order to explain the truth regarding the Ultimate Reality already stated, it is thus said:—As in common experience it is noticed that a fire-brand  when moved, appears straight, crooked, etc., so does Consciousness appear as the perceiver, the perceived, and the like. What is that which appears as the perceiver, the perceived, etc.? It  is Consciousness set in motion. There is no motion in Consciousness. It only appears to be moving. This appearance is due to Avidya or ignorance. No motion is possible in Consciousness which is ever immovable. It has already been stated that Consciousness is unborn and immovable.

Karika, verse 4.48
As that very fire-brand, when not in motion, does not take any form, straight or crooked, etc., becomes free from all appearances and remains changeless, so also the consciousness, which appears as moving through ignorance, when dissociated from the idea of motion on the disappearance of ignorance, becomes  free from all appearances, as those of birth, etc., and remains unborn and motionless.

Karika, verse 4.49-50
Moreover, when that very fire-brand is in motion, the appearances, straight or crooked, etc., do not come to it from anywhere else outside the fire-brand. Nor do the appearances go elsewhere from the fire-brand when it is motionless. Nor, again, do the appearances, enter into the fire-brand when it is motionless.
Moreover, those appearances do not emerge from the fire-brand as something that comes out of a house. The reason is that appearances are not of the nature of substance. The appearances have no reality. Entrance, etc., can be said of a real thing but not of anything unreal. The appearance of birth, etc., in the case of consciousness is exactly similar, for,  appearances are of the same nature in both the cases.

Karika, verse 4.51-52
How are the two appearances similar? It is thus replied: The fire-brand and Consciousness are alike in all respects. The only special feature of Consciousness is that it always remains immutable. What is the cause of such appearances as birth, etc., in Consciousness which is ever immutable? In  the absence of causality, it is not reasonable to establish the relationship of the producer and the produced (between Consciousness and appearances). The appearances, being illusory, are ever unthinkable. The purport of the whole thing is this: As the fire-brand (which is merely a point) is associated with forms straight, crooked, etc., though, in reality, such crooked or straight forms are ever non-existent, so also, pure Consciousness is associated with the ideas of birth, etc., though such ideas as birth, etc., are ever non-existent. Hence these ideas of birth, etc., associated with Consciousness are illusory.

Karika, verse 4.53
It has already been established that the essence of Self is one  and unborn. Those who imagine causal relation in Atman must admit that substance may be the cause of another substance and that  which is other than substance may be the cause of something else which is also other than substance. But a thing itself cannot be the cause of itself. Further, we do not find in common experience a non-substance which is independently the cause of something. The selves (i.e., the Jivas or beings) can be called neither substance  nor other  than substance. Hence the Jivas or selves cannot be the cause or effect of anything. Therefore Atman, being neither substance nor other than substance, is neither the cause nor the effect of anything.

Karika, verse 4.54
Thus, for  reasons already stated, the mind is verily of the nature of the essence of the Self. External objects are not caused by the mind nor is the mind the product of the external objects. That is because all (external) entities are mere appearances in Consciousness. Thus neither the (so-called) effect comes from the (so-called) cause nor the cause from the effect. In this way is reiterated the absolute non-evolution of causality. In other words, the knowers of Brahman declare the absence of causality with regard to Atman.

Karika, verse 4.55
What happens with regard to those who cling to the belief in cause and effect? In reply, it is said:—As long as there is faith in causality, as long as a man thinks, “I am the agent; these virtuous and vicious deeds belong to me. I shall enjoy the results of these actions, being born in course of time, as some being,” in other words, as long as a man falsely attributes causality to Atman and devotes his mind to it, cause and effect must operate for him; that is to say, the man must without intermission be subject to birth and death, which are the result of his attachment to the belief in causality. But when attachment to causality, due to ignorance, is destroyed by the knowledge of non-duality as described above,—like the destruction of the possession of a ghost through the power of incantation, medicinal herb, etc.—then on account of the wearing away of the illusion of causality, do cause and effect cease to exist.

Karika, verse 4.56
What is the harm if the law of cause and effect continues to operate? In reply we say:—As long as faith in causality is not destroyed by right knowledge, our course (of birth and death) in this world will continue. But when that faith is destroyed (by right knowledge) the world also ceases to exist for want of any other cause for its existence.

Karika, verse 4.57
Objection: Nothing else verily exists except the unborn Atman. Then how can you speak of the origin and destruction of the cause and the effect as well as of (the chain of birth and death constituting) the world?
Reply: Listen. The word Saṃvṛti in the text signifies the (illusory) experiences of the empirical world which are caused by ignorance. All this is born of this power of ignorance which brings into existence the illusory experiences of the world. For this reason, nothing is permanent in the realm of ignorance. Therefore it is said that the world, having the characteristics of origination and destruction, is spread before us (i.e., the ignorant persons). But as one with the Ultimate Reality, all this is nothing but the unborn Atman. Therefore, in the absence of birth, there cannot be any destruction, viz., the destruction of cause or effect.

Karika, verse 4.58
Those, again, who imagine the birth of the Jivas and other entities, do so only through Saṃvṛti or the power of ignorance as stated in the preceding Kārikā. The Jivas are seen to be born only through ignorance. But from the standpoint of the Supreme Reality no such birth is possible. This  (supposed) birth of the Jivas through ignorance, described above, is like the birth of objects through illusion (Maya).

Opponent: Then there must be something real known as Maya or illusion?
Reply: It is not so. That Maya or illusion is never existent. Maya or illusion is the name we give to something which does not (really) exist (but which is perceived).

Karika, verse 4.59
Now, is the birth of Jivas, that are seen to exist, illusory? To this question, our reply is as follows:—From  an illusory mango seed is born a mango sprout which is equally illusory. This sprout  is neither permanent nor destructible, simply because it does not exist. In  the like manner, ideas of birth and death are applied to the Jivas. The purport is that from the standpoint of the Ultimate Reality, neither birth nor death is applicable to Jivas.

Karika, verse 4.60
From the standpoint of the Ultimate Reality, no epithet such as permanence  or impermanence, nor any sound corresponding to such names, can be applied to Jivas (selves or beings) which are eternal, birthless, and which are always of the nature of a homogeneous consciousness. That by which an object is designated is known as “Varṇa” or name associated with a sound. The words fail to denote the nature of Atman. It cannot be discriminated as this or that, permanent or impermanent. The Śruti also says, “Whence words fall back,” etc.

Karika, verse 4.61-62
That pure consciousness which is non-dual (from the standpoint of the Supreme Reality) is sought to be described by words, is due to the active condition of the mind (which is due to Avidya). This description (of the non-dual Atman by words) has no meaning from the standpoint of the Ultimate Truth. These  verses have already been explained.

Karika, verse 4.63
Here is another reason which also shows us that duality describable by words, does not exist. The beings or Jivas, born  of eggs or moisture, which a dreamer going about in all ten directions perceives in his dream condition as existing, (have, as a matter of fact, no existence apart from the mind of the dreamer).
Objection: Suppose we admit this. What are you driving at?
Reply: Our reply is as follows:

Karika, verse 4.64
Those  beings perceived by the mind of the dreamer have no existence outside the mind of the person who dreams about them. It  is the mind alone which imagines itself to have assumed the forms of many diversified beings. Similarly,  that mind of the dreamer is, again, perceived by the dreamer alone. Therefore there is no separate thing called mind which is apart from the dreamer himself.

Karika, verse 4.65-66
The Jivas, perceived in the waking state, do not exist anywhere except in the mind of the perceiver, for, they are not seen independent of the mind. These Jivas are similar to the Jivas, perceived in the dream, which are cognized by the mind of the dreaming person alone. That mind again, having the characteristic of perception of Jivas is non different from the perceiver of the wakings condition, because  it is seen by the perceiver, as  is the case with the mind which perceives the dream. The rest has already been interpreted (in the previous verses).

Karika, verse 4.67
Both the mind and the Jivas,  or in other words, the mind and its modifications (which are seen as external objects) are each an object of perception to the other. In other words, one is perceived only through the other. The mind exists only in relation to the Jiva, etc., and the Jiva and objects exist only in relation to the mind. Therefore they are each an object of perception to the other. Hence  wise men assert that nothing whatsoever, neither the mind nor its object, can be said to have any existence (if either be considered by itself)—(from the standpoint of either the idealist or the realist). As in the dream the elephant as well as the mind that perceives the elephant, are not really existent, so also is the case with the mind and its objects of the waking condition. How is it so? For, both the mind and its objects have no proof of their existence (independent of each other). They are each an object of perception to the other. One cannot cognize a jar without the cognition of a jar; nor can one have a cognition of a jar without a jar. In the case of the jar and the cognition of the jar it is not possible to conceive the distinction between the instrument of knowledge and the object of knowledge.

Karika, verse 4.68-70
The “magician’s Jiva” means that which is conjured up before our vision by the feat of a magician. The “artificial Jiva” is that which is brought into existence by means of incantation, medicinal herb, etc.
As the Jivas born of egg, etc., and created in dream, are seen to come into existence and then to pass away, so also the Jivas such as human beings, etc., seen in the waking state, though really non-existent (appear to come into existence and then pass away). These are merely the imagination of the mind.

Karika, verse 4.71
It has already been stated that the appearances of birth, death, etc., of the Jivas are possible only in the empirical plane, as is the case with the dream-beings. But the Ultimate Truth is that no Jiva is ever born. The rest has already been stated.

Karika, verse 4.72
The whole world of duality consisting of the subject and the object is, verily, an act of the mind. But from the standpoint of the Ultimate Reality, the mind, which is verily Atman, is  unrelated to any object. On account of the absence of relation (with any object), the mind is declared as eternal and unattached. The Śruti also says, “The Puruṣa is always free from relation.” That which perceives objects outside of it, is related to such objects. But the mind, having no such external object, is free from all relations.

Karika, verse 4.73
Objection: It has been said that the mind is free from the relation with any objects, as such objects do not exist. But this non-attachment regarding the mind cannot be maintained inasmuch as objects in the forms of the teacher, the Scripture and the pupil exist.
Reply: There is no such defect in our contention.
Objection: How?
Reply: The  existence of such objects as Scripture, etc., is due to the empirical experience which is illusory. The empirical knowledge in respect of Scripture, teacher and taught is illusory and imagined only as a means to the realisation of the Ultimate Reality. Therefore Scripture, etc., which exist only on the strength of illusory empirical experiences, have no real existence. It has already been said that duality vanishes when the Ultimate Reality is known. Again, the  objects (which appear to come into existence through the illusory experiences), supported by other schools of thought as existent, do not, when analysed from the standpoint of the Ultimate Reality, verily exist. Hence it has been rightly said in the previous Kārikā that the mind is unattached.

Karika, verse 4.74
Objection: If Scriptural teaching, etc., were illusory, then the birthlessness of Atman, as taught by Scripture, is also due to illusory imagination.
Reply: This is, indeed, true. Atman is said to be unborn only in relation to illusory empirical experiences which comprehend ideas of Scripture, teacher and taught. From  the standpoint of the Ultimate Reality, Atman cannot be said to be even unborn. Atman   which is said to be unborn only as against the conclusion of those schools (which maintain that Atman comes into existence), appears to be born to the ignorant. Therefore, the notion (based upon illusion) that Atman is unborn has no bearing on the Ultimate Reality.

Karika, verse 4.75
As objects are, really speaking, non-existent, therefore people who believe in their existence have, in fact, attachment for duality which is unreal. It is a mere belief in the (existence of) objects which (really speaking) do not exist. There is no duality. The cause of birth is this attachment. Therefore one who has realised the unreality of duality is never born again as he is free from the cause (of birth), viz., attachment to the illusory duality.

Karika, verse 4.76
The superior cause consists of those Dharmas (i.e., duties of life), wholly virtuous, which are prescribed according to different castes and stages of life, and which when performed without any attachment to the result, enable one to attain to the position of gods, etc. The middling cause consists of those duties, mixed with certain irreligious practices the observance of which enables one to attain to the position of man, etc. The inferior cause consists of those particular tendencies, characterised by irreligious practices alone, which lead one to the position of lower creatures, such as beasts, birds, etc. When the mind realising the essence of Self which is one and without a second and which is free from all (illusory) imaginations, does not find the existence of any of the causes, superior, inferior or middling, all  imagined through ignorance,—like a man of discrimination not seeing any dirt which a child sees in the sky-then it does not undergo any birth, i.e., it does not objectify itself as god, man or beast, which are the effects of their respective causes (enumerated above). No effect can be produced in the absence of a cause, as sprouts cannot come forth in the absence of the seed.

Karika, verse 4.77
It has already been stated that in the absence of a cause, the mind is not subject to birth. But what is the nature of that non-evolution of the mind? It is thus replied:—The causes of birth are meritorious actions and their opposite. The state of absolute non-manifestation of the mind,—known as liberation (knowledge) and free from causality  on account of the realisation of the Supreme—is  always constant under all conditions and absolute, that is, ever non-dual. Even  before the attainment of knowledge, the mind always remains nonmanifest and non-dual. Even prior to the realisation of the highest knowledge the idea of duality (i.e., the subject and the object) and the idea of birth are merely an objectification of the mind. Hence the non-evolution of the mind which is always  free from change or birth is constant and absolute. In other words, it cannot be said that this non-evolution or liberation sometimes exists and sometimes disappears. It is always the same and changeless. It may be contended from the previous Kārikā that liberation depends upon the external factor of time. This contention is-answered in this verse.

Karika, verse 4.78
Through  the reasoning indicated above, one knows the absence of duality, which is the cause of birth and thus realises absolute non-causation as the Ultimate Truth. Further, he  does not see the reality of anything else as cause, such as religious merit, etc., which may enable one to attain to the position of gods, etc. Thus freeing himself from all desires, he attains to the highest state, i.e., liberation (knowledge) which is free from desire, grief, ignorance and fear. That is to say, he no longer becomes subject to birth and death.

Karika, verse 4.79
Attachment to the unreal (objects) is due to the firm belief that duality exists, though in reality such duality is ever non-existent. On  account of such attachment which is of the nature of delusion caused by ignorance, the mind runs after objects corresponding to those desires. But when a man knows the unreality  of all duality of objects, then he becomes indifferent to them and turns away his mind from the unreal (objects) to which he feels attached.

Karika, verse 4.80
When the mind is withdrawn from all duality of objects, and when it does not attach itself to any objects,—as no objects exist—then the mind attains to the state of immutability which  is of the same nature as Brahman. This realisation of the mind as Brahman is characterised by the mass of unique non-dual consciousness. As that condition of the mind is  known,, (only) by the wise who have known the Ultimate Reality, that state is supreme and undifferentiated, birthless and non-dual.

Karika, verse 4.81
The nature of that which is realisable by the wise is again described:—It (Atman) reveals itself by itself. It does not depend for its revelation upon any external light, such as the sun, etc. Self-luminosity  is its very nature. It is ever-luminous. This is the inherent characteristic of the Dharma, known as Atman.

Karika, verse 4.82
How is it that the people, at large, do not realise Atman, which is the Supreme Reality, though It is again and again thus explained? To this the following reply is given: On account of the mind apprehending through attachment, single objects of the world of duality, the blissful nature of Atman is easily covered. The reason for this concealment is only the perception of duality. There is no other cause for it. Moreover, misery  is brought to the surface. The knowledge of the Supreme Reality is extremely hard to attain. The Lord, the non-dual Atman, the effulgent Being, though again and again taught by the Vedānta Scriptures and the teachers, is not therefore comprehended. The Śruti also says, “One who speaks of Atman is looked upon with wonder and he who has attained and who has realised it, is equally an object of wonder.”

Karika, verse 4.83
Attachment of the learned to such predicates  as existence, non-existence, etc., serves verily as a veil between them and the Supreme Reality. What wonder is there that childish persons on account of their undeveloped intellect are unable to grasp Atman! This Kārikā brings out the aforesaid idea. Some  disputant asserts that Atman exists. Another  disputant, viz., the Buddhist, says that it is non-existent. A third  disputant, the Jaina, who is a pseudo-nihilist, believing in both the existence and non-existence of Self, proclaims that Atman both exist and does not exist. The  absolute nihilist says that nothing exists at all. He  who predicates existence of Atman associates it with changeability in order to make it distinct from such impermanent objects as a jar, etc. The  theory that Atman is non-existent, i.e., inactive, is held on account of its undifferentiated nature. It   is called both existent and non-existent on account of its being subject to both changeability and immutability. Non-existence is predicated of Atman on account of everything ending in absolute negation or void. All the four classes of disputants, mentioned above, asserting existence, non-existence, existence and non-existence, and total non-existence (about Atman), derived respectively from their notion of changeability, immutability, combination of both and total negation, reduce themselves to the position of the childish, devoid of all discrimination; and by associating Atman with all these illusory ideas (Kalpanā) cover Its  real nature. If these (so-called) learned men act as veritable children on account of their ignorance of Ultimate Reality, what is to be said regarding those who are, by nature, unenlightened!

Karika, verse 4.84
What is the nature of the essence, i.e., the Ultimate Reality, by knowing which people are purged of their stupidity and are really made to attain to wisdom?
It is thus replied: There are four alternate theories regarding Atman such as, It exists, It does not exist, etc., mentioned in the works of those who are fond of disputations. The Atman always remains covered and hidden from these vain talkers on account of their attachment to their theories. The thoughtful person who has realised the Atman, known only by the (correct understanding of) Upaniṣads, as ever-untouched by any of the four alternative predicates such as It exists,. It does not exist, etc., is the seer  of all, the omniscient and the real knower of the Ultimate Reality.

Karika, verse 4.85
The  state of the Brāhmaṇa signifies the state in which one is established in Brahman. The Śruti says, “This is the eternal  glory of the Brāhmaṇa.” That state of Brāhmaṇa is free from beginning, end or middle. That is to say, that state of non-duality is free from the (illusory ideas of) creation, preservation and destruction. Having obtained the whole  of omniscience, described  above, i.e., the state of Brāhmaṇa, a non-dual state without beginning, end or middle, which is the same as the realisation of Self, the summum bonum of existence—what else remains for him to be desired? In other words, all other strivings become useless for him. It is thus said in Gītā, “He has nothing to gain by the activities (of the relative world).”

Karika, verse 4.86
The humility of the Brāhmaṇas which is due to their realisation of their identity with the Self, is quite natural. This is (the real significance of) his humility. The tranquillity (of the mind which the Knowers of Brahman enjoy) is also natural and not induced by any artificial means. Brahman is all peace and tranquility. Hence the Brāhmaṇas are said to have controlled their sense-organs (from pursuing the external objects). This is also the cause of the tranquillity of their nature. Having realised Brahman which is, by nature, all-peace the wise man attains to peace which is the characteristic of Brahman. That is to say, he becomes identical with Brahman.

Karika, verse 4.87
We have so far, come to the following conclusions: The theories of mere disputants contradicting one another, are the causes of our existence in the relative (Saṃsāra) world. Further these theories are characterised by partiality and aversion. Therefore these are merely false, as already shown by reasoning. On the other hand the philosophy of Advaita alone gives us true knowledge, as, being free from the four alternative predicates referred to above,—it is untouched by partiality and aversion and is all-peace by its very nature.
Now the following topic is introduced as an explanation of the Vedāntic method of arriving at truth. The word “Savastu” in the text implies objects that are perceived in our empirical experiences. Similarly, the word “Sopalambha” in the text implies the idea of one’s coming in contact with such objects. This constitutes the world of duality, common to all human beings and known as the waking state which is characterised by the subject-object relationship and which alone is the sphere of all our dealings including  the Scriptural, etc. The waking  state, thus characterised, is admitted in the Vedānta Scriptures. There is another state which lacks the experiences (of the waking state) caused by external sense-organs. But  there exists in that state the idea of coming in contact with objects, though such objects are absent. This is admitted (in the Vedāntas) as the dream state, which is again common to all, and different from and subtler than the gross state of waking.

Karika, verse 4.88-89
The state in which one neither perceives any object  nor possesses the idea  of coming in contact with such object—a state free from the relationship of subject and object—is called the highest state, which is beyond all empirical experiences. All empirical experiences consist of the subject-object relationship. This state is free from all such relationship and is the seed of future experiences. This  is known as the state of deep sleep. That alone is called knowledge? which is the realisation of essence, i.e., the Supreme Reality, as well as the means to do so, viz., the analysis of the states of gross experience, subtle experience and the condition beyond all experiences. The  three states, mentioned above, are the objects of knowledge; for, there cannot be anything knowable besides these three states. All entities falsely imagined by the different schools of the disputants are included in these three states. That which is to be ultimately known is the truth regarding the Supreme Reality, known as Turīya, i.e., the knowledge of Self, non-dual and Unborn. The illumined ones, i.e., those who have seen the Supreme Reality have described these features (topics) ranging from the, objects of gross experience to the Supremely Knowable Self.
The word Jnanam signifies knowledge by which one grasps the significance of the three states. The word “Jneya” or knowable, signifies the three states which should be known. The first (knowable) consists of the gross stated of empirical experience. Then comes the state of subtle  experience in which the first state loses itself, i.e., merges. And last comes deep sleep which is beyond all empirical experiences (gross or subtle) which results in the absemce of the two previous states, i.e., i n which the two previous states merge. By the knowledge of these three, one after  the other, and consequently, by the negation of the three states the Turīya,  non-dual, birthless and fearless, which alone is the Supreme Reality, is realised. Thus the knower (possessed of the highest power of discrimination) attains in this  very life the state of omniscience  which is identical with the knowledge of Self. He is called Mahādhīḥ   or the man of the highest intellect as he has understood that which transcends all human experiences. His omniscience is constant and remains undiminished. For, the knowledge of Self once realised remains as such for ever. This is  because the knowledge of the knower of the Supreme Reality does not appear and disappear like that of mere vain disputants. The scriptural statements that the Atman being known, everything else is known, is explained in the Kārikā.

Karika, verse 4.90
There may arise a doubt that the three states of empirical experience may constitute the Ultimate Reality on account of their being pointed out  as things to be gradually known. In order to remove this doubt it is said, the “Heyas” or things to be avoided are the three states of empirical experience, viz., the waking, the dream and the deep sleep. These do not exist in Atman just as the snake is not present in the rope. Therefore they should be avoided. The word Jñeya, i.e., the thing to be known, in this text refers to the knowledge of the Ultimate Reality, free from the four  alternative theories described before. The things to be acquired are the accessories of spiritual realisation, viz., wisdom, childlike  innocence and silence.  These virtues are practised by the sages after they have renounced the threefold  desires. The word “Pākyāni” in the text signifies the latent  impressions which in due course attain maturity, viz., such blemishes as attachment, aversion, delusion, etc. These are known as Kaṣāya or the passions that hide the real nature of the soul. As  a means to their realisation of the Supreme Reality, sages should first of all be acquainted with these four things, viz., the thing to be avoided, the thing to be realised, the thing to be acquired and the thing to be rendered ineffective. These, however, with the exception of the thing to be known—that is to say, with the exception of the non-dual Brahman alone, the essence of the Ultimate Reality, that should be realised—are perceived  on account of our imagination. This is the conclusion of the Knowers of Brahman with regard to the three things, viz., those to be avoided, acquired, and those that are (awaiting maturity and therefore) to be made ineffective. In other words, these three do not exist from the standpoint of the Ultimate Reality.

Karika, verse 4.91
Those who seek liberation should regard, from the standpoint of the Ultimate Reality, all Jivas, as by their very nature without beginning, i.e., eternal, and, like Ākāśa, subtle, free from all blemish and all-pervading. The plural number used with regard to the ‘Jivas’ may suggest multiplicity. The second line of the Kārikā is meant to remove  any such apprehension. There is no multiplicity in the Jivas even  in the slightest degree and under any condition.

Karika, verse 4.92
Even the knowableness attributed to the Jivas is also due to the illusion of empirical experiences. It cannot be applied from the standpoint of the Supreme Reality. This idea is explained in this text. The Jivas are illumined, by their very nature, from the very beginning. That is to say, all the Jivas, like the sun which is of the very nature of eternal light, are ever illumined. No effort need be made to define their nature, as the nature of the Jiva is, from the very beginning, well determined.  It cannot be subject to any such doubt as, “The Jiva may be like this or like that”. The seeker of liberation who in the manner above described, does not stand in need of anything else to make this knowledge certain to himself or others,—just as the sun, by nature ever illumined, is never in need of any light from itself or others—who thus always rests  without forming ideas of duality regarding any further knowledge of his own self, becomes capable of realising the Ultimate Reality.

Karika, verse 4.93
Similarly, there is no room for any effort to make Atman peaceful, for, all Jivas are, by their very nature, eternally peaceful, unborn and of the nature of eternal freedom. All Jivas are further of the same nature and norf-separate from one another. They being Atman in their very essence, ever pure, unborn and established in sameness, therefore the effort of attaining to liberation is meaningless. For, if something is accomplished with regard to an entity which is always of the same nature, it does not make any change in the thing itself.

Karika, verse 4.94
Those who have realised the truth regarding the Ultimate Reality as described above, are alone free from narrowness. Others are verily narrow-minded. This is thus described in this verse. “Drowned in the idea of separation” means those who stick to the idea of separation, that is to say, those who confine themselves to the multiplicity of phenomenal experiences. Who are they? They are those who assert that the multiplicity of objects exists, i.e., the dualists. They are called “narrowminded” as they never realise the natural purity of Atman on account of their ever-dwelling on the thought of multiplicity, i.e., on account of their taking as real the duality of experiences imagined through ignorance. Therefore it has been truly said that these people are narrow-minded.

Karika, verse 4.95
That this knowledge of the Supreme Reality is incapable of being understood by the poor intellect, by the unwise,  i.e., by persons of small intellect who are outside the knowledge of Vedanta,—is thus explained in this verse. Those few, even though  they may be women or others, who are firm in their conviction of the nature of Ultimate Reality, unborn and undivided, are alone possessors of the highest wisdom. They alone know the essence of Reality. Others, i.e., persons of ordinary, intellect, cannot understand their ways, that is to say, the Supreme Reality realised by the wise. It is said in the Smṛti:—“Even the gods  feel puzzled while trying to follow in the footsteps of those who leave no track behind, of those who realise themselves in all beings and who are always devoted to the welfare of all. They? leave  no track behind like the birds flying through the sky.”

Karika, verse 4.96
What constitutes the highest Wisdom (i.e., the wisdom of the knower of the non-dual Atman)? This is thus explained: Knowledge which constitutes the essence of the Dhūrmas (Jivas), unborn, immutable and identical with Atman, is also admitted to be unborn and immutable. It is just like the light and the heat belonging to the sun. Knowledge, being ever unrelated to other  objects, is said to be unborn. As knowledge is, thus, unrelated to other objects, it is like the Ākāśa, called unconditioned or absolute.

Karika, verse 4.97
If persons, through ignorance, think,—as those who differ from us assert—that an entity (i.e., Jiva or Atman) does undergo the slightest change, either subjectively or objectively, then such ignorant persons can never realise the ever-unrelatedness (of Atman).  Therefore  it goes without saying that there cannot be any destruction of bondage (that is supposed to keep the Jiva bound to the world).

Karika, verse 4.98
Objection: It has been stated in the previous Kārikā that (according to the view of the ignorant) the destruction of the veil covering the real nature of Atman is not possible. This is a (tacit) admission by the Vedāntist that the (real) nature of the Jivas is covered by a veil.
Reply: It  is not so. The Jivas   are never subject to any veil or bondage imposed by ignorance. That is to say, they are ever free from any bondage (which does not at all exist). They are pure by nature; illumined and free from the very beginning as it is said that they are of the nature of eternal purity, knowledge and freedom. If so, why are Jivas described as capable of knowing (the Ultimate Reality) by teachers who are competent to know the Truth, i.e., those who are endowed with the power of discrimination? The reply is that it  is like speaking about the sun as shining though the very nature of the sun is all-light, or speaking about the hill, which is ever free from any motion, as always standing.

Karika, verse 4.99
The knowledge of the wise man, that is to say, of the one who has attained to the Supreme Reality, is ever unrelated to other  objects or Jivas. This knowledge is always centred in or is identical with Jiva (i.e., Atman) like the sun and its light. The word “Tāyee”, “All-light”, in the text signifies that which is all-pervasive like Ākāśa or, it may mean that which is adorable or allknowledge. All entities, i.e., Jivas (beings like so many Atmans) are as unattached as the Ākāśa, and ever-un-related to anything else. Knowledge (Jnana) which has been compared to Ākāśa in the beginning  of this chapter is non-different from the knowledge of the wise one who is all-light. Therefore the Ākāśa like knowledge of the wise does not relate itself to any other object. This is also the essence of the Dharmas or all entities. The essence of all the entities is the essence of Brahman, and is, like Ākāśa, immutable, changeless, free from parts, permanent, one and without a second, unattached, non-cognizable, unthinkable and beyond hunger and thirst. The Śruti also says, “The knowledge (characteristic) of the seer is never absent.” This knowledge regarding the Ultimate Reality, non-dual and characterised by the absence of perceiver, perception and the perceived, is not the same as that declared by the Buddha.  The view  of the Buddha, which rejects the existence of external objects and asserts the existence of ideas alone, is said to be similar to or very near the truth of non-dual Atman. But this knowledge of non-duality which is the Ultimate Reality can be attained through Vedanta alone.

Karika, verse 4.100
The treatise is now completed. This Salutation is made with a view to extol the knowledge of the Supreme Reality. It  is extremely difficult to understand it. In other words, it is difficult of comprehension as it is not related to any of the four  possible predicates, such as existence, non-existence, etc. It is profound, that is, very deep like a great ocean. People  devoid of discrimination cannot fathom it. This knowledge (Jnana) is, further, birthless, always the same and all-light. Having attained this knowledge which is free from multiplicity, having  become one with it, we salute it. Though  this absolute knowledge cannot be subjected to any relative treatment (such as, Salutation, etc.) yet we view it from the relative standpoint and adore it to  the best of our ability.

The Concluding Salutation by Shri Shankaracharya

1. I bow to that Brahman, the destroyer of all fear of those who take shelter under It,—which, though unborn, appears to be associated with birth through Its (inscrutable and indescribable) power (of knowledge and activity); which, though ever at rest, appears to be moving; and which, though non-dual, appears to have assumed multifarious forms to those whose vision is deluded by the perception of endless objects and their attributes.
2. I prostrate to the feet of that Great Teacher, the most adored among the adorable, who,—out of sheer compassion for the beings drowned in the deep ocean of the world, infested with the terrible sharks of incessant births (and deaths),—rescued, for the benefit of all, this nectar, hardly obtainable even by the gods, from the innermost depths of the ocean of the Vedas by churning it with the (churning) rod of his illumined reason.
3. I make obeisance with my whole being to those holy feet—the dispellers of the fear of this chain of births and deaths—of my great teacher who, through the light of his illumined reason, destroyed the darkness of delusion enveloping my mind; who destroyed for ever my (notions of) appearance and disappearance in this terrible ocean of innumerable births and deaths; and who makes all others also that take shelter at his feet, attain to the unfailing knowledge of Scriptures, peace and the state of perfect non-differentiation.

Aum Peace! Peace! Peace!
Karika, verse 3.1
While determining the meaning of Aum, it has been stated in the form of a proposition that “Atman is the negation of phenomena, blissful and non-dual.” It has been further stated that “Duality does not exist when the reality is known.” Further, in the chapter on Illusion, that duality does not exist really has been established by the illustrations of dream, magic, castle-in-the-air, etc., and also by reasoning on the grounds of “the capability of being seen” and “the being finite,” etc. Now it is asked whether non-duality can be established only by scriptural evidence or whether it can be proved by reasoning as well. It is said in reply that it is possible to establish non-duality by reasoning  as well. How is it possible? This is shown in this chapter on Advaita. It has been demonstrated in the last chapter that the entire realm of dualism including the object and the act of devotion is illusory,  and the attributeless, non-dual Atman alone is the Reality. The word “upāsanāŚrīta” in the text, meaning the one  betaking himself to devotion, signifies him who has recourse to devotional exercises as means to the attainment of liberation and who further thinks that he is the devotee and Brahman is his object of worship. This Jiva or the embodied being further thinks that through devotional practices he, at present related to the evolved  Brahman (Personal God), would attain to the ultimate Brahman after the dissolution of the body. Prior  to the manifestation, according to this Jiva, everything including itself, was unborn. In other words he thinks, “I shall, through devotional practices, regain that which was my real nature before manifestation, though at present I subsist in the Brahman that appears in the form of the manifold.” Such a Jiva, that is, the aspirant, betaking itself to devotion, inasmuch as it knows only a partial aspect of Brahman, is called of narrow  or poor intellect by those who regard Brahman as eternal  and unchanging. The Upaniṣad of the Talavakāra (Kena) supports this view in such statements as, “That which is not expressed (indicated) by speech and by which speech is expressed, That alone know as Brahman and not that which people here adore,” etc.

Karika, verse 3.2
One unable to realise Atman, which is both within and without and birthless, and therefore believing oneself to be helpless through Avidya, thinks, “I am born, I subsist in the Brahman with attributes (saguṇa) and through devotion to It I shall become Brahman,” and thus becomes Kripaṇa (narrow-minded). Therefore, I shall describe Brahman which has never been subject to any limitation and which is birthless (changeless). The narrowness of mind has been described in such Śruti passages as, “When one sees another, hears another, knows another, then there is limitedness (littleness), mortality and unreality,” “Modification is only a name arising from speech, but the truth is that all is clay,” etc. But contrary to it is Brahman known as Bhumā (great) which is both within and without and which is free from all limitations. I shall now describe that Brahman, free from all limitations, by realising which one gets rid of all narrowness superimposed by ignorance. It (Brahman) is called Ajāti, birthless, inasmuch as none knows its birth or cause. It is the same always and everywhere. How is it so? It is so because there does not exist in it (Brahman) any inequality caused by the presence of parts or limbs. For, only that which is with parts may be said to be born (or to have taken new form) by a change of its parts. But as Atman is without parts, it is always the same and even, that is to say, it does not manifest itself in any new form through a change of the parts. Therefore it is without birth and free from limitation. Now listen as to how  Brahman is not born, how it does not undergo change by so much as a jot, but ever remains unborn, though it appears, through ignorance, to be born and to give birth to others, like the rope  and the snake.

Karika, verse 3.3
It has been said in the previous text, “I shall now describe Brahman, birthless and free from all narrowness.” Now I shall give an illustration and a reason to substantiate the proposition. As the Supreme Atman is like the Ākāśa, subtle, without parts and all-pervasive, it is compared to the Ākāśa. The Supreme Self again, who is likened to the Ākāśa, is said to be manifested as the embodied beings (Jivas) or Kṣetrajñas (Knowers of bodies), and are likened to the Ghaṭākāśas or the Ākāśa enclosed in jars. This is the Supreme Self which is like the Ākāśa. Or the sentence may be explained thus:—As the totality of the Ākāśa enclosed within the pots is said to constitute what is known as the Mahākāśa or the great expanse of ether, similarly the totality of the embodied beings (Jivas) constitutes the Supreme Being. The creation or manifestation of the Jivas (embodied beings) from the Supreme Self, as stated in the Vedānta, is like the creation or manifestation of the Ghaṭākāśa (i.e., the ether enclosed in a jar) from the Mahākāśa (or the great and undifferentiated ether). That is to say, creation or manifestation is not  real. As  from that Ākāśa are produced such physical objects as the pot, etc., similarly from the Supreme Self which is like the Ākāśa, are produced the entire aggregate of material entities, such as the earth, etc., as well as the individual bodies, all  characterised by causality, the entire  production being nothing but mere imagination like that of the snake in the rope. Therefore it is said, “The aggregates (of the gross bodies) are produced like the pot, etc.” When  the Śruti, with a view to the enlightenment of the ignorant, speaks of the creation or manifestation (of the Jivas) from the Atman, then such manifestation, being admitted as a fact, is explained with the help of the illustration of the creation of the pot, etc., from the Ākāśa.

Karika, verse 3.4
As the creation of ether enclosed within the pot, etc., follows the creation of the pot, etc., and as the merging of the same ether (in the Mahākāśa) is consequent on the destruction of the pot, etc.; in the same manner the creation or manifestation of the Jiva follows that of the aggregate of the body, etc., and the merging of the Jiva in the Supreme Self follows in the wake of the destruction of the aggregate of the body, etc. The meaning is that neither the creation nor destruction is in itself real (from the standpoint of the Absolute).

Karika, verse 3.5
The dualists contend that if one Atman exists in all bodies then the birth, death, happiness, etc., of one Atman (as Jiva) must affect all and, further, there  must follow a confusion regarding the results of the action (done by individuals). This contention is,thus refuted:—As  the Ākāśa enclosed within one jar being soiled by dust, smoke, etc., does not make the Ākāśa enclosed in other jars soiled with the dust and the  smoke, so all created beings are not affected by the happiness, etc. (of one Jiva).

Objection: Is it not your contention that there is only one Atman?
Reply: Yes, we admit it. Have you not heard that there is only one Atman like the all-pervading space, in all bodies?
Objection: If  there be only one Atman then it must always and everywhere feel misery and happiness.
Reply: This objection cannot be raised by the Sāṃkhyas. For,  the Sāṃkhyas do not admit that misery, happiness, etc., ever cling to the Atman; for they assert that happiness, misery, etc., belong inseparably to Buddhi.  Further, there is no evidence for imagining multiplicity of Atman which is of the very nature of knowledge.
Objection: In the absence of the multiplicity of Atman the theory that the Pradhāna or Prakṛti acts for the sake of others  does not hold good.
Reply: No, this argument is not valid; for whatever the Pradhāna or Prakṛti may be supposed to accomplish by itself for another cannot inseparably inhere in Atman. If bondage  and liberation accomplished by the Pradhāna inseparably inhered in the multiple Puruṣas, then the theory that the Pradhāna (Prakṛti) always acts for the sake of others would not be consistent with the unity of Atman existing everywhere. And the theory of the Sāṃkhyas regarding the multiplicity of Atman would be reasonable. But the Sāṃkhyas do not admit that the purpose of bondage or liberation can ever be inseparably associated with the Puruṣa. For, they admit that the Puruṣas are attributeless and are centres of Pure Consciousness. Therefore,  the very existence of the Puruṣa is their support for the theory that the action of Pradhāna is directed to serve the purpose of others (the Puruṣas). But the supposition of the multiplicity of Puruṣas need not be made for this purpose. Therefore the theory of the Pradhāna seeking to serve the purpose of others cannot be an argument for the supposition of the multiplicity of Atman. The Sāṃkhyas have no other argument in support of their supposition regarding the multiplicity of Atman. The Pradhāna takes upon itself bondage and liberation only through the instrumentality of the existence of the other (the Puruṣa). The Puruṣa which is of the very nature of knowledge, is the cause of the activity of the Pradhāna by the fact of its very existence and not on account of its any specific qualities. So it is through ignorance alone that people imagine the Puruṣa (Atman) to be many and also thereby give up the real  import of the Vedas.
The Vaiśeṣikas and others assert that attributes such as desire, etc., are inseparably related to Atman. This  view is also not correct. For, the Samskāras (the impressions) which are the cause of memory cannot have any inseparable relation with Atman which has no  parts. Further, if  it be contended that the origin of memory lies in the contact of Atman with the mind, we say that this contention is not valid; for, in that case there will be no principle regarding memory. Memory of all things will come simultaneously. Besides  mind can never be related to the Atman which is devoid of all sensations such as touch, etc., and which belongs to a class other than that of the mind. Further the Vaiśeṣikas do not admit that the attributes (Guṇa) such as forms, etc. (Rūpas), action (Karma), generality (Sāmānya), particularity (Viśeṣa) and inherence (Samavāya), can exist independently of the substance (Dravya). If these are totally independent of one another, the contact between the Atman and desire, etc., and also between the attributes (Guṇa) and the substance (Dravya) will be an absurdity.

Objection: The contact characterised by an inseparable inherence is possible in the case of entities where such relation is proved to be innate.
Reply: This  objection is not valid; for such innate relationship cannot be reasonable, as the Atman, the ever permanent, is antecedent to the desires, etc., which are transitory. And if desires, etc., be admitted to have inseparable innate relationship with Atman, then  the former would be as permanent as such innate attributes of Atman as greatness, etc. That is not desirable, for then there would be no room for liberation of the Atman. Further, if inseparable relationship (Samavāya) were something separate from the substance, then another factor must be stated which can bring about the relationship between Samavāya and the substance,—as in the case of the substance and the attributes. Nor can it be stated that Samavāya is a constant inseparable relationship with Atman; for, in that case, the Atman and Samavāya on account of their constant and inseparable relationship can never be different from one another. If, on the other hand, the relationship of Samavāya be totally different from the Atman, and the attributes also be different from the substance, then the possessive case cannot be used to indicate their mutual relation which is possible only when the two terms connected by the possessive are not totally different. If Atman be inseparably connected with such categories as desires, etc., which have both “beginning” and “end,” then it would itself be impermanent. If Atman be considered to have parts and undergo changes, like the body, etc., then, these two defects always associated with the body, etc., would be inevitable in the case of the Atman. (Therefore the conclusion is that) as the Ākāśa (ether), on account of the superimposition of ignorance (Avidya), is regarded as soiled by dust and smoke, in like manner, the Atman also, on account of the limiting condition of the mind caused by the erroneous attribution of Avidya, appears to be associated with the contamination of misery, happiness, etc. And such being the case, the idea of bondage and liberation, being empirical in nature, does not contradict (the permanent nature of Atman from the standpoint of Truth). For, all the disputants admit the relative experience to be caused by Avidya and deny its existence from the standpoint of the Supreme Reality. Hence it follows that the supposition of the multiplicity of Atman made by the logicians is without basis and superfluous.

Karika, verse 3.6
Objection: If Atman be one then how is it possible to justify the variety of experiences pointing to the multiplicity of Atman (which is explained as being) due to Avidya (ignorance)?
Reply: This is thus explained: In our common experience with regard to this Ākāśa (which is really one), we find variety of forms, such as large, small, etc., in respect of the Ākāśa enclosed in a pot, a water-bowl and a cover. Similarly there are various functions (of the same Ākāśa) such as fetching water, preserving water and sleeping. Lastly there are various names as the ether enclosed in a jar (ghaṭa). the ether enclosed in a water-bowl (karaka), etc., caused by different upadhis. All these different forms, functions and names are matters of common experience. This variety of experience caused by different forms, etc., is not true from, the standpoint of the ultimate Reality. For, in reality Ākāśa. never admits of any variety. Our empirical activities based upon the difference in Ākāśa are not possible without the instrumentality of an adventitious upadhi.  As in this illustration, the Jivas (embodied beings) which may be compared to the Ākāśa enclosed in a jar, are regarded as different, this difference  being caused by the upadhis. This is the conclusion of the wise. This text gives one of the explanations of the empirical world as stated by the wise.

Karika, verse 3.7
Objection: Our experience of the variety of forms, functions, etc., associated with the ether enclosed in the pot, etc., is true from the standpoint of the ultimate Reality (and not illusory, as you say).
Reply: No, this  cannot be so. For, the ether enclosed in the pot cannot be the evolved effect of the real ether in the same way as the ornament,  etc., are the effect of gold or the foam, bubble, moisture, etc., are the effect of water. Nor, again is the Ghaṭākāśa (the Ākāśa in the pot) similar to the branches and other parts of a tree. As Ghaṭākāśa is neither a part (limb) nor an evolved effect of the Ākāśa, so also the Jiva (the embodied being), compared to the Ākāśa enclosed in the pot, is neither, as in the illustrations given above, an effect nor part (limb) of the Atman, the ultimate Reality, which may be compared to the Mahākāśa (i.e., the undifferentiated expanse of ether). Therefore the relative experience based upon the multiplicity of Atman is an illusion (from the standpoint of the ultimate Reality).

Karika, verse 3.8
As  the diversity of experiences such as forms, functions, etc., is caused by the admitted differences of the Ghaṭākāśa, etc., so also is the experience of birth, death, etc., consequent on the perception of the different Jivas, due to the limitations caused by Avidya (ignorance). Therefore the contamination of misery, action and result (of action) caused by Avidya does not really inhere in the Atman. In order to establish this meaning by an illustration, the text says:—As in our ordinary experience it is found that the ignorant regard the Ākāśa (ether),—which, to those who know, the real nature of a thing by discrimination, is never soiled by any contamination—as soiled with cloud, dust and smoke, so also the Supreme Atman, the Knower, the innermost Self directly perceived within, is regarded by those who do not know the real nature of the innermost Self, as affected by the evils of misery, action and result. But this is not the case with those who can discriminate. As in the desert are never found foam,  waves, etc., though thirsty creatures falsely attribute these things to it, similarly the Atman also is never affected by the turbidity of misery,  etc., falsely attributed to it by the ignorant.

Karika, verse 3.9
The point which has been just stated is again thus developed:—Birth, death, etc., of the Atman as seen in all bodies is like the creation, destruction, coming, going and existence of the Ghaṭākāśa (or ether enclosed within a jar).

Karika, verse 3.10
The aggregates of body, etc., answering to the pots, etc., in the illustration, are produced,—like the body, etc., seen in dream or conjured up by the magician—by the illusion  of the Atman, i.e., the Avidya (ignorance) which is in the perceiver. That  is to say, they do not exist from the standpoint of the ultimate Reality. If it be argued, in order to establish their reality, that there is a superiority (among the created beings),—as in the case of the aggregates of cause and effect constituting gods who are superior to lower beings, such as birds and beasts—or that there is an equality (of all created beings), yet no cause  can be set forth regarding their creation or reality. As there is no cause therefore all these are due to Avidya or ignorance; they have no real existence.

Karika, verse 3.11
Now statements are made in order to show that the existence of the essence of Atman which is non-dual and without birth, etc., can  as well be proved on the evidence of the Śruti. Rasa, etc., are the five  sheaths such as the physical sheath (Annarasamaya), the vital sheath (Pranamaya), etc. These are called “sheaths” (Kośa) because they  are like the sheath of the sword, the previous  sheaths being outer than the following ones. These have been clearly explained in the Taittirīyaka, i.e., in a chapter of the Taittirīyaka-śākhā Upaniṣad. It is the Self (Atman) of these sheaths. By It, the innermost Self, the five sheaths are regarded as alive. It is again called Jiva as it is the cause of the life of all. What is It? It is the Supreme Self which has ' been described before as “Brahman which is Existence, Knowledge and Infinity.” It has been further stated that from this Atman the aggregates of the body known as Rasa, etc., having the characteristics of the sheath, have  been created by its (Atman’s) power called ignorance, this creation being like the illusory creation of objects seen in a dream or in a performance of jugglery. We have described this Atman as the ether (Ākāśa) in the text, “The Atman is verily like the Ākāśa” (Gauḍapada Kārikā, 3. 3). This Atman cannot be established by the reasoning  of a man who follows the logician’s method of arguments as the Atman referred to by us is different from the Atman of the logicians.

Karika, verse 3.12
Moreover, in the words  “All this is the Supreme Atman, the Brahman, the bright, the immortal Person who is both the celestial (superphysical—Adhidaiva) and the corporeal (Adhyātma), who is in this earth as well as the Knower incorporated in the body,”—Brahman alone is described in order to indicate the limit at which duality vanishes. Where does this occur? It is thus replied:—It occurs in the Madhu Brāhmaṇa chapter which is known as the chapter dealing with the Knowledge of Brahman. It is because therein is described the nectar (i.e., immortality) which is known as Madhu, i.e., honey, as it gives us the highest bliss. This Brahman is like the Ākāśa which is said to be the same or identical though separately indicated as existing in the earth and in the stomach.

Karika, verse 3.13
The Śāstras   as well as the sages like Vyāsa, etc., extol the identity of Jiva and the Supreme Self through the negation of all differences—the conclusion arrived at by reasoning and supported by the scriptures. Further, the experiences of multiplicity which are natural (to the ignorant) and common to all beings—the view propounded by those who do not understand the real import of the Śāstras and who indulge in futile reasoning—have been condemned  thus: “But there is certainly nothing corresponding to the dual existence,” “Fear arises from the consciousness of duality,” “If he sees the slightest difference (in Atman) then he is overcome with fear,” “All this is verily Atman, “He goes from death to death who sees here (in this Atman) multiplicity.” Other Knowers of Brahman as well as the scriptures (quoted above) extol identity (of Jiva and Brahman) and condemn multiplicity. Thus alone this praise and condemnation can easily be comprehended; in other words, it accords with reason. But the false views (vainly) advanced by the logicians,  not easy of comprehension, cannot be accepted as facts (Truth).

Karika, verse 3.14
Objection: Even the Śruti has already declared the separateness of the Jiva and the Supreme Self in that part of the Upaniṣad which describes the creation (of the universe), i.e., in the ritual portion (Karmakāṇḍa) of the Vedas. The texts of the Karma - kāṇḍa, referred to here, describe the Supreme Puruṣa who had multiple desire, in such words as, “desirous of this,” “desirous of that,” “He,  the Highest, supported the heaven and the earth,” etc. This being the case, how is it possible, when there is a conflict between the knowledge portion and the ritual portion of the Vedas, to conclude that the unity underlying the meaning of the knowledge portion (of the Vedas) is alone reasonable and accurate?
Reply: Our reply is as follows: The seperateness (of Jiva and ParamAtman) described in the Karma - kāṇḍa (ritual portion of the Vedas)—anterior to such Upaniṣadic statements dealing with the creation of the universe as “That from which all these beings emanate,” “As small sparks (come out) from fire,” “The Ākāśa has evolved from that which is this Atman,” “It created heat”—is not real from the absolute.standpoint.

Objection: What is it then?
Reply: It has only a secondary meaning. The separateness (between Jiva and ParamAtman implied in these passages) is like that between the undifferentiated  ether (Mahākāśa) and the ether enclosed in the jar (Ghaṭākāśa). This statement is made with reference to a future  happening as in the case of another statement we often make, “He is cooking rice.” For, the words describing separateness (of Jiva and ParamAtman) can never reasonably uphold such separateness as absolutely real, as the statements regarding the separateness of Atman only reiterate the multiple experiences of those beings who are still under the spell of their inborn  Avidya or ignorance. Here  in the Upaniṣads, the texts regarding the creation, destruction, etc., of the universe are meant only to establish the identity of Jiva and the Supreme Self, as is known from the texts, “That thou art,” “He does not know who knows I am another and he is another”. In other words, in the Upaniṣads the purpose of the Śruti is to establish the identity (of Jiva and Brahman). Keeping in view this identity which is going to be established later on, the (dualistic) texts only reiterate the common  experience of multiplicity (due to ignorance). Therefore these (dualistic) texts are only metaphorical. Or, the Kārikā may be explained thus:—The scriptural text, “He is one and without a second,” declares the (complete) identity of Jiva and Brahman even before creation, denoted by such passages as, “He saw,” “He created fire,” etc. The culmination is, again, that identity as is known from such Śruti passages as, “That is the Reality; He is the Atman. That thou art”. Now, if keeping in view this future identity, the separateness of Jiva and Atman has been declared in some texts, it must have been used in a metaphorical way as is the case with the statement “He is cooking rice”.

Karika, verse 3.15
Objection: Before  creation all this might have been unborn, one and non-dual; but after creation, all this evolved world and the embodied beings (Jivas) denote multiplicity.
Reply: No, it cannot be so. For, the scriptural passages dealing with creation have another meaning. This difficulty raised here has already been solved by the statements that  the aggregates (entities) of body, etc., like dream-objects, are produced through illusion of the subject (Atman) and that creation and the differences of the Jivas are like the creation and the differences of the Ghaṭākāśas, i.e., the bits of Ākāśa enclosed in different jars. The scriptural  statements dealing with creation and differences (of the created beings), have again been referred to here in order to show that such statements regarding creation have the purpose of determining the unity of Jiva and Brahman. The  (theory of) creation has been described in the scripture through the illustrations of earth, iron, sparks, etc., or otherwise; but all these modes of creation are meant for enlightening our intellect so that it may comprehend the identity of Jiva and Brahman. It is just like the story  of the organs of speech (vāk), etc., being smitten with evil by the Asuras (demons) as described in the chapter on Prana (vital breath), where the real purpose of the Śruti is to demonstrate the special importance of Prana.

Objection: We  do not accept this meaning as indicated.
Reply: Your contention is not correct. For  this story about Prana, etc., has been differently narrated in different recensions of the Vedas. If the story of Prana were literally true, there should have been one version only in all recensions. Different versions of contradictory nature would not have been narrated. But we do come across such different versions in the Vedas. Therefore the scriptural passages recording stories of Prana are not meant to serve any purpose of their own, i.e., they should not be taken literally. The scriptural statements regarding creation should also be understood in a similar manner.
Objection: There have been different creations in different cycles. Therefore, the scriptural statements regarding creations (of the universe) and stories (of Prana) are different as they refer to the Creations in different cycles.
Reply: This contention is not valid. For, they (the illustrations of earth, iron, etc., as well as the stories of Prana) serve no other useful purpose than clearing our intellect as stated above. No one can imagine any other utility of the scriptural statements regarding creation and Prana.
Objection: We  contend that these are for the purpose of meditation so that one may ultimately attain to that end.
Reply: This is not correct either; for no one desires to attain his identity with the dispute (in the case of the Prana narrative), or with the creation or destruction (in the case of the scriptural statements regarding creation, etc.). Therefore we have reasonably to conclude that the scriptural statements regarding creation, etc., are for the purpose of helping the mind to realise the oneness of Atman, and for no other purpose whatsoever. Therefore, no multiplicity is brought about by creation, etc.

Karika, verse 3.16
Objection: If according to such Śruti passages as “Atman is one and without a second”, etc., the Atman alone, the one, the eternally pure, illumined and free, is the highest and the ultimate Reality and all else is unreal, what then is the purpose of the devotion and spiritual practices implied in such Śruti   passages as “Oh dear, Atman alone is to be seen”, “The Atman who is free from”, “He desired”, “It should be worshipped as Atman”, etc.? Further, what is the utility of Karma (Vedic works) like Agnihotra, etc.?
Reply: Yes, listen to the reasons. Āśrama signifies those who are competent to follow the disciplines of life as prescribed for the different stages.  The word (in the text) also includes those who belong to the (different) castes  and therefore who observe the rites (prescribed for those castes). The application of the word “Āśrama” implies that these castes are also three in number. How? It is because they are endowed with three kinds of intellect, viz., low,  middle  and high.  This discipline as well as the (various) Karmas (works) are prescribed for the Āśramis of low and average intellect, by the Śruti, out of compassion, so that they also, following the correct disciplines, may attain to the superior knowledge. That  this discipline is not for those who possess the right understanding, i.e., who are already endowed with the Knowledge of Atman which is one and without a second, is supported by such Śruíi passages as “That which cannot be known by the mind, but by which, they say, the mind is able to think, that alone know to be Brahman, and not that which people here adore”, “That thou art”, “All this is verily Atman”, etc.
In the previous Kārikās it has been proved that the Scriptural statements regarding creation, etc., do not conflict with the nondual Atman. This Kārikā states that the prescription of various disciplines associated with different Varṇas and Āśramas also does not contradict the view of the non-dual Atman. The statements regarding creation, etc., as well as the various spiritual disciplines are only meant for the unenlightened in order to assist them to understand the oneness of Atman.

Karika, verse 3.17
The knowledge of the non-dual Self is established by both Scriptures and reasoning. Therefore, it is alone the perfect knowledge. Other views, on account of their being devoid of the bases of Scriptures and reasoning, lead to false systems. The views of the dualists are false on account of this additional reason, that they are the fruitful sources of the vices of attachment and hatred, etc. How is this? The dualists following the views of Kapila, Kanāda, Buddha and Jina, etc., hold firmly to the conclusions as outlined and formulated by their respective schools. They  think that the view they hold is alone the ultimate Reality, whereas other views are not so. Therefore they become attached to their own views and hate others whom they consider to be opposed to them. Thus being overcome with attachment and hatred, they contradict one another, the reason being the adherence to their own convictions as the only truth. But our view, viz., the unity of Atman, based upon the identity of all, supported by the Vedas, does not conflict with others who find contradictions among themselves,—as  one’s limbs such as hands, feet, etc., do not conflict with one another. Hence the purport of the Śruti is that the knowledge of the oneness of Atman, as it is free from the blemish of attachment and aversion, is the true knowledge.
This Karikā proves the superiority of the Advaita knowledge over other views as it does not contradict the Scriptural statements regarding creation and exercises (Upāsana), and also because it does not clash with other theories. Advaita alone harmonises all other doctrines and theories. It alone gives the rationale of other relative views regarding Truth.

Karika, verse 3.18
How is it that the non-dualist does not conflict with the dualist? The reason is thus stated:—As  nonduality is the ultimate Reality, therefore duality or multiplicity is only its effect. The Scriptural passages such as, “He is one and without a second”, “He created fire”, etc., support this view. It  is further borne out by reason as duality is not perceived in the states of swoon, deep sleep or trance (samādhi), in the absence of the activity of the mind. Therefore duality is said to be the effect of non-duality. But the dualists perceive duality alone either  way, that is, from both the absolute and the relative standpoints. As duality is perceived only by the deluded and non-duality by us who are enlightened,  therefore our view does not clash with their views. For, the Scripture also says, “Indra (the Supreme Lord) created all these diverse forms through Maya”, “There exists nothing like duality”. It  is like the case of a man on a spirited elephant, who knows that none can oppose him, but who yet does not drive his beast upon a lunatic who though standing on the ground, shouts at the former, “I am also on an elephant, drive your beast on me”. Therefore from the standpoint of Reality, the Knower of Brahman is the very self of (even) the dualists. Hence, our, viz., the non-dualistic view does not clash with other views.
It may be asked in view of the differences between the dualistic and the non-dualistic views, how it can be said that the latter does not find any contradiction with the former. The text of the Kārikā gives the reply. It says that the so-called duality does not exist at all. Whatever exists is non-dual Brahman alone. Therefore the non-dualist cannot quarrel with a thing which is ultimately non-existent.

Karika, verse 3.19
If duality  were the effect of non-duality, then it could be contended that duality also, like the Advaita, is the Supreme Reality. In order to remove this doubt which may crop up in the minds of some, it is said that non-duality which is the Supreme Reality appears manifold through Maya,  like the one moon appearing as many to one with defective eye-sight and the rope appearing (to the deluded) as the snake, the water-line, etc. This manifold is not real, for Atman is without any part. An object endowed with parts may be said to undergo modification by a change of its parts, as clay undergoes differentiation into pots, etc. Therefore the purport is that the changeless (unborn) Atman which is without parts cannot, in any manner, admit of distinction excepting through Maya or the illusion of the perceiver. If  the appearance of manifoldness were real, then the Atman, the ever-unborn and non-dual, which is, by its very nature, immortal would become mortal as though fire would become cold (which is an absurdity). The reversal of one’s own nature is not desired by any—as it is opposed to all means of proofs. Therefore the Reality—which is Atman—changeless and unborn, appears to undergo a modification only through Maya. Hence it follows that duality is not the ultimate Reality.

Karika, verse 3.20
Some interpreters of the Upaniṣads, who  are garrulous and who put on the airs of the Knowers of Brahman, admit that the Reality—the Atman—which is by nature ever-unborn (changeless) and immortal, really passes  into birth (i.e., becomes the universe). If,  according to them, the Atman really passes into birth it must undergo destruction. But,  how is it possible for the Atman which is, by its very nature, ever-unborn (changeless) and immortal to become mortal, i.e., to be subject to destruction? It can never become mortal which is contrary to its very nature.

Karika, verse 3.21-22
As in common experience the immortal never becomes mortal, nor the mortal ever becomes immortal; therefore it is, in no way, possible for a thing to reverse its nature, i.e., to become otherwise than what it is. Fire can never change its character of being hot.
The disputant who maintains that the naturally immortal entity becomes mortal, i.e., really passes into birth, makes  the futile proposition that that entity before creation is by its very nature, immortal. How can he assert that the entity is of immortal nature if it be admitted that it passes  into birth? That is to say, how can the immortal retain its immortal nature of changelessness if it should undergo a change? It cannot, by any means, be so. Those who hold that the Atman passes into birth (i.e., undergoes a change), cannot speak of the Atman as ever birthless. Everything, according to them, must be mortal. Hence  there cannot be a state called liberation.

Karika, verse 3.23

Objection: Those  who do not admit the change or the passing into birth of Brahman, cannot justify the Scriptural passages which support creation.
Reply: Yes, we also admit the existence of Scriptural texts supporting creation as actual, but such texts serve other purposes. Though the question has already been disposed of, the contention is here again made and refuted in order to allay all doubts regarding the applicability or otherwise of the Scriptural texts to the subject-matter  that is going to be dealt with. The Scriptural text regarding creation is the same, whether the creation of things is taken in the real sense or as a mere illusion produced by the juggler.
Objection: If words admit of metaphorical and direct meanings, it is reasonable to understand the world according to their direct meaning.
Reply: We do not admit it. For,  creation, in any sense other than illusion, is unknown to us, and further, no purpose is served by admitting (the act of) creation. All  creation, whether metaphorical or actual, refers to the apparent creation caused by Avidya but not to any creation from the standpoint of Reality. For the Scripture says, “Though existing both within and without, he (the Atman) is (really) changeless”. Therefore we have stated in the foregoing part of this work only what is supported by reason and determined by the Śruīi such words as, “He is one and without a second and is free from birth and death”. That alone is the true import of the Scripture and not anything else.

Karika, verse 3.24
It may be asked how the changelessness (Ajāti) of Atman is the final conclusion of the Śruti. In reply it is said that if creation were real, then the existence of the variety of objects would be absolutely real. Consequently there ought not to be Scriptural texts implying their unreality. But there are such Scriptural texts as, “In this (Atman) there is no multiplicity,” etc., which negate the existence of duality. Therefore creation (imaginary) has been imagined in order to help the understanding of the non-duality of Atman. It  is like the story of Prana. And this is further borne out by the use of the word, “Maya” denoting unreality (in connection with creation) in such Scriptural texts as “Indra  through Maya assumed diverse forms”.

Objection: The word denotes knowledge (Prajna).
Reply: It is true, but sens e-knowledge is illusory. The word  “Maya” is used to denote that (sense-) knowledge. Hence there is no blemish (in such use of the word). The word “Mayabhiḥ” (through Maya) in the Scriptural text means through sense-knowledge, which is illusory. For, the Scripture again says, “Though unborn he appears to be born in many ways.” Therefore Atman passes into birth through Maya alone. The word “Tu” (“verily”) in the text (of the Kārikā) denotes certainty, that is to say, it  indicates that creation is possible only through Maya or illusion and not in any real sense. For, birthlessness and birth in various forms cannot be predicated of the same object, as fire cannot be both hot and cold. Further, from such Śruti passages as “How can there be any delusion and any grief for him who sees unity,” etc., we know that the knowledge of the unity of Atman is alone the conclusion of Śruti on account of the (good) result it brings to the knower. Again, the perception of differentiation implied by creation has been condemned in such Śruti passages as, “He goes from death to death (who sees here many)”.

Karika, verse 3.25
By the condemnation of Sambhūti   (i.e., Hiraṇyagarbha) as something fit to be meditated upon, in such Śruti  passage as, “They enter into blind darkness who worship Sambhūti,” the whole  creation (evolution) is negatived. For, if Sambhūti were absolutely real, then its condemnation, in such manner, would not be reasonable.

Objection: The  condemnation of Sambhūti is meant here for co-ordinating Sambhūti with Vināśa   as is the case with the Śruti passage,  “They enter into blind darkness who worship Avidya”.
Reply: Yes, it is indeed true that the condemnation of the exclusive worship of Sambhūti is made for the purpose of co-ordinating the meditation regarding Sambhūti with the Karma (ritual) known as Vināśa. Still it should not be forgotten that as the purpose of the Karma known as Vināśa is to transcend death,—whose nature is the desire consequent upon the inborn ignorance of man—so also the aim  of the co-ordination of the meditation on Devatā (i.e., Sambhūti or Hiraṇyagarbha) with the Karma (called Vināśa) undertaken for the purpose of the purification of the mind of man, is to transcend death,—which  is of the nature of the attachment to ritual and its results characterised by the dual hankering after the end and the means. For, thus alone man becomes free from death which is of the nature of impurity and is characterised by the dual impulse of end and means. Therefore the co-ordination of the meditation of Devatā and of Karma—which is Avidya—leads to freedom from death. Thus  the realisation of Vidyā (the highest knowledge), characterised by the identity of the Supreme Self and Jiva, is inevitable  for one who has transcended death,—of the form of Avidya and characterised by the dual impulses (of the means and the end),—and who is established in renunciation and also devoted to the meaning of the import of the Upaniṣad. It is therefore said thus : BrahmAvidya (i.e., the knowledge of Brahman—which is the means for the attainment of Immortality and which is (from the relative standpoint) subsequent to the state of the antecedent Avidya (ignorance) being related to the same person (who is still in the state of ignorance), is said to be coordinated with Avidya (avidya).

Hence the negation of Sambhūti is for the purpose of condemnation as it serves a purpose other  than the knowledge of Brahman which (alone) is the means to the attainment of Immortality. Though it serves the purpose of removing impurity yet the devotion to Sambhūti does not enable one to realise (directly) immortality. (Therefore the condemnation of Sambhūti is reasonable.) Hence, Sambhūti, being thus negatived, it can be said to have only a relative existence. Having regard to the unity of Atman, the ultimate Reality, creation (symbolised by Hiraṇyagarbha) which is known as immortal  (only from the relative standpoint) is negated. Such  being the case, who can bring into being the Jiva who is seen as created only through illusion (Maya) and who exists only while ignorance (Avidya) lasts? This Jiva reverts to its original nature (of Brahman) with the disappearance of Avidvā, For, no one can verily bring into being the snake (falsely) superimposed upon the rope through Avidya and which disappears when one knows (the true nature of the rope). Therefore no one can produce or create the Jiva. The words “Ko nu” (“who can?”) in the text, being in the form of interrogation refute the idea of causality. The purport of the Kārikā is that there can be no cause for a thing which is seen to be born only through ignorance and which disappears with the destruction of the said ignorance. The Śruti also says, “This  Atman is not born from any cause nor is anything born from it.”

Karika, verse 3.26
The Śruti in such passage as, “This is the final instruction. It is not this, not this,” has determined the nature of Atman by the refutation of all specific characteristics. But knowing this Atman to be incomprehensible  the Śruti has again sought to establish the very same Atman through other means and finally refuted what have been described (as the means for the attainment of Atman). That is to say, the Śruti, in such passage as, “It is not this, not this,” demonstrates the incomprehensibility of Atman or in other words, refutes the idea that Atman   can be realised or understood. Those  who do not understand that the means (suggested for the realisation of Atman) have only one purpose, viz., the realisation of the end (i.e., the non-dual Atman), make a mistake by thinking that what are suggested as the means have the same reality as the end. In order to remove this error, the Śruti negates the reality  of the means by  pointing out the incomprehensibility of Atman, as its reason. Subsequently,  the student knows that the means serve their purpose by pointing only to the end and the end itself is always one and changeless. To such a student the knowledge of the unborn Self which is both within and without reveals itself.

Karika, verse 3.27
Thus hundreds of Scriptural passages conclude that the essence which is the non-dual and birthless Self, existing both within and without, is the only Reality, and that nothing else, besides the Self, exists. Now, in order to determine this very Reality through reason, again it is stated:—

Objection: It may also be true that if Reality be incomprehensible then the knowledge of Self would be unreal.
Reply: No, this cannot be, for  the effect is comprehended. As the effects, that is to say creation (of new things), come from a really existent magician through Maya (magic), so also the comprehension of the effects, in the form of the creation of the universe, leads us to infer the existence of the Atman, the Supreme Reality, who, like the magician, is, as it were, the substratum of the illusion which is seen in the form of the creation of the universe. For, the creation of the universe is possible only with a Reality, i.e., an existing cause, like the birth of the effects, such as the elephant, etc., conjured up through illusion (by an existing magician); and this creation is never possible with a non-existing cause. It is not, however, possible for the unborn Atman to really pass into birth. Or,  the first line of the text may be explained in another manner. As a really existing entity, such as the rope, etc., passes into such effects as the snake, etc., only through Maya and not in reality, similarly, the real and the incomprehensible Atman is seen to pass into birth, in the form of the universe, like the rope becoming the snake, only through illusion. The birthless Atman cannot pass into birth from the standpoint of Reality. But the disputant who holds that the unborn Atman, the Supreme Reality, is really born in the form of the universe, cannot assert that the unborn is born, as this implies a contradiction.  In that case he must admit that, in fact, what is (already) born, again passes into birth. If, thus, birth is predicated of that which is already born, then the disputant is faced with what is known in logic as regressus ad infinitum. Therefore it is established that the Essence which is Atman is ever unborn and non-dual.

Karika, verse 3.28
There are those who hold that all entities are unreal, that the non-existent produces this world. But production, by the non-existent, of any thing either in reality or in illusion is not possible. For we know nothing like it in our experience. As the son of a barren woman is not seen to be born either really or through Maya, the theory of the non-existence of things is in truth untenable.

Karika, verse 3.29
How is it possible for the Reality to pass into birth through Maya? It is thus replied; As the snake imagined in the rope, is real  when seen as the rope, so also the mind,  from the standpoint of the knowledge of the ultimate Reality, is seen to be identical with Atman. This mind, in dream, appears to us as dual in the forms of the cogniser and the cognised through  Maya, as the snake àppears to be separate from the rope through ignorance. Similarly, indeed the mind acts (in a dual form) in the waking state through Maya. That is to say, the mind appears to act.

Karika, verse 3.30
Really speaking, the snake is identical with the rope. In like manner, the mind which is nondual  as Atman appears undoubtedly in dual forms in dreams. Verily in dream, such objects of perception as elephants, etc., or their perceivers such as eyes, etc., have  no existence independently of consciousness (mind). Similar  is the case in the waking state as well. For (conciousness) mind, which is the highest Reality, is common to both.

Karika, verse 3.31
It has been said that it is the mind alone which appears as dual (objects) like the appearance of the snake in the rope. But what is its proof? Our answer is this: We make the statement on the strength of an inference following the method of agreement and difference. The proposition is that all this duality perceived as such by the imagination of the mind is, in reality, nothing but the mind. The reason for such inference is that duality is perceived when the mind acts and it vanishes when the mind ceases to act; that is to say, when the (activity, i.e., the Vṛttis of the) mind is withdrawn  unto itself by the knowledge got through discrimination, repeated practice and renunciation,—like the disappearance of the snake in the rope—or during deep sleep.  Hence on account of the disappearance of duality it is established that duality is unreal or illusory. That the perception of duality is due to the action of the mind is further proved in this Kārikā.

Karika, verse 3.32
How does the mind become naught? It is thus replied:—The Atman alone is the Reality like  the clay; as in the Śruti passage, “All modifications are mere names arising from efforts of speech. The clay alone is real.” That knowledge of the reality of Atman comes through the Scripture  and the teacher. The mind having attained to that knowledge does not imagine, as  there remains nothing to be imagined. The mind then is like fire when there is no fuel to burn. When the mind thus does no longer imagine, it ceases to be mind, that is, the mind, for want of any object to be cognised, becomes free from all cognition.

Karika, verse 3.33
If all this duality be illusory, how is the knowledge of the Self to be realised? It is thus replied: The Knowers of Brahman describe knowledge, i.e., the mere essence of thought, which is unborn and free from all imaginations as  non-different from Brahman, the ultimate Reality, which is also the object of knowledge. This is supported by such Scriptural passages as, “Like heat from fire, knowledge (Jñānam) is never absent from the knower (Atman),” “Brahman is Knowledge and Bliss,” “Brahman is Reality, Knowledge and Infinity,” etc. The knowledge of which Brahman is the object, is non-different from (the know-able) Brahman, as is the heat from the fire. The Essence of the Self, which is the object of knowledge, verily knows itself by means of unborn knowledge, which is of the very nature of Atman. Brahman which is of the nature of one homogeneous mass of eternal consciousness, does not depend upon another instrument of knowledge (for its illumination), as is the case with the sun, which being of the nature of continuous light (does not require any instrument to illumine itself).
As non-different, etc.—The Jñānam or knowledge is the same as Brahman; otherwise no knowledge would be able to tell us what Brahman is. Darkness cannot illumine the sun. Only the light of the sun which is the sun itself, can illumine the sun. Another instrument—Such as scripture, etc., which only tell us what is not self.
To the Jñāni (Jnani), even when he acts in this empirical world, the knower, the knowledge and the object of knowledge are all Brahman. And yet all these, being of the nature of Brahman, are without birth (Aja).

Karika, verse 3.34-35
It has been stated before that the mind, free from imagination on account of the knowledge  of Truth, which is Atman, becomes tranquil for want of external objects, like the fire not fed by fuel. Such mind may be said to be under control, It has been further stated that duality disappears when the mind thus ceases to act. The Yogis should particularly know the behaviour  of the mind which is thus brought under discipline, which is free from all imaginations and which is possessed of discrimination.

Objection: In  the absence of all specific consciousness the mind, in the state of deep sleep, behaves exactly in the same manner as does the mind under control. What is there to be known in the absence of all specific knowledge?
Reply: To this objection we reply thus:—Your objection is not valid. For, the behaviour of the mind in deep sleep, overcome by the darkness of delusion caused by ignorance, and still full of many potential desires which are the seeds of numerous future undesirable activities, is quite different from the behaviour of the mind well under control and free from the ignorance which produces activities that give rise to numerous afflictions, and from which has been burnt away by the fire of self-knowledge the ignorance which contains the harmful seed of all potential tendencies to act. The behaviour of the latter kind of mind is quite different. Therefore it is not like the mind in deep sleep. Hence the behaviour of such mind should be known. This is the purport.

Karika, verse 3.36
Brahman is both within and without as well as unborn, as there is no cause for its passing into birth. For, we have already stated that (the phenomenon of) birth is seen on account of the ignorance (of the real nature of a thing), as  is the case with the rope giving birth to the (illusion of the) snake. It is birthless because all ignorance is destroyed by the knowledge of Truth which is the Atman. Hence it is free from sleep ; for, Atman, which is, by nature, non-dual, is always free from sleep the nature of which is that of beginningless delusion characterised by ignorance. Therefore it is free from dream.  Names and forms which are ascribed to it are due to the ignorance of its real nature. These names and forms are destroyed by Knowledge. It is like the (destruction of the illusion of the) snake seen in the rope. Hence Brahman cannot be described by any name, nor can it be in any manner described to be of any form. To support this, there are such Śruti passages as, “From which words come back,” etc. Moreover, it  is ever effulgent or it is of the very nature of effulgence. For,  it is free from (the ideas of) manifestation and non-manifestation characterised by wrong apprehension and non-apprehension. Apprehension and nonapprehension are (as inseparable) as day and night. Darkness is the characteristic of ignorance. These are the causes of the non-manifestation (of the real nature of Atman). These  are absent in Atman. Moreover, Atman is always of the nature of consciousness and effulgence. Therefore it is reasonable to speak of Atman as ever-effulgent. It is all-knowing, that is to say, Atman is all that exists and Atman is consciousness (awareness) itself. As regards such Brahman (i.e., the one that knows such Brahman) no action can be enjoined, as may be in the case of others, who (on account of their ignorance of the real nature of Brahman) are asked to practise concentration, etc., on the nature of Atman. The  purport is that besides the destruction of ignorance it is not possible to prescribe any disciplinary action (for the knowledge of Brahman), as Brahman is always of the nature of purity, knowledge and freedom. The nature of Brahman, which is the subject-matter under discussion is thus described in other ways. The purport of the Kārikā is that apart from the realisation of one’s identity with the attributeless Brahman no effort is to be made by him. The categorical imperative of Kant has no meaning for a knower of Atman. Yogic Samādhi is not the same as the goal of Jñāna Yoga as described in the philosophy of Advaita Vedānta or the Kārikā.

Karika, verse 3.37
Now is explained the reason for indicating Brahman as without name, etc., as stated above. The word Abhilāpa, meaning expression, denotes here the instrument of sound by which all sounds are expressed. Brahman is beyond speech. The instrument of sound is used in the sense of metonymy, i.e., it also implies other instruments of sense-knowledge. The purport is that the Atman is beyond all external sense-organs. Similarly, it is beyond all activities of the mind. The word “Chintā” in the text stands for “mind” (or the internal organ of thought). For, the Śruti says, “It is verily without Prana and without mind”, “It is higher than the imperishable Supreme.” It is all peace as it is free from all distinctions. The Atman is ever-effulgent, that is to say, being of the nature of self-consciousness which is its very essence, it is eternal light. The Atman is denoted by the word Samādhi   as it can be realised only by the knowledge arising out of the deepest concentration (on its essence) or, the Atman is denoted by Samādhi because the Jiva concentrates his mind on Atman. It is immovable, i.e., beyond change. Hence, it is fearless as it is free from change.

Karika, verse 3.38
As Brahman alone has been described in the previous text as Samādhi (i.e., the sole object of concentration) and as free from activity and fear, therefore in that Brahman there  is nothing to accept nor is there anything to give up. For, acceptance or abandonment is possible only where there is change or the possibility of change. But both these are inconsistent with Brahman—as nothing else exists which can cause a change in Brahman, and further because Brahman is without parts. Therefore, the meaning is that in Brahman there is no possibility of either accepting or giving up anything. The purport of the Kārikā is this: How can there be any acceptance or abandonment (in Brahman) where, in the absence of the mind, no  mentation whatsoever is possible? When the knowledge of Reality which is the Self, ensues, then Knowledge, for want of any object to rest upon, becomes established in Atman, like the heat of fire (in the absence of fuel). Ajāti, i.e., free from birth. It attains to the state of supreme non-duality. Thus is concluded, by means of reasoning and Scriptural authority what was stated before as a proposition in the following words: “Now I shall describe the non-dual Brahman which is free from limitation and birth and which is the same everywhere.” Everything else, other than the knowledge of Reality which is the Self, birthless and homogeneous, implies limitation. The Śruti also says, “O Gārgi, he who departs from this world without knowing that Imperishable One, is, indeed, narrow-minded.” The purport is that everyone, realising this knowledge, becomes established in Brahman and attains to the fulfilment of all desires.

Karika, verse 3.39
Though  such is the nature of the knowledge of the Supreme Reality, yet it is described in the Upaniṣads as Yoga not in touch with anything; for, it is free from all touch implying relations (with objects). It is hard to be attained by the Yogis   who are devoid of the knowledge taught in the Vedānta philosophy. In other words, this truth can be realised only by the efforts culminating in the knowledge of Atman as the Sole Reality. The Yogis shrink from it, which is free from all fear, for  they think that this Yoga brings about the annihilation of their self. In other words, the Yogis, being devoid of discrimination, who, through fear, apprehend the destruction of their self, are afraid of it which is, in reality, fearlessness.

Karika, verse 3.40
Those  who regard mind and the sense-organs, when seen apart from their identity with the very nature of Brahman, as mere imagination,—like that of the snake when seen apart from its identity with the rope—and who thus deny the sole reality of the mind and the sense-organs (independent of Brahman), i.e., those who look upon themselves as of the very nature of Brahman, spontaneously enjoy, as quite natural to them, fearlessness and eternal peace known as Freedom, (perfect knowledge) for which they (the Jñānis) do not depend upon any mechanical effort (such as the control of the mind, etc.). We have already stated that no duty (effort), whatsoever, exist for the Jñāni. But those other Yogis who are also traversing the path (leading to Truth), but who possess inferior  or middling understanding and who  look upon the mind as separate from but related to Atman, and who  are ignorant of the knowledge regarding the reality of Atman—the Yogis belonging to this class can experience fearlessness as a result of the discipline of the mind. To them  the destruction of misery is also dependent upon mental control. The ignorant can never experience the cessation of misery, if the mind, (considered) related to Atman, becomes active. Besides, their knowledge of self is dependent on their control of the mind. And similarly, eternal peace, known as Mokṣa (or liberation), in their case, depends upon the mental discipline.

Karika, verse 3.41
As one may try to empty the ocean, by draining off its water drop by drop, with the help of a (blade of) Kuśa -grass, even so may one control the mind by making the same effort with a heart which becomes neither depressed nor tired.
This Kārikā gives us an idea of the effort that a Yogi should make to control his mind completely. But it appears that the complete suppression of the mental Vṛttis is impossible in this way. And as the happiness of a Yogi is dependent upon such suppression, he can never attain to eternal Truth by the Yogic method. Jñāna - yoga is the royal road for the attainment of eternal Truth and peace.

Karika, verse 3.42
Is untiring effort the only way for bringing the mind under discipline? We say, in reply, no. One should, with untiring effort, follow the means, to be stated presently, in order to bring the mind under discipline, that is to say, bring it back to Atman,  when the mind turns towards objects of desires and enjoyments. The word “Laya”  in the text indicates Suṣupti, i.e., deep sleep in which state one becomes oblivious of all things. The  (injunction implied in the) words “should be brought under discipline”, should also be applied in the case of the mind when it feels happy, that is to say free from all worries in the state of Laya or oblivion. Why should it be further brought under discipline if it feels pleasure (in that state)? It is thus replied: Because the state of oblivion is as  harmful as desire, the mind should be withdrawn from the state of oblivion as it should be withdrawn from objects of enjoyment.

Karika, verse 3.43
What is the way of disciplining the mind? It is thus replied: Remember that all  duality is caused by Avidya or illusion and therefore afflicted with misery. Thereby dissuade the mind from seeking enjoyments produced by desires. In other words, withdraw the mind from all dual objects by impressing upon it the idea of complete non-attachment.  Realise from the teachings of the Scriptures and the Āchāryās that all this is verily the changeless Brahman. Then you will not see anything to the contrary, viz., duality; for it does not exist.

Karika, verse 3.44
When  the mind is immersed in oblivion, i.e., in Suṣupti, then rouse it up by means of knowledge and by detachment. That is to say, turn the mind to the exercise of discrimination which leads to the knowledge of the Self. The word “Chitta” in the text bears the same meaning as “Manas” or mind. Bring  the mind back to the state of tranquillity if it is distracted by the various objects of desires. When the mind is thus, by constant practice, awakened from the state of inactivity and also turned back from all objects, but not yet established in equilibrium,  that is to say, when the mind still dwells in an intermediary state,—then know  the mind to be possessed of attachment. Then the mind contains within it the seeds of desires for enjoyment and inactivity. From  that state also, bring the mind, with care, to the realisation of equilibrium. Once the mind hás realised the state of equilibrium, that is, when it is on the way to realise that state, then do not disturb it again. In other words, do not turn it to (by attachment) external objects.

Karika, verse 3.45
The seeker should not taste that happiness that is experienced by the Yogis seeking  after Samādhi. In other words, he is not to be attached to that happiness. What then should be done by the student? He should be unattached to such happiness, by gaining knowledge through discrimination, and think that whatever happiness is experienced is false  and conjured up by ignorance. The mind should be turned back from such happiness. When, however, having been once withdrawn from happiness and fixed on the state of steadiness, the mind again manifests its outgoing propensities, then control it by adopting the above-mentioned  means; and with great care, make it one  with Atman; that is, make the mind attain to the condition of pure existence and thought.

Karika, verse 3.46
When the mind brought under discipline by the above-mentioned  methods, does not fall into the oblivion of deep sleep, nor is distracted by external objects, that is to say, when the mind becomes quiescent  like the flame of a light kept in a windless place; or when  the mind does not appear in the form of an object,—when the mind is endowed with these characteristics, it verily becomes one  with Brahman.

Karika, verse 3.47-48
The above-mentioned bliss which is the highest Reality and which is characterised by the knowledge of the Atman is  centred in the Self. It is all peace, characterised by the cessation of all evils. It is the same as liberation.  It is indescribable as  nobody is able to describe it; for, it is totally different from all objects. This ultimate bliss is directly realized by the Yogis.  It is unborn because it is not produced like anything resulting from empirical perceptions. It is identical with the Unborn which is the object sought by Knowledge. The Knowers of Brahman describe this bliss verily as the omniscient Brahman, as it is identical with that Reality which is omniscient.
Karika, verse 2.1
Aum. It has been already said, “Duality does not exist when (true) knowledge arises,” and this is borne out by such Śruti passages as, “It (Atman) is verily one and without a second,” etc. This is all based merely on the authority  of the Śruti. It  is also equally possible to determine the unreality (illusoriness) of duality through pure reasoning; and for this purpose is begun the second chapter which commences with the words Vaitathyam (unreality) etc. The word, Vaitathyam signifies the fact of its being unreal or false. Of what is this (unreality) predicated? Of all objects, both internal  and external,  perceived in the dream. It is thus declared by the wise, i.e., those who are experts in the use of the means (pramāṇas) of arriving at true knowledge. The reason of this unreality is stated thus; For, the objects perceived are found to be located within the body. All these entities such as a mountain, an elephant, etc., perceived in the dream are cognized there  (i.e., within) and not outside the body. Therefore they must be regarded as unreal.

Objection: This (“being within”) is no valid reason. A jar and other things on account of their being perceived within a cover, such as a cloth, etc. (cannot be called unreal).
Reply: On account of their being confined in a limited space, that is, within the body (where dream objects are cognized). It is not possible for the mountain, the elephant, etc., to exist in the limited space (within the nerves  of the body) which are within the body.. A mountain does not or cannot exist inside a body.

Karika, verse 2.2
That all that is perceived to exist in dreams is located in a limited space, is not a fact. For a man sleeping in the east, often finds himself, as it were , experiencing dreams in the north. Anticipating this objection (of the opponent) it is said:—The dreamer does not go to another region outside his body where he experiences dream. For, it is found that as soon as a man falls asleep he experiences dream objects, as it were, at a place which is hundreds of Yojanas   away from his body and which can be reached only in the course of a month. The long period of time which is necessary to go to that region (where dream objects are perceived) and again to come back (to the place where the sleeper lies) is not found to be an actual fact. Hence on account of the shortness of time the experiencer of the dream does not go to another region. Moreover, the dreamer when he wakes up, does not find himself in the place where he experiences the dream. Had the man (really) gone to another place while dreaming and cognized (or perceived) the dream-objects there, then he would have certainly woke up there alone. But this does not happen. Though a man goes to sleep at night he feels as though he were seeing objects in the day-time and meeting many persons. (If that meeting were real) he ought to have been met by those persons (whom he himself met during the dream). But this does not happen; for if it did, they would have said, “We met you there to-day.” But this does not happen. Therefore one does not (really) go to another region in dream.

Karika, verse 2.3
For this reason also the objects perceived to exist in dream are illusory. For, the absence of the chariots, etc. (perceived in dream) is stated by Śruti, in such passages as “There  exists neither chariot, etc.” its assertion being based on reason.  In the opinion of the wise, i.e., the knowers of Brahman, the illusoriness (of the dream objects) has been established on the ground of their being perceived within the contracted space in the body. The Śruīi only reiterates it in order to establish the self-luminosity  (of Atman) in dream.

Karika, verse 2.4
The proposition to be established (Pratijñā) is the illusoriness of objects that are perceived in the waking state. “Being perceived” is the “ground” (hetu) for the inference. They are like the objects that are perceived in dream, is the illustration (dṛṣṭāntaḥ). As the objects perceived to exist in dream are illusory so also are the objects perceived in the waking state. The common feature of “being perceived” is the relation (Upanaya) between the illustration given and the proposition taken for consideration. Therefore the illusoriness is admitted of objects that are perceived to exist in the waking state. This is what is known as the reiteration (Nigamanam) of the proposition or the conclusion. The objects perceived to exist in the dream are different  from those perceived in the waking state in respect of their being perceived in a limited space within the body. The fact of being seen and the (consequent) illusoriness are common to both.

Karika, verse 2.5
The identity  (of the experiences) of the dream and waking states is declared by the wise on account of the reason, already stated, i.e., the experience of objects (in both the states) is associated with subject-object  relationship. This Kārikā enunciates the conclusion that has already been arrived at in the previous inference by the wise.

Karika, verse 2.6
The objects perceived to exist in the waking state are unreal for this reason also,  that they do not really exist either at the beginning or at the end. Such objects (of experience) as mirage, etc., do not really exist either at the beginning or at the end. Therefore they do not (really) exist in the middle either. This is the decided opinion of the world. The several objects perceived to exist really in the waking state are also of the same nature. Though they (the objects of experience) are of the same nature as illusory objects, such as mirage, etc., on account of their non-existence at the beginning and at the end, still they are regarded as real by the ignorant, that is, the persons that do not know Atman.

Karika, verse 2.7
Objection: The assertion that the objects perceived to exist in the waking state are illusory like those of the dream state is illogical. It is so because the objects of the waking experience, such as food, drink or vehicles, etc., are seen to serve some purpose, that is, they appease hunger and thirst as well as do the work of carrying a man to and fro. But this is not the case with the objects perceived in dream. Therefore the conclusion that the objects perceived in the waking state are unreal like those seen in dream is mere fancy.
Reply: It is not so.
Objection: Why?
Reply: It is because the serving as means to some end or purpose which is found in respect of food, drink, etc. (in the waking state) is contradicted in dream. A man, in the waking state, eats and drinks and feels appeased and free from thirst. But as soon as he goes into sleep, he finds himself (in dream) afflicted with hunger and thirst as if he were without food and drink for days and nights. And the contrary also happens to be equally true. A man satiated with food and drink in dream finds himself, when awakened, quite hungry and thirsty. Therefore the objects perceived in the waking state are contradicted in dream. Hence, we think that the illusoriness of the objects perceived in the waking state like those of dream need not be doubted. Therefore  both these objects are undoubtedly admitted to be illusory on account of their common feature of having a beginning and an end.

Karika, verse 2.8
Objection: The assertion about the illusoriness of objects perceived in the waking state on account of their similarity to those perceived in the dream state is not correct.
Reply: Why?
Objection: The illustration does not agree with the thing to be illustrated.
Reply: How?
Objection: Those objects that are cognized in the waking state are not seen in dream.
Reply: What then are they (dream experiences)?
Objection: A man perceives in dream objects which.are never usually seen in the waking state. He finds himself (in dream) to be with eight hands and seated on an elephant with four tusks. Similarly various other unusual (abnormal) objects are seen in the dream. These (dream objects) are not like other illusory objects. They are, without doubt, real (in themselves). Therefore the illustration does not agree. Hence, the statement that the waking experiences are unreal like those of dream is not correct.
Reply: No, your conclusion is not correct. You think that the objects perceived in dream are extraordinary (not like those usually seen in the waking state), but these are not absolutely real in themselves. What, then, is their nature? They  are only peculiar to the circumstances of the perceiver associated with those (dream) conditions, i.e., of the dreamer associated with the dream-conditions. As  the denizens of heaven, such as Indra, etc., have the characteristics of being endowed with a thousand eyes, etc. (on account of the very condition of their existence in heaven), so also there are the (peculiar) unusual (abnormal) features of the dreamer (on account of the peculiar condition of the dream state). These  (dream experiences) are not absolutely real like the absolute reality of the perceiver. The dreamer associated with the (dream) conditions, while in the dream state, sees all these abnormal or peculiar objects which are but the imaginations of his own mind. It is like the case of a man, in the waking experience, who is well instructed regarding the route to be taken to reach another country, and who while going to that country sees on the way objects belonging to that locality. Hence as  perception of snake in the rope and the mirage in the desert which are due to the (mental) conditions of the perceiver are unreal, so also the objects transcending the limits of the waking experience, perceived in dream, are unreal on account of their being due to the (peculiar) condition of the dream state itself. Therefore the illustration of dream is not incorrect.

Karika, verse 2.9-10
Having refuted the contention of the opponent that there exists no similarity between objects of the waking state and the abnormal (unusual) objects seen in dream, (the text proceeds to point out) the truth of the objects of waking state being (unreal) like those of dream. In the dream state also those which are mere modifications of the mind, cognized within, are illusory. For, such internal objects vanish the moment after they are cognized. In that very dream such objects as pot, etc., cognized by the mind and perceived by the sense-organs, eyes, etc., as existing outside, are  held to be real. Thus, though all the dream experiences are, without doubt, known  to be unreal, yet they arrange themselves as  real and unreal. Both kinds of objects (in dream), imagined by the mind internally and externally, are found to be unreal. Similarly in the waking experience objects known as real and imaginary (mental) should be rationally held to be unreal. Objects, internal and external, are creations of the mind (whether they be-in the dream or in the waking state). Other matters have already been explained.

Karika, verse 2.11
The opponent asks, “If the objects, cognized in the-waking and dream states, be devoid of reality, who  is the cognizer of these,—objects imagined by the mind, both inside (subjective), and outside (objective)? Who is, again, their fmaginer?” In short, what is the support (substratum) of memory and knowledge? If you say none,. then we shall be led to the conclusion that there is nothing like Atman or Self.

Karika, verse 2.12
The self-luminous  Atman himself,  by  his own Maya, imagines  in  himself the different  objects, to be described hereafter. It is like the imagining of the snake, etc., in the rope, etc. He  himself cognizes them, as  he has imagined them. There  is no other substratum of knowledge and memory. The aim of Vedānta is to declare that knowledge and memory are not without, support as the Buddhistic nihilists maintain.

Karika, verse 2.13
How does he imagine the ideas? It is described thus:—The word “Vikaroti” means creates or imagines, i.e., manifests in multiple forms. Lord, i.e., Atman,. with  his mind turned outward, imagines in diverse forms various objects, perceived in the (outside) world, such as sound, etc., as well as other objects,  and also various objects permanent (such as earth, etc.), and impermanent,  i.e., which exist only for the moment, i.e., as long as that imagination lasts—all being of the nature of subtle ideas (Vāsanas) in his mind and not yet fully manifested. Similarly, turning his mind within, the Lord imagines various ideas which are subjective. “Prabhu” in the text means the Lord (Isvara), i.e., the Atman.

Karika, verse 2.14
A doubt is raised as to the statement that everything is mere imagination of mind like the dream. For, the imagination of mind, such as desire, etc., determined  by mind, is different from objects  perceived to exist outside, on account of the latter being determined by two points in time. This objection is not valid. Objects perceived to exist within, only as long as the thought About them lasts, signify those (subjective) ideas which  are only determined by mind; i.e., such objects have no other time to determine them except that wherein the idea in the mind exists (when.imagining such ideas). The meaning is that such (subjective) ideas are experienced at the time when they are imagined. Objects related to two points of time signify those external objects which are cognizable by others at some other point of time and which cognize the latter in their turn. Therefore such objects are said to be mutually limited by one another. As for example, when it is said that he remains  till the cow is milked, the statement means, “The cow is milked as long as he remains and he remains as long as the cow is milked.” A  similar instance is the following: “It is like that, that is like this.” In this way, the objects perceived to exist outside mutually determine one another. Therefore they are known as “Dvayakālāh” that is, related to two points in time. Ideas perceived within and existing as long as the mind that cognizes them lasts, as well as the external objects related to two points in time, are all mere imaginations.  The  peculiar characteristic of being related to two points in time of the objects that are perceived to exist outside is not due to any other cause except their being imagined by the mind. Therefore the illustration of dream well applies here.

Karika, verse 2.15
Though  the objects perceived within, as mere mental impressions, are unmanifested, and though  the objects perceived outside through the sense-organs such as eyes, etc., are known as manifested (gross entities), yet the distinction  is not due to anything substantial in the nature of the (two kinds of) objects. For, such distinction is seen in dreams as well. What is, then, the cause of this distinction? It  is only due to the difference in the use of sense-organs (by means of which these objects are perceived). Hence, it is established that the objects perceived in the waking state are as much imagination of the mind as those seen in the dream.

Karika, verse 2.16
What is the source of the imagination of various objects, subjective  and objective  that are perceived and appear to be related to one another as cause and effect? It is thus explained:—The Jiva is of the nature of cause and effect and is further characterised by such ideas as “I do this, I am happy and miserable.” Such Jiva is, at first, imagined  in the Atman   which is pure and devoid of any such characteristics, like  the imagination of a snake in a rope. Then for the knowledge of the Jiva are imagined  various existent entities, both subjective and objective, such as Prana, etc., constituting different ideas such as the agent, action and the result (of action). What is the cause of this imagination? It is thus explained:—It, the Jiva, who is the product of imagination and competent to effect further imagination, has its memory determined by its own inherent knowledge. That is to say, its knowledge is always followed by a memory, similar to that knowledge. Hence,  from the knowledge of the idea of cause results the knowledge of the idea of the effect. Then follows.the memory of both cause and effect. This memory is followed by its knowledge which results in the various states of knowledge characterised by action, actor and the effect. These are followed by their memory, which, in its turn, is followed by the states of knowledge. In this way are imagined various objects, subjective and objective, which are perceived and seen to be related to one another as cause and effect.

Karika, verse 2.17
It has been said that the imagination of Jiva (the Jiva- idea) is the source of all (other) imaginations (ideas). What is the cause of this Jiva -idea? It is thus explained by an illustration:—It is found in common experience that a rope, not known as such, is imagined, in hazy darkness, as snake, water-line, stick or any one of the many similar things. All this is due to the previous absence of knowledge regarding the real nature of the rope. If previously the rope had been known in its real nature, then the imagination of snake, etc., would not have been possible, as in the case of one’s own fingers.
Similarly, Atman has been variously imagined as, Jiva, Prana and so forth  because It is not known in Its own nature, I.e., pure  essence of knowledge itself, the non-dual Atman, quite distinct from such phenomenal characteristics indicated by the relation of cause and effect, etc., which are productive of misery. This is the unmistakable verdict of all the Upaniṣads.

Karika, verse 2.18
When it is determined that it is nothing but the rope alone, then all illusions regarding the rope disappear and the (non-dual) knowledge that there exists nothing else but the rope, becomes firmly established. Similar is the knowledge,—like the light of the sun—produced by the negative Scriptural statements which deny all phenomenal attributes (in Ātmari),—statements like “Not this”, “Not this”, etc., leading to the knowledge of the real nature of Atman, as: “All this is verily Atman”, “(It is) without cause and effect, without internality and externality”, “(It is) ever without and within and beginningless”, “(It is) without decay and death, immortal, fearless, one and without a second.”

Karika, verse 2.19
If it be definitely ascertained that Atman is verily one, how could it be imagined as the endless objects like Prana, etc., having the characteristics of the phenomenal experience? It is thus explained:—This is due to the Maya (ignorance) inhering in the luminous Atman. As the illusion conjured up by the juggler makes the very clear sky appear covered with trees blooming with flowers and leaves, so  does this luminous Atman become deluded, as it were, by his own Maya. “My Maya cannot be easily got over” declares the Gītā.

Karika, verse 2.20-28
Prana means Prājña (the Jiva associated with deep sleep) and Bījātmā (the causal self). All the entities from Prana to the Sthiti (subsistence) are only various effects of Prana. These and other popular ideas of their kind, imagined by all beings, are like the imaginations of the snake, etc., in the rope, etc. These are through ignorance imagined in Atman which is free from all these distinctions. These fancies are due to the lack of determination of the real nature of the Self. This is the purport of these ślokas. No attempt is made to explain the meaning of each word in the texts beginning with Prana, etc., on account of the futility of such effort and also on account of the clearness of the meaning of the terms.

Karika, verse 2.29
What more is to be gained (by this kind of endless discussion)? Whatever idea or interpretation of such things as Prana,   etc., narrated above or omitted, is shown to the inquirer by the teacher or other trustworthy person. He realises  that as the sole essence (Atman), i.e., he understands that as “I am that or that is mine”. Such conception about Atman as is revealed to the inquirer, appears to him as the sole essence and protects him, i.e., keeps him away from all other ideas (because it appears to him as the highest ideal). On  account of his devotion (attachment) to that ideal, he realises it as the sole essence in due course, i.e., attains his identity with it. Prana—All interpretations of Atman must be included in the Prana, as Prana or the causal Self is the highest manifestation of Atman in the relative plane.
Realises, etc.—It is because such inquirer, for want of proper discrimination, accepts the words of the teacher as the highest truth. The teacher also, realising the limited intellectual capacity of the student, teaches him, at first, only a partial view of truth.
On account, etc.—Such student only gets a partial view of Reality though he takes it as the sole essence. He shuts his eyes to other views. On account of his single-minded devotion to that ideal he becomes intolerent of other view-points. But he who takes a particular idea to be the Reality and condemns other ideas as untrue, has not realised the Highest Truth. For, to a knower of Reality, all imaginations are identical with Brahman and hence have the same value. This is the mistake generally committed by the mystics who, for want of the faculty of rational discrimination, do not see any truth in the views of others.

Karika, verse 2.30
Though this Atman is verily non-separate  from these, the Prana, etc.,—like the rope from such imaginary ideas as the snake, etc.,—it appears as separate to the ignorant persons. But to the Knower (of truth), the Prana, etc., do not exist apart from Atman, just as the snake, etc., falsely imagined in the rope, do not exist apart from the rope. For, the Śruti also says, “All that exists is verily Atman” One who thus knows truly, that is, from Scriptures as well as by reasoning that Prana, etc., imagined in Atman, do not exist separately from Atman fas in the illustration) of the (illusory) snake and the rope, and further knows that Atman is ever pure  and free from all imaginations,—construes,  without hesitation, the text of the Vedas according to its division.  That is to say, he knows that the meaning of this passage is this and of that passage is that. None but the Knower of Atman is able to know truly the (meaning of the) Vedas. “None but the Knower of Atman is able to derive any benefit from his actions,” says Manu.

Karika, verse 2.31
The unreality of duality has been demonstrated by of Vedānta Scriptures. Therefore it is stated:—Dream objects and illusion, though unreal when their true nature is considered, are thought, in spite of their unreality, as real by the ignorant. As an imaginary city in the sky, filled with shops full of vendable articles, houses, palaces and villages frequented by men and women, though appearing real to us, is seen to vanish suddenly as dream and illusion, which are known to be unreal (though they appear to be real),—so also is perceived this entire duality of the universe to be unreal. Where is this taught? This is thus taught in the Vedānta Scriptures. “There is no multiplicity here.” “Indra (assumed diverse forms) through the powers of Maya.” “In the beginning all this existed as Brahman.” “Fear rises verily from duality,” “That duality does never exist.” “When all this has become Atman then who can see whom and by what?” In these and other passages, the wise men, i.e., those who see the real nature of things, declare (the unreal nature of the universe). The Smṛti of Vyāsa also supports this view in these words:
“This duality of the universe, perceived by the wise like a hole seen in darkness in the ground, is unstable like the bubbles that appear in rain-water, always undergoing destruction, ever devoid of bliss, and ceasing to exist, after dissolution.”

Karika, verse 2.32
This verse sums up the meaning of the chapter. When duality is perceived to be illusory and Atman alone is known as the sole Reality, then it is clearly established that all our experiences, ordinary or religious (Vedic), verily pertain to the domain of ignorance. Then one perceives that there is no dissolution, i.e., destruction (from the standpoint of Reality); no birth or creation, i.e., coming into existence; no one in bondage, i.e., no worldly being; no pupilage, i.e., no one adopting means for the attainment of liberation; no seeker after liberation, and no one free from bondage (as bondage does not exist). The Ultimate Truth is that the stage of bondage, etc., cannot exist in the absence of creation and destruction. How can it be said that there is neither creation nor destruction? It is thus replied:—There is no duality (at any time). The absence of duality is indicated by such Scriptural passages as, “When duality appears to exist....” “One who appears to see multiplicity....” “All this is verily Atman.” “Atman is one and without a second.” “All that exists is verily the Atman,” etc. Birth  or death can be predicated only of that which exists and never of what does not exist, such as the horns of a hare, etc. That  which is non-dual (Advaita) can never be said to be born or destroyed. That it should be non-dual and at the same time subject to birth and death, is a contradiction in terms. It  has already been said that our dual experience characterised by (the activities of) Prana, etc., is a mere illusion having Atman for its substratum, like the snake imagined in the rope which is its substratum. The imagination characterised by the appearance of the snake in the rope cannot be produced from nor dissolved in the rope  (i.e., in any external object), nor is produced from the imaginary snake or dissolved in the mind,  nor even in both (i.e., the rope and the mind). Thus  duality being non-different from mental (subjective) imagination (cannot have a beginning or an end). For,  duality is not perceived when one’s mental activities are controlled (as in Samādhi) or in deep sleep. Therefore  it is established that duality is a mere illusion of the mind. Hence it is well said that the Ultimate Reality is the absence of destruction, etc., on account of the non-existence of duality (which exists only in the imagination of the mind).

Objection: If this be the case, the object of the teachings should be directed to prove the negation of duality and not to establish as a positive fact non-duality, inasmuch as there is a contradiction (in employing the same means for the refutation of one and the establishment of another). If this were admitted, then the conclusion will tend to become Nihilistic  in the absence of evidence for the existence of non-duality as Reality; for, duality has already been said to be non-existent.
Reply: This contention is not consistent with reason. Why  do you revive a point already established, viz., that it is unreasonable to conceive of such illusions as the snake in the rope, etc., without a substratum?
Objection: This analogy is not relevant as even the rope, which is the substratum of the imaginary snake, is also an imaginary entity.
Reply: It is not so. For, upon the disappearance of the imagination, the unimagined substratum can be reasonably said to exist on account of its unimagined character.
Objection: It may be contended that like the imagination of the snake in the rope, it (the unimaginary substratum) is also unreal.
Reply: It cannot be so. For, it (Brahman) is ever unimagined, because it is like the rope that is never the object of our imagination and is real even before the knowledge of the unreality of the snake. Further, the existence of the subject (knower or witness) of imagination must be admitted to be antecedent to the imagination. Therefore it is unreasonable to say that such subject is non-existent.
Objection: How  can the Scripture, if it cannot make us understand the true nature of the Self (which is non-duality), free our mind from the idea of duality?
Reply: There  is no difficulty. Duality is superimposed upon Atman through ignorance, like the snake, etc., upon the rope. How is it so? I am happy, I am miserable, ignorant, born, dead, worn out, endowed with body, I see, I am manifested and unmanifested, the agent, the enjoyer, related and unrelated, decayed and old, this is mine,—these and such other ideas are superimposed upon Atman. The notion  of Atman (Self) persists in all these, because no such idea can ever be conceived of without the notion of Atman. It is like the notion of the rope which persists in (all superimposed ideas, such as) the snake, the water-line, etc. Such being the case, the Scripture has no function with regard to the Atman which, being of the nature of the substantive, is ever self-evident. The function of the Scripture is to accomplish that which is not accomplished yet. It does not serve the purpose of evidence if it is to establish what has been already established.
The Atman does not realise its own natural condition on account of such obstacles as the notion of happiness, etc., superimposed by ignorance; and the true nature is realised only when one knows it as such. It  is therefore the Scripture, whose purpose is to remove the idea of happiness, etc. (associated with Atman) that produces the consciousness of the not-happy (i.e., attributeless) nature of Atman by such statements as “Not this” “Not this”, “(It is) not gross,” etc. Like the persistence of Atman (in all states of consciousness) the not-happy (attributeless) characteristic of Atman does not inhere in all ideas such as of being happy and the like. If it were so, then one would not have such specific experience as that of being happy, etc., superimposed upon Atman, in the same manner as coldness cannot be associated with fire whose specific characteristic is that of heat. It is, therefore, that such specific characteristics as that of being happy, etc., are imagined in Atman which is, undoubtedly, without any attributes. The Scriptural teachings which speak of Atman as being not-happy, etc., are meant for the purpose of removing the notion that Atman is associated with such specific attributes as happiness, etc. There is the following aphoristic statement by the knowers of the Āgama. “The validity of Scripture is established by its negating all positive characteristics of Atman (which otherwise cannot be indicated by Scriptures).”

Karika, verse 2.33
The reason for the interpretation of the previous verse is thus stated: Just as in a rope, an unreal snake, streak of water or the like is imagined, which are nonseparate (non-dual) from the existing rope,—the same (rope) being spoken of as this snake, this streak of water, this stick, or the like,—even so this Atman is imagined to be the innumerable objects such as Prana, etc., which are unreal  and perceived only through ignorance, but not from the standpoint of the Ultimate Reality. For, unless the mind is active, nobody is ever able to perceive any object. But no action is possible for Atman. Therefore the objects that are perceived to exist by the active mind can never be imagined to have existence from the standpoint of the Ultimate Reality. It is therefore this (non-dual) Atman which alone is imagined as such illusory objects as Prana, etc., which are perceived, as well as the  non-dual and ultimately real Atman (which is the substratum of illusory ideas, such as Prana, etc.) in the same manner as the rope is imagined as the substratum of the illusion of the snake. Though  always one and unique (i.e., of the nature of the Atman), the Prana, etc., the entities that are perceived, are imagined (from the standpoint of ignorance) as having the nondual and ultimately real Atman as their substratum. For, no illusion is ever perceived without a substratum. As “non-duality” is the substratum of all illusions (from the standpoint of ignorance) and also as it is, in its real nature, ever unchangeable, non-duality alone is (the highest) bliss even  in the state of imagination, i.e., the empirical experiences. Imaginations alone (which make Prana, etc., appear as separate from Atman) are the cause of misery.  These imaginations cause fear, etc., like the imaginations of the snake, etc., in the rope. Non-duality  is free from fear and therefore it is the (highest) bliss.

Karika, verse 2.34
Why is non-duality called the highest bliss? One suffers from misery when one finds differences in the form of multiplicity, i.e., when one finds an object separate from another. For  when this manifold of the universe with the entire relative phenomena consisting of Prana, etc., imagined in the non-dual Atman, the Ultimate Reality is realised to be identical with the Atman, the Supreme Reality, then alone multiplicity ceases to exist, i.e., Prana, etc., do not appear to be separate from Atman. It  is just like the snake that is imagined (to be separate from the rope) but that does no longer remain as such when its true nature is known with the help of a light to be nothing but the rope. This manifold (Idam) does never really exist as it appears to be, that is to say, in the forms of Prana, etc., because it is imaginary just like the snake seen in the place of the rope. Therefore different objects, such as Prana, etc., do not exist as separate from one other as a buffalo appears to be separate from a horse. The idea of separation being unreal, there is nothing which exists as separate from an object of the same nature or from other objects (of different nature). The Brāhmaṇas, i.e., the Knowers of Self, know this  to be the essence of the Ultimate Reality. Therefore the implication of the verse is that non-duality alone, on account of the absence of any cause that may bring about misery, is verily the (highest) bliss.

Karika, verse 2.35
The perfect knowledge as described above, is thus extolled.  The sages who are always  free from all blemishes such as attachment, fear, spite, anger, etc., who are given to contemplation, who can discriminate between the real and the unreal and who can grasp the essence of the meaning of the Vedas, i.e., who are well versed in the Vedanta (i.e., the Upanishads) do  realise the real nature of this Atman which is free from all imaginations and also free from this the illusion of the manifold. This Atman is the total negation of the phenomena of duality and therefore it is non-dual. The intention of the Śruti passage is this: The Supreme Self can be realised only by the Sannyāsins (men of renunciation) who are free from all blemishes and who are enlightened regarding the essence of the Upaniṣads and never by others, i.e., those vain logicians whose mind is clouded by passion, etc., and who find truth only  in their own creeds and opinions.

Karika, verse 2.36
As non-duality, on account of its being the negation of all evils, is bliss and fearlessness, therefore knowing it to be such, direct your mind to the realisation of the non-dual Atman. In other words, concentrate your memory on the realisation of non-duality alone. Having known this non-dual Brahman which is free from hunger, etc., unborn and directly perceptible as the Self and which transcends all codes  of human conduct, i.e., by attaining to the consciousness that ‘I am the Supreme Brahman,’ behave with others as one not knowing the Truth; that is to say, let  not others know what you are and what you have become.

Karika, verse 2.37
What should be his code of conduct in the world? It is thus stated:—He  should give up all such formalities as praise, salutation, etc., and be free  from all desires for external objects. In other words, he should take up the life of a Paramahamsa Sannyāsin.  The Śruti also supports this view in such passages as “knowing this Atman”, etc. This is further approved in such Smṛti passages as, “With their consciousness in That (Brahman), their self being That, intent on That, with That for their Supreme Goal” (Gītā), etc. The word “chalam” in the text signifying “changing” indicates the “body” because it changes every moment. The word “Achalam” signifying “unchanging” indicates the “Knowledge of Self”. He  has the (changing) body for his support when he, for the purpose of such activities as eating, etc., forgets the Knowledge of the Self, the (real) support of Atman, unchanging like the Ākāśa, (ether) and relates himself to egoism. Such  a wise man never takes shelter under external objects. He entirely depends upon circumstances, that is to say, he maintains his body with whatever food or strips of cloth, etc., are brought to him by mere chance.

Karika, verse 2.38
The truth  regarding external objects such as the earth, etc., and the truth regarding internal objects characterised by body, etc., is that these are as unreal as a snake seen in the rope, or objects seen in dream or magic. For, there are such Śruti passages as, “modification being only a name, arising from speech, etc.” The Śruti further declares, “Atman is both within and without, birthless, causeless, having no within or without, entire, all-pervading like the Ākāśa (ether), subtle, unchanging, without attributes and parts, and without action. That is Truth, That is Atman and That thou art.” Knowing it to be such from the point of view of Truth, he becomes one with Truth and derives his enjoyment  from Truth and not from any external  object. But a person  ignorant of Truth, takes the mind to be the Self and believes the Atman to be active like the mind, and becomes active. He thus thinks his self to be identified with the body, etc., and deviated from Atman saying, “Oh, I am now fallen from the Knowledge of Self.” When his mind is concentrated he sometimes thinks that he is happy and one with the Self. He declares “Oh, I am now one with the essence of Truth.” But, the knower of Self never makes any such statement, as Atman is ever one and changeless and as it is impossible for Atman to deviate from its own nature. The  consciousness that “I am Brahman” never leaves him. In other words, he never loses the consciousness regarding the essence of the Self. The Smṛti supports this view in such passages as “The wise man views equally a dog or an outcaste.” “He sees who sees the Supreme Lord remaining the same, in all beings.” (Gītā)
Upanishad Verse 1 Introductory & Commentary
How does, again, the determination of (the meaning of) Aum help the realization of the essential nature of Atman? It is thus  explained: The Śruti passages such as these declare  thus: “It  is Aum.” “This (Aun) is the (best)  support.” “Oh, Satyakāma, It  is the Aum which is also the higher and the lower Brahman.” “Meditate  on the Self as Aum.” “Aum, this  word is Brahman.” “All  this is verily Aum [Om].” As the rope, etc., which are the substratum of such illusions (misapprehensions) as the snake, etc., so is the non-dual Atman, which is the Ultimate Reality, the substratum of such imaginations as the vital breath (Prana), etc., which are unreal. Similarly, Aum is the substratum of the entire illusion of the world of speech having  for its (corresponding) contents such illusory objects as Prana, etc., imagined in Atman. And Aum is verily of the same  essential character as the Atman; for it is the name for Atman. All illusions such as Prana, etc., having Atman for their substratum and denoted by words—which are but modifications of Aum—, cannot exist  without names (which are but the modification of Aum). This is supported by such Śruti passages as: “The modification  being only a name arising from speech.” “All this related to It (Brahman) is held  together by the cord  of speech, and strands  of (specific) names.” “All these (are rendered possible in experience) by names,” etc.

Aum, the word, is all this. As all diversified objects that we see around us, indicated by names, are not different  from their (corresponding) names, and further as the different names are not different from Aum, therefore all this is verily Aum. As a thing is known through its name, so the highest Brahman is known through Aum alone. Therefore the highest Brahman is verily Aum. This (treatise) is the explanation of that, tasya, that is, of Aum, the word, which is of the same nature as the higher as well as the lower Brahman. Upavyākhyānam means clear explanation, because Aum is the means to the knowledge of Brahman on account of its having the closest proximity to Brahman. The word ‘Prastutam’ meaning ‘commences’ should be supplied to complete the sentence (as otherwise, it is incomplete). That which is conditioned by the triple (conceptions of) time, such as past, present and future is also verily Aum for reasons already explained. All that is beyond the three (divisions of) time, i.e., unconditioned by time, and yet known by their effects, which is called ‘Avyākṛta’, the unmanifested, etc.,—that also  is verily Aum.

Upanishad Verse 2 Introductory & Commentary
Though the name and the object signified by the name are one and the same, still the explanation  has been given (here) by giving prominence  to the name (Aum). Though in the Upaniṣadic passage,—“Aum, this word, is all this”—explanation has been furnished by giving prominence  to the name (Aum), the same thought is again expounded by giving prominence to the thing signified by the name. The object is to realize the knowledge of the oneness of the name and the thing signified by it. Otherwise, (the explanation) that the knowledge of the thing is dependent on the name, might suggest that the oneness of the name and the thing is to be taken only in a figurative  sense. The purpose of the knowledge of the unity (of the name and the thing signified by it) is to simultaneously remove, by a single effort, (the illusion of) both the name and the thing and establish (the nature of) Brahman which  is other than both. Therefore,the Śruti says,’ “The quarters (Pādas) are the letters of Aum (Mātrā) and the letters are the quarters.”

All this is verily Brahman. All that has been said to consist merely of Aum (in the previous text) is Brahman. That Brahman which has been described (as existing) inferentially  is now pointed out, as being directly  known, by the passage, “This Self is Brahman”. The word this, meaning that which appears divided into four quarters,  is pointed out as the innermost Self, with a gesture (of hand) by the passage, “This is Atman”. That Atman indicated by Aum, signifying both the higher and the lower Brahman, has four quarters (Pādas), not indeed, like the four feet (Pādas) of a cow,  but like the four quarters (Pādas) of a coin known as Kārṣāpaṇa. The knowledge of the fourth (Turiya) is attained by merging the (previous) three, such as Viśva, etc., in it in  the order of the previous one, in the succeeding one. Here  the word ‘Pāda’ or ‘foot’ is used in  the sense of instrument. The word ‘Pāda’ is again used in the sense of an object when the object to be achieved is the fourth (Turiya).

Upanishad Verse 3
Jāgaritasthāna, i.e., his sphere  (of activity) is the waking state. Bahiṣprajña, i.e., who  is aware of objects other than himself. The meaning is that consciousness appears, as it were, related to outward objects on account of Avidya. Similarly Saptāṅga, i.e., he has seven  limbs. The Śruti says, “Of that Vaiśvānara Self, the effulgent  region is his head, the sun his eye, the air his vital breath, the ether (Ākāśa) the (middle part of his) body, the water his kidney and the earth his feet.” The Āhavanīya fire (one of the three fires of the Agnihotra sacrifice) has been described as his mouth in order to complete the imagery of the Agnihotra sacrifice. He is called Saptāṅga because these are the seven limbs of his body. Similarly he has nineteen mouths. These are the five  organs of perception (Buddhindriyas); the five  organs of action (Karmendriyas); the five  aspects of vital breath (Prana, etc.); the mind (Manas); the intellect (Buddhi); egoity (Ahamkara); mind-stuff (Chitta). These are, as it were, the mouths, i.e., the instruments by means of which he (Vaiśvānara) experiences (objects). He, the Vaiśvānara, thus constituted, experiences through the instruments enumerated above, gross objects, such as sound, etc. He is called Vaiśvānara because he leads all creatures of the universe in diverse ways (to  the enjoyment of various objects); or because he comprises all beings. Following the grammatical rules regarding the compound which gives the latter meaning, the word that is formed is Viśvānara, which is the same as Vaiśvānara. He is the first quarter because he is non-different from the totality of gross bodies (known as Virāt). He is called first  (quarter) because the subsequent quarters are realized through him (Vaiśvānara).

Objection: While the subject-matter under discussion treats of the innermost Self (Pratyak Ātmā) as having four quarters—in the text, “This Atman is Brahman”—how is it that (the external universe consisting of) the effulgent regions, etc., have been described as its limbs such as head, etc.?
Reply: This, however, is no  mistake; because the object is to describe the entire phenomena, including those of gods (Adhidaiva) as having four quarters from the standpoint of this Atman known as the Virāt (i.e., the totality of the gross universe). And in  this way alone is non-duality established by the removal of (the illusion of) the entire  phenomena. Further, the one Atman is realized as existing in all beings and all  beings are seen as existing in Atman. And, thus alone, the meaning of such Śruti passages as “Who sees all beings in the Self, etc.” can be said to be established.

Otherwise, the subjective world will, verily, be, as in the case of such philosophers as the Sāmkhyas,  limited by its (one’s) own body. And if that be the case, no room would be left for the Advaita which is the special feature of the Śruti. For, in the case of duality, there would be no difference between the Advaita and the Sāmkhya and other systems. The establishment of the identity of all with Atman is sought by all the Upaniṣads. It is, therefore, quite reasonable to speak of the effulgent regions, etc., as seven limbs in connection with the subjective (individual self, Adhyātma) associated with the gross body, because of its identity with the Adhidaiva (comprising the super-physical regions) universe from the standpoint of the Virāt (the totality of the gross physical universe). This is further known from such characteristic indication (of the Śrutí), as “Thy head shall fall”, etc. The identity (of Adhyātma and Adhidaiva) from the standpoint of the Virāt indicates similar identity  of the selves known as the Hiraṇyagarbha and the Taijasa   as well as of the Unmanifested  (Isvara) and the Prajna. It is also stated in the Madhu Brāhmaṇa, “This bright immortal person in this earth and that bright immortal person in the body (both are Madhu).” It is an established fact that the Self in deep sleep (Prajna) is identical with the Unmanifested (Isvara) because  of the absence of any distinction between them. Such being the case, it is clearly established that non-duality is realized by the disappearance (of the illusion) of all duality.

Upanishad Verse 4
He is called the Svapnasthāna because the dream (state) is his (Taijasa) sphere. Waking consciousness, being associated as it is with many means,  and appearing  conscious of objects as if external, though (in reality) they are nothing but states  of mind, leaves in the mind corresponding  impressions. That the mind (in dream) without  any of the external means, but possessed of the impressions left on it by the waking consciousness, like a piece of canvas  with the pictures painted on it, experiences the dream state also as if it were like the waking, is due to its being under the influence of ignorance, desire and their action.  Thus  it is said, “(And when he falls asleep) then after having taken away with him (portion of the) impressions from the world during the waking state (destroying and building up again, he experiences dream by his own light)” (Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad, 4. 3. 9). Similarly the Atharvana, after introducing the subject with “(all the senses) become one in the highest Deva, the mind,” continues “There the god (mind) enjoys in dream greatness” (Praśna Upaniṣad). From the standpoint of the sense-organs, the mind is internal. He (the Taijasa) is called the Antaḥprajña or conscious of the internal because his consciousness in dream becomes aware of the mental states, which are impressions left by the previous waking state. He is called the Taijasa because he appears as the subject though this (dream) consciousness is without any (gross) object and is of the nature of the essence of light. The Viśva (the subject of the waking state) experiences consciousness associated with gross external objects; whereas, here (in the dream state), the object of experience is consciousness consisting of Vāsanās (the impressions of past experience). Therefore this experience is called the experience  of the subtle. The rest is common (with the previous Śruti). This Taijasa is the second quarter (of Ātmarn).

Upanishad Verse 5
The adjectival clause, viz., “Wherein the sleeper,” etc., is put with a view to enabling one to grasp what the state of deep sleep (Suṣupti) signifies, inasmuch as sleep characterized by  the absence of the knowledge of Reality is the common feature of those mental modifications which are associated with (waking, that is) perception  (of gross objects) and (dream, that is the) non-perception  (of gross objects). Or  the object of the introduction of the adjectival clause may be to distinguish the state of deep sleep (of the sleeping person) from the two previous states as sleep characterized by the absence of knowledge of Reality is the common feature of the three states. ‘Wherein,’ that is to say, in which state or time, the sleeping person does not see any dream, nor does he desire any desirable (object). For; in the state of deep sleep, there does not exist, as in the two other states, any desire or the dream experience whose characteristic is to take a thing for what it is not. He is called the ‘Suṣuptasthāna’ because his sphere is this state of deep sleep. Similarly it is called Ekībhūta, i.e., the state in which all experiences become unified—a state in which all objects of duality, which are nothing but forms  of thought, spread over the two states (viz., the waking and the dream), reach the state of indiscrimination or non-differentiation without losing their characteristics, as the day, revealing phenomenal objects, is enveloped by the darkness of night. Therefore conscious experiences, which are nothing but forms of thought, perceived during dream and waking states, become a thick mass (of consciousness) as  it were (in deep sleep); this state of deep sleep is called the ‘Prajñānagharta’ (a mass of all consciousness unified) on account of the absence of all manifoldness (discrimination of variety). As at night, owing to the indiscrimination produced by darkness, all (percepts) become a mass (of darkness) as it were, so also in the state of deep sleep all (objects) of consciousness, verily, become a mass (of consciousness). The word ‘eva’ (‘verily’) in the text denotes the absence  of any other thing except consciousness (in deep sleep). (At the time of deep sleep) the mind is free from the miseries  of the efforts made on account of the states of the mind being involved in the relationship of subject and object: therefore, it is called the Ānandamaya, that is, endowed with an abundance of bliss. But this is not Bliss Itself; because it  is not Bliss Infinite. As in common (experience) parlance, one, free from efforts, is called happy and enjoyer of bliss. As the Prajna   enjoys this state of deep sleep which is entirely free from all efforts, therefore it is called the ‘Ānandabhuk’ (the experiencer of bliss). The Śruti also says, “This is its highest bliss.” It is called the ‘Cetomukha’ because it is the doorway to the (cognition) of the two other states of consciousness known as dream and waking. Or because the Ceta (the perceiving entity) characterized  by (empirical) consciousness (Bodha) is its doorway leading to the experience of dreams, etc., therefore it is called the “Cetomukha’. It is called Prajna as it is conscious of the past and the future as well as of all objects. It is called the Prajna, the knower par excellence, even in deep sleep, because  of its having been so in the two previous states. Or it is called the Prajna because its peculiar feature is consciousness  undifferentiated. In the two other states consciousness exists, no doubt, but it is (there) aware of (the experiences of) variety. The Prajna, thus described, is the third quarter.

Upanishad  Verse 6
This in its natural  state, is the Lord (Isvara) of all. All, that is to say, of the entire physical and super-physical universe. He (Isvara) is not something separate from the universe as others  hold. The Śruti also says, “O good one, Prana (Prajna or Isvara) is that in which the mind is bound.” He is omniscient because he is the knower  of all beings in their different conditions. He is the Antaryāmin, that is, he alone entering into all, directs everything from within. Therefore He is called the origin of all because from Him proceeds the universe characterized by diversity, as described before. It being so, He is verily that from which all things proceed and in which all disappear.

Karika, verse 1.1
The implication of the passage is this:—That Atman is (as witness) distinct from the three states (witnessed) and that he is pure  and unrelated,  is established by his moving in three states, in  succession, and also on account of the knowledge, “I am. that,” resulting from the experience which unites  through memory. The Śruti also corroborates it by the illustration  of the ‘great fish’, etc.

Karika, verse 1.2
This verse is intended to show that the threefold experience of Viśva, etc. (Taijasa and Prajna) is realised in the waking  state alone. Dakṣinākṣi: the means of perception (of gross objects) is the right eye. The presence of Viśva, the cognizer of gross objects, is chiefly felt there. The Śruti also says, “The person that is in the right eye is known as Indha—the Luminou s One” (Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad). Indha, which means the effulgent one, who is the Vaiśvānara and also known as the Virāt Atman (the totality of gross bodies), the perceiver in the sun, is the same  as the perceiver in the eye.

Objection: The Hiranyagarbha is distinct from the knower of the body (Kṣetra) who is the cognizer, the controller of the right eye, who is also the general experiencer and who is the Lord of the body.
Reply: No, for, in reality, such a distinction is not admitted. The Śrutí says, “One effulgent being alone is hidden in all beings.” The Smṛti also says: “Me do thou also know, O Arjuna, to be the Kṣetrajña (the knower of the body) in all Kṣetras (bodies)” (Gītā, 13. 2). “indivisible, yet it exists as if divided in beings” (Gītā, 13. 16). Though the presence of Viśva is equally felt in all sense-organs without distinction yet the right eye is particularly singled  out (as the chief instrument for its perception), because he (Viśva) makes a greater use of the right eye in perceiving objects. (The right eye is made here to represent all the sense-organs). The one, who has his abode in the right eye, having perceived (external) forms, closes the eye; and then recollecting them within the mind sees  the very same (external objects) as in a dream, as the manifestation of the (subtle) impressions (of memory). As  is the case here (waking), so also is the case with dream. Therefore, Taijasa, the perceiver in the mind.within, is verily the same as Viśva. With the cessation of the activity known as memory,  the perceiver (in the waking and dream states) is unified  with Prajna in the Ākāśa of the heart and becomes  verily a mass  of consciousness, because there is, then, a cessation of mental activities. Both perception and memory are forms of thought, in the absence of which the seer remains indistinguiṣably  in the form of Prana in the heart alone. For, the Śruti  also says, “Prana alone withdraws all these within.” Taijasa is identical  with Hiraṇyagarbha on account of its existence being realised in mind. Mind is the characteristic indication  (of both). This is supported by such scriptural passages as “This Puruṣa (Hiraṇyagarbha) is all mind,” etc.

Objection: The Prana (vital breath) of a deep sleeper is manifested. The sense-organs (at the time of deep sleep) are merged in it. How, then, can it (Prana) be said to be unmanifested?
Reply: This is no mistake, for the unmanifested (Avyākritā) is characterised by the absence (of the knowledge) of time and space. Though Prana, in the case of a person who identifies himself with (particular) Prana, appears to be manifested (during the time of waking and dream), yet even in the case of those who (thus) identify themselves with individualized Prana, the Prana, during deep sleep, loses (such) particular identification, which is due to its limitation by the body, and is verily the same as the unmanifested. As in the case of those who identify themselves with individualized Pranas, the Prana, at  the time of death, ceases to be the manifested, so also in the case of those who think of themselves as identified with the individualized Pranas, the Prana attains to the condition like the unmanifested, in the state of deep sleep. This Prana (of deep sleep) further contains the seed (cause) of (future) creation  (as is the case with the Avyākritā). The cognizer of the two states—deep sleep and Avyākritā—is also one  (viz., the Pure Consciousness). It (one in deep sleep) is identical  with the (apparently) different cognizers identifying themselves with the conditioned (in the states.of waking and dream), and therefore such attributes as “unified,” “mass of all consciousness,” etc., as described above, are reasonably applicable to it (one in deep sleep). Other reason, already stated, supports it. How does, indeed, the word Prana  apply to the Avyākrita (unmanifested)? It is supported by the Śruti passage, “Oh, good one, the mind is tied to the Prana.”

Objection: In that Śruti passage, the word Prana indicates Sat (Existence) i.e., the Brahman, (not the Avyākrita) which is the subject-matter under discussion, as the text commences with the passage, “All this was Sat in the beginning.”
Reply: This is no mistake, for (in that passage) the Sat is admitted to be that which contains within it the seed  or cause (of creation). Though Sat, i.e., Brahman, is indicated in that passage by the word ‘Prana’, yet the Brahman that is indicated by the words Sat and Prana (in that connection) is not the one who is free from its attribute of being the seed or cause that creates all  beings. For if in that Śruti passage, Brahman, devoid of the causal relation (i.e., the Absolute) were sought to be described, then the Śruti would have used such expressions as “Not this, Not this,” “Wherefrom speech turns back”, “That is something other than both the known and the unknown”, etc. The Smṛti also declares, “It is neither Sat (existence) nor Asat (non-existence)” (Gītā). If by the text were meant the (Absolute) devoid of causal relation then the coming back, to the relative plane of consciousness, of those who were in deep sleep and unified with Sat at the time of Praḷaya (cosmic dissolution), could  not happen. Further, (in that case) the liberated souls would again come back to the relative plane of consciousness; for the absence of seed or cause (capable of giving birth to the world of names and forms) would be the common  feature of both. Further, in the absence of the seed  (cause, i.e., at the time of Suṣupti and Praḷaya) which can be destroyed by Knowledge (alone), Knowledge itself becomes futile. Therefore the word Sat (the text of the Chāndogya Upaniṣad, the passage under discussion) in that aspect in which causality is attributed to it, is indicated by Prana, and accordingly has been described in all the Śrutis as the cause.  It is for this reason also that the Absolute Brahman, dissociated from its causal attribute, has been indicated in such Śruti passages as “It is beyond the unmanifested which is higher than the manifested”, “He is causeless and is the substratum of the external (effect) and the internal (cause),” “Wherefrom words come back....”, “Not this, not this”, etc. That which is designated as Prajna (when it is viewed as the cause of the phenomenal world) will be described as Turiya separately when it is not viewed as the cause, and when it is free from all phenomenal relationship (such as that of the body, etc.), i.e., in its absolutely Real aspect. The causal condition is also verily experienced in this body from such  cognition of the man who is awakened from the deep sleep, as “I did not know anything (at the time of deep sleep).” Therefore it is said that (one) Atman is perceived as threefold  in the (one) body.

Karika, verse 1.3-5
In the three states, namely, waking, etc., the one and the same object of experience appears in threefold forms as the gross, the subtle and the blissful. Further, the experiencer (of the three states) known (differently) as Viśva, Taijasa and Prajna has been described as one on account of the unity  of consciousness implied in such  cognition as ‘I am that’ (common to all conditions). as well as from the absence  of any distinction in respect of the perceiver. He who knows the two (experiencer and the objects of experience), appearing as many in the form of subject and objects of experience, though enjoying them, is  not affected thereby; because all objects (of experience) are experienced by one subject alone. As (the heat of the) fire  does not increase or decrease by consuming wood, etc., so also nothing  is added to or taken away (from the knowingness or awareness of the Atman) by its experience of that which, is its object.

Karika, verse 1.6
The manifestation can be predicated of positive  entities comprehended as the different forms of Viśva, Taijasa and Prajna—whose existence, of the nature of illusory names and forms caused by an innate Avidya (ignorance), cannot be denied. This is thus explained later on: “Neither in reality nor in illusion can the son of a barren woman be said to be born.” For, if things could come out of non-entity, Brahman whose existence is inferred from experience  will itself be rendered a non-entity because of the absence of means of comprehension. That the snake (in the rope) appearing as such on account of an illusory cause (Māya) which itself is the effect of ignorance (Avidya), pre-exists in the form of the rope is a matter of common experience. For by no one is the illusion of the rope-snake or the mirage, etc., ever perceived without a substratum. As before the illusory  appearance of the snake, its existence was certainly there in the rope, so also all  positive entities before their manifestation certainly exist in the form of a cause, i.e., Prana. The Śruti also declares this in such passages as: “All this (the phenomenal universe) was verily Brahman at the beginning” and “All this existed, at the beginning as Atman.” Prana manifests all. As the rays proceed from the sun, so also all different centres of consciousness (i.e., the Jivas) which are like the (many) reflections of the same sun in the water and which are manifested differently as Viśva, Taijasa and Prajna, comprising various physical forms of gods, animals, etc., proceed from the Puruṣa.  The Puruṣa manifests all these entities called as living beings, which are different from inanimate objects, but of the same nature as itself (Puruṣa), like fire and its sparks and like the sun with its reflections in water. Prana, the causal self, manifests all other entities like the spider producing the web. There are such scriptural pass-ages in its support as, “The sparks from the fire, etc.”

Karika, verse 1.7
Creation is the manifestation of the superhuman power of God ; thus think those who reflect on (the process of) creation. But  those who intently think  of the Ultimate Reality find no interest in (the theory of) creation. It (that no interest should be attached to the act of creation) is also supported by such Śruti passages as, “Indra (the great god) assumed diverse forms through Maya (Maya)”. The juggler throws the thread up in the sky, climbs by it with his arms, disappears from the sight (of the spectators), engages himself in a fight (in the sky) in which his limbs, having been severed, fall to the ground and he rises up again. The on-looker, though witnessing the performance, does not evince any interest in the thought in regard to the reality of the jugglery performed by the juggler. Similarly there is a real juggler who is other than the rope and the one that climbs up the rope. The manifestation of deep sleep, dream and waking is analogous to the throwing up of the rope by the juggler (in the above illustration) and the (empirical selves known as) Prajna, Viśva and Taijasa, related to the three states, are similar to the juggler, who appears to have climbed up the rope. As he, the juggler, remains on the ground unseen (by the on-lookers) having veiled himself, as it were, by his illusion, so also is the truth about the Highest Reality known as Turiya Therefore those noble souls seeking Moksa evince interest in the contemplation of this (the Turiya) but not in the creation which is futile. The word, ‘SvapnaMayasarūpa’—meaning, alike dream and illusion—is intended to show that all  these (false) notions (regarding manifestation) belong only to those who imagine the process of creation or manifestation.

Karika, verse 1.8
The manifestation (creation) proceeds from the mere will of God because His will in reality cannot but achieve its purpose. Such objects as pot, etc., are but the (manifestation of the) will (of the potter). They can never be anything external or unrelated to such will. Some say manifestation proceeds from time.

Karika, verse 1.9
Others think that the purpose of manifestation is only the enjoyment (by God of the objects so created), that creation is merely a diversion of God. These two theories are refuted (by the author) by the single assertion that it is the very  nature of the Effulgent (Brahman). Thus taking this standpoint (the nature of the Effulgent Being) all  the theories (of creation) herein (stated) are refuted  for the reason indicated by: “What could be the desire for manifestation on the part of Brahman whose desires are ever in a state of fulfilment?” For the rope, etc., to appear as snake, no other reason can be assigned than Avidya.

Upanishad Verse 7 Introductory & Commentary
The fourth  quarter which now comes in order (for explanation) has to be described. This is done in the words of the text: “Not conscious of the internal object.” It (Turiya) does not admit of description or indication by means of words, for all uses (affirmative or negative) of language fail to express it. Therefore Turiya is sought  to be indicated by the negation of all attributes (characteristics).

Objection: Then it becomes mere void or Sunya.
Reply: No, because it is impossible for imagination to exist without  a substratum. The illusion of silver, a snake, a man or mirage, etc., cannot be conceived as existing without the (corresponding) substratum of the mother-of-pearl, rope, stump or desert, etc.
Objection: If that be the case, Turiya ought to be indicatable by words and not by the negation of all attributes. For, it is the substratum of all imaginations such as, Prana, etc., in the same way as jars, etc., which being the substratum of water, etc., are indicated as such by words.
Reply: The idea of Prana, etc., (supposed to exist in Turiya) is unreal like the false idea of silver, etc., in the mother-of-pearl, etc. A relation  between the real and the unreal cannot be expressed by words because such relation is, itself, non-existent. Turiya cannot be the object of any other instrument of knowledge (such as direct perception) like the cow, etc., because of its unique nature, owing to the absence of Upādhis. Atman cannot have anything like a generic property, like the cow, etc., because it is devoid of all Upādhis or attributes; it has neither generic nor specific characteristics because it is one, without a second. It cannot be known by any activity (proceeding from it) as in the case of a cook; because it is devoid of all actions. It cannot be described by attributes such as blue, etc., because it is without any attribute. Therefore it follows that Turiya cannot be indicated by any name.

Objection: Then it (Turiya) would be like the “horns of a hare” and hence one’s pursuit of it must be futile.
Reply: No, the knowledge of Turiya as identical with Self (Atman) destroys the hankering after objects which are non-self just as the knowledge of mother-of-pearls (mistaken for silver) removes the desire for (illusory) silver. For, once the identity of Turiya and Self is realised there is no possibility of one’s being deluded  by ignorance, desire and the like misapprehensions (which are the effects of ignorance) and there is no reason for Turiya not being known as identical with the Self. For all the Upaniṣads point to this end only as is evident from the following: “That thou art”, “This Atman is Brahman”, “That is real and that is Atman”, “The Brahman which is directly and immediately cognized”, “He is both without and within, as well as causeless”, “All this is verily Atman”, etc. This very Atman has been described as constituting the Highest Reality and its opposite  (the unreal) and as having four quarters. Its unreal (illusory) aspect has been described as due to ignorance, like the illusion of snake in the rope, having for its characteristics the three quarters and being of the same nature as the seed  and the sprout. Now is described (in the following Śruti) Turiya which is not of the nature of cause but which is of the nature of the Highest Reality corresponding to the rope—by negating  the three states, enumerated above, which correspond to the snake, etc.

Objection: The object was to describe Atman as having four quarters. By the very descriptions of the three quarters, the fourth is established as being other than the three characterised by the “conscious of the subjective”, etc. Therefore the negation (of attributes relating to the three quarters) for the purpose of indicating Turiya implied in the statement, “Turiya is that which is not conscious of the subjective”, etc., is futile.
Reply: No. As the nature of the rope is  realised by the negation of the (illusory) appearances of the snake, etc., so also it is intended to establish the very Self, which subsists in the three states, as TuriyaThis is done in the same way as (the great Vedic statement) “Thou art that”. If Turiya were, in fact, anything different  from Atman subsisting in the three states, then, the teachings of the Scriptures would have no meaning on  account of the absence of any instrument of knowledge (regarding Turiya). Or the other (inevitable alternative would be to declare absolute nihilism ( śūnya) to be the ultimate Truth. Like the (same) rope mistaken as snake, garland, etc., when the same Atman is mistaken as Antaḥprajña (conscious of the subjective) etc., in the three states associated with different characteristics, the knowledge, resulting from the negation of such attributes as the conscious of the subjective, etc., is the means of establishing the absolute absence of the unreal phenomena of the world (imagined) in Atman.

As a matter of fact, the two results, namely, the negation of (superimposed) attributes and the disappearance of the unreal phenomena happen at the same time. Therefore no additional  instrument of knowledge or no other  effort is to be made or sought after for the realisation of TuriyaWith the cessation of the idea of the snake, etc., in the rope, the real nature of the rope becomes revealed and this happens simultaneously with the knowledge of the distinction between the rope and the snake. But those who say that the knowledge, in addition to the removal of the darkness (that envelopes the jar), enables  one to know the jar, may as well affirm  that the act of cutting (a tree), in addition to its undoing the relation of the members of the body intended to be cut, also functions (in other ways) in other parts of the body. As the act of cutting intended to divide the tree into two is said to be complete with the severance of the parts (of the tree) so also the knowledge employed to perceive the jar covered by the darkness (that envelopes it) attains its purpose when it results in removing the darkness, though that is not the object intended to be produced. In such case the knowledge of the jar, which is invariably connected with the removal of the darkness, is not the result accomplished by the instrument of knowledge. Likewise, the knowledge, which is (here) the same as that which results from the negation of predicates, directed towards the discrimination of such attributes as “the conscious of the subjective” etc., superimposed upon Atman, cannot  function with regard to Turiya in addition to its act of negating of such attributes as “the conscious of the subjective” which is not the object intended to be produced. For, with the negation of the attributes such as “conscious of the subjective,” etc., is  accomplished simultaneously the cessation of the distinction between the knower, the known and the knowledge. Thus it will be said later on, “Duality cannot exist when Gnosis, the highest Truth (non-duality), is realised.” The knowledge of duality cannot exist even for a moment immediately after the moment of the cessation of duality. If it should remain, there would follow what is known as regressus ad infinitum; and consequently duality will never cease. Therefore it is established that the cessation of such unreal attributes as “conscious of the subjective” etc., superimposed upon Atman is simultaneous with the manifestation of the Knowledge which, in itself, is the means (pramana) for the negation of duality.

By the statement that it (Turiya) is “not conscious of the subjective” is indicated that it is not “Taijasa”. Similarly by the statement that it is “not conscious of the objective,” it is denied that it (Turiya) is Viśva. By saying that it is “not conscious of either”, it is denied that Turiya is any intermediate state between  the waking and the dream states. By the statement that Turiya is “not a mass all sentiency”, it is denied that it is the condition of deep sleep—which is held to be a causal condition on account of one’s inability to distinguish the truth from error (in deep sleep). By saying that it is “not simple consciousness”, it is implied that Turiya cannot simultaneously cognize the entire world of consciousness (by a single act of consciousness). And lastly by the statement that it is “not unconsciousness” it is implied that Turiya is not insentient or of the nature of matter.

Objection: How, again, do such attributes as “conscious of the subjective,” etc., which are (directly) perceived to subsist in Atman become non-existent only by an act of negation as the snake, etc. (perceived) in the rope, etc., become non-existent (by means of an act of negation)?
Reply: Though  the states (waking and dream) are really of the essence of consciousness itself, and as such are non-different from each other (from the point of view of the substratum), yet one state is seen to change  into another as do the appearances of the snake, water-line, etc., having for their substratum the rope, etc. But the consciousness itself is real because it never changes.

Objection: Consciousness is seen to change (disappear) in deep sleep.
Reply: No, the state of deep sleep is a matter of experience.  For the Śruti says, “Knowledge of the Knower is never absent.”
Hence it (Turiya) is “unseen” ; and because it is unseen therefore it is “incomprehensible”.  Turiya cannot be apprehended by the organs of action. Alakṣanam means “uninferable”,  because there is no Liṅga (common characteristic) for its inference. Therefore Turiya is “unthinkable”  and hence “indescribable”  (by words). It is “essentially  of the nature of consciousness consisting of Self”. Turiya should be known by spotting that consciousness that never changes in the three states, viz., waking, etc., and whose nature is that of a Unitary Self. Or,  the phrase may signify that the knowledge of the one Atman alone is the means for realising Turiya, and therefore Turiya is the essence of this consciousness or Self or Atman. The Śruti also says, “It should be meditated upon as Atman.” Several attributes, such as the “conscious of the subjective” etc., associated with the manifestation (such as, Viśva, etc.) in each of the states have already been negated. Now by describing Turiya as “the cessation of illusion”, the attributes which characterise the-three states, viz., waking, etc., are negated. Hence it is “ever  Peaceful”, i.e., without any manifestation of change—and “all  bliss”. As it is non-dual, i.e., devoid of illusory ideas of distinction, therefore it is called “Turiya”, the “Fourth”, because it is totally distinct (in character) from the three quarters which' are mere appearances. “This, indeed, is the Atman and it should be known,” is intended to show that the meaning of the Vedic statement, “That thou art”, points to the relationless Atman (Turiya) which is like the rope (in the illustration) different from the snake, line on the ground, stick, etc,, which are mere appearances. That Atman which has been described in such Śruti passages as “unseen, but the seer”, “the consciousness of the seer is never absent”, etc., should be known. (The incomprehensible) Turiya “should be known”, and this  is said so only from the standpoint of the previously unknown condition, for duality cannot exist when the Highest Truth is known.

Karika, verse 1.10
In (the Knowledge of) Īśāna, meaning the Turiya Atman there is a cessation  of all miseries characterised by the three states, viz., Prajna,  Taijasa and Viśva. The word ‘Īśāna’ is explained as ‘Prahhu’, i.e., the one who brings about the cessation of miseries. It is because misery is destroyed by one’s own Knowledge of it (Turiya). ‘Avyaya’ means that which is not subject to any change, i.e., which does not deviate from its own nature. How? It is so because Turiya is non-dual, all  other entities being illusory (unreal) like the idea of the snake, etc., imagined in the rope. It is he who is recognised  as the Deva (on account of his effulgent nature), the Turiya, the fourth, the Vibhu, that is the all-pervading one.

Karika, verse 1.11
The generic  and specific  characters of Viśva, etc., are described with a view to determining the real nature of Turiya‘Kārya’ or effect is that which is done, i.e., which has the characteristic of result. ‘Kāraṇa’ or the cause is that which acts, i.e., it is the state in which the effect remains latent. Both Viśva and Taijasa, described above, are known as being conditioned by cause and effect,  characterised by both non-apprehension and mis-apprehension of Reality. But Prajna is conditioned by cause alone. Cause, characterised by the non-apprehension of Reality, is the condition of Prajna. Therefore these two, cause and effect, i.e., non-apprehension and mis-apprehension of Reality, do not exist, i.e., are not possible in Turiya.

Karika, verse 1.12
How is it that Prajna is conditioned by cause? And how is it, again, that the two conditions of non-apprehension and mis-apprehension of Reality do not exist in Turiya? It is because Prajna does not, like Viśva and Taijasa, perceive anything of the duality,  external to and other  than itself and born  of the cause known as Avidya. Therefore it is conditioned by darkness characterised by non-apprehension of Reality which is the cause of mis-apprehension. As Turiya exists always, ever all-seeing , on account of the absence of anything other than Turiya, it is never associated with the causal condition characterised by non-apprehension of Reality. Consequently mis-apprehension of Reality winch is the result of non-apprehension is not found in TuriyaFor, it is not possible to find in the sun, whose nature is to be ever-luminous, anything contrary to light, viz., darkness, or any other light different from itself. The Śruti also says: “The Knowledge of the seer is never absent.” Or the phrase may be explained thus: Turiya may be designated as ever all-seeing because it subsists in all, in dream and waking states and all the seers that cognize them (in those states) are Turiya alone. This is also borne out by the following Śruti passage, “There is no seer other than this.”

Karika, verse 1.13
This śloka is meant to remove a doubt that has arisen incidentally. The doubt is this: How is it that it is Prajna alone and not Turiya that is bound by the condition of cause, since the non-cognition of duality is the common feature of both? This doubt is thus removed : The meaning of the phrase Bījanidrāyuta is: Nidrā or sleep is characterised by the absence of the Knowledge of Reality. This is the cause which gives rise to the cognition of varieties. Prajna is associated with this sleep which is the cause. It is because Turiya is ever all-seeing, therefore the sleep characterised by the absence of the Knowledge of Reality does not exist in TuriyaTherefore the bondage in the form of causal condition does not exist in Turiya.

Karika, verse 1.14
Svapna or dream is the mis-apprehension  of Reality like that of the snake in the rope. Nidrā or sleep has already been defined as darkness characterised by the absence of the Knowledge of Reality. Viśva and Taijasa are associated with these, viz., the conditions of dream and sleep. Therefore they have been described as conditioned by the characteristics of cause and effect. But Prajna is associated with sleep alone without dream; therefore it is described as conditioned by cause only. The knower of Brahman does not see them (dream and sleep) in Turiya, as it would be inconsistent like seeing darkness in the Sun. Therefore Turiya has been described as not associated with the conditions of cause and effect.

Karika verse 1.15
When is one established in Turiya? It is thus replied: During the states of dream and waking when one wrongly cognizes Reality like the perception of the snake in the place of the rope, he is said to be experiencing dream.  Nidrā or sleep,  characterised by the ignorance of Reality, is the common feature of the three states. Viśva and Taijasa, on account of their having the common features of Svapna (dream) and Nidrā (sleep), form a single class. That Nidrā (sleep) which is characterised by the predominance of wrong apprehension (of Reality) constitutes the state of inversion which is Svapna (dream). But in the third state, Nidrā (sleep), alone, characterised by the nonapprehension of Reality is the only inversion. (This forms the second or the other class implied in the text which speaks only of dream and sleep as covering the three states.) Therefore when these two classes of the nature of effect and cause, characterised by the mis-apprehension and non-apprehension respectively (of Reality), disappear by the destruction of the inversion characterised by effect and cause, by the knowledge of the nature of the Highest Reality, then one realises Turiya which is the goal. Then one does not find in Turiya this condition, the characteristics of which are these two (effect and cause), and one thus becomes firm in the Highest Reality which is Turiya.

Karika, verse 1.16
One who is called the Jiva, the individual soul, (whose characteristic is to be) subject  to the law of transmigration, sleeping  under the influence of Maya which is active from time without  beginning and which has the double characteristics of non-apprehending (on account of its being of the nature of the cause) and mis-apprehending Reality, experiences such dreams as, “This is my father, this is my son, this is my grandson, this is my property and these are my animals, I am their master, I am happy, I am miserable, I have suffered loss on account of this, I have gained on this account”... When the Jiva remains asleep experiencing these dreams in the two states  he is then thus, awakened  by the gracious teacher who has himself realised the Reality, indicated by Vedānta: “Thou art not this, of the nature of cause and effect, but That thou art.” When the Jiva is thus awakened from sleep, he, then, realises his real nature. What is his nature? It (Self) is birthless, because it is beyond cause and effect and because it has none of the characteristics  such as birth, etc., which are (inevitably) associated with all (relative) existence. It is birthless, i.e., it is devoid of all changes associated with the object of relative existence including the conditions of cause and effect. It is Anidram (sleepless) because there does not exist in it Nidrā (sleep), the cause, of the nature of the darkness of Avidya, which produces the changes called birth, etc. Turiya is free from Svapna (dream) because it is free from Nidrā (sleep) which is the cause of mis-apprehension of Reality (dream). It is because the Self is free from sleep and dream therefore the Jiva, then  realises himself as the Turiya Atman, birthless and non-dual.

Karika, verse 1.17
If  the knowledge of non-duality (Turiya) be possible.after the disappearance of the perceived manifold, how could non-duality be said to exist (always) while the perceptual manifold remains? This is explained thus: This would have been true if the manifold really existed.  This manifold being only a false imagination, like the snake in the rope, does not really exist. There is no-doubt that it would (certainly) disappear if it really existed. The snake imagined in the rope, through false conception, does not really exist and therefore does, not disappear  through correct understanding. Nor, similarly, does the illusion of the vision conjured up by the magician exist and then disappear as though a veil thrown over the eyes of the spectators (by the magician) were removed. Similar is this duality of the cognized universe called the Phenomenal or manifold, (Mayamātraṃ dvaitaṃ) a mere illusion. Non-duality Turiya like the rope and the magician (in the illustrations) is alone the Supreme Reality. Therefore the fact is that there is no such thing as the manifold about which appearance or disappearance can be predicated.

Karika, verse 1.18
Objection: How  could (duality implied in) ideas such as the teacher, the taught and the scripture disappear?
Reply: This is thus explained. If  such ideas had ever been imagined by someone then they might be supposed to disappear. As the manifold is like the illusion (conjured up by the magician or) of the snake in the rope, so  also are the ideas of the teacher, etc. These ideas, namely, the ideas of teacher, taught, and scripture are for  the purpose of teaching which are (therefore appear) true till one realises the Highest Truth. But duality does not exist when one, as a result of the teaching, attains knowledge, i.e., realises the Highest Reality.

Upanishad Verse 8
In the word Aum prominence is given to that which is indicated by several names. The word Aum which has been explained before as Atman having four quarters is again the same Atman described here from the standpoint of syllable where prominence is given to the name. What, again, is that syllable? It is thus replied: Aum. It is that word Aum which being divided into parts, is viewed from the standpoint of letters. How? Those which constitute the quarters of the Atman are the letters of Aum. What are they? The letters are A, U and M.

Tn the first Upaniṣad it is said, “Aum, the word, is all this.” The word Aum is the name (abhidhāna) which indicates everything (abhidheya) past, present, future and all that which is beyond even the conception of time. Thus Aum is the name for Brahman. The second Upaniṣad declares that Brahman is the Atman. The Atman with its four quarters has been explained in the following Upaniṣads. Therefore all these explanations are of Aum from the standpoint of Atman where prominence is given to that which is indicated by names. Now the same Aum is explained from the standpoint of the word itself, that is the name which indicates Atman or the Supreme Reality.
The Highest Truth as explained above by the process of the refutation of the erroneous superimposition can be grasped only by the students of sharp or middling intelligence. But those ordinary students who cannot enter upon philosophical reflection regarding the Supreme Reality as given in the previous texts, are advised to concentrate on Aum as the symbol of the Ultimate Reality.

Upanishad Verse 9
Points of specific resemblance between them are thus pointed out. That which is Vaiśvānara, whose sphere of activity is the waking state, is the first letter of Aum. What is the Common feature between them? It is thus explained: the first point of resemblance is pervasiveness.  All sounds are pervaded  by A. This is corroborated by the Śruti passage, “The sound A is the whole of speech.” Similarly the entire universe is pervaded by the Vaiśvānara as is evident from such Śruti passages as, “The effulgent Heaven is the head of this, the Vaiśvānara Atman,” etc. The identity of the name and the object, indicated by the name, has already been described. The word ‘Ādimat’ means that this has a beginning. As  the letter A is with a beginning, so also is Vaiśvānara. Vaiśvānara is identical with A on account of this common feature. The knower of this identity gets the following result : One who knows this, i.e., the identity described above, has all his desires fulfilled and becomes the first of the great.

Upanishad Verse 10
He who is Taijasa having for its sphere of activity the dream state is U (उ) the second letter of Aum. What is the point of resemblance? It is thus replied: The one common feature is superiority. The letter U:is, as it were, ‘superior’  to A; similarly Taijasa   is superior to Viśva. Another common feature is: the letter U (उ) is in between the letters A (अ) and M (म). Similarly Taijasa is in between Viśva and Prajna. Therefore this condition of being in the middle is the common feature. Now is described the result of this knowledge. The knowledge (of the knower of this identity) is always on the increase, i.e., his power of knowing increases considerably. He is regarded in the same way by all, i.e., his enemies, like his friends, do not envy him. Further, in his family not one is born who is not a knower of Brahman.

Upanishad Verse 11
One who is Prajna associated with deep sleep is M (म) the third sound (letter) of Aum. What is the common feature? It is thus explained. Here this is the common feature: The word Miti in the text means “measure”. As barley is measured by Prastha (a kind of measure), so also Viśva and Taijasa are, as it were, measured  by Prajna during their evolution (utpātti) and involution (praḷaya) by their appearance from and disappearance into Prajna (deep sleep). Similarly  after once finishing the utterance of Aum when it is re-uttered, the sounds (letters) A and U, as it were, merge into and emerge from M. Another common feature is described by the word “Apiteh” which means “becoming one”. When the word Aum is uttered the sounds (letters) A and U become  one, as it were, in the last sound (letter) M. Similarly, Viśva and Taijasa become one (merge themselves) in Prajna in deep sleep. Therefore Prajna and the sound M are identical on account of this common basis that underlies them both. Now is described the merit of this knowledge. (One who knows this identity) comprehends all this, i.e., the real nature of the universe. Further he realises himself as the Atman, the cause of the universe, i.e., Isvara. The enumeration of these secondary  merits is for the purpose of extolling the principal means (of knowledge).

Karika, verse 1.19
When the Śruti intends to describe Viśva as of the same nature as A (अ), then the most prominent ground is seen to be the fact of each being the first, as described in the Upaniṣad discussed above. “Mātrā sampratipath” in the text means the identity of Viśva and A. Another prominent reason for such identity is their all-pervasiveness.

Karika, verse 1.20
When Taijasa is intended to be described as ‘U’, the reason of their being ‘Superior’ (in respective cases) is seen to be quite clear. Their being in ‘the middle’ is also another plain ground. All these explanations are as before.

Karika, verse 1.21
Regarding the identity of Prajna, and M the plain common features are that both of them are the ‘measure’ as well as that wherein all merge.

Karika, verse 1.22
One who knows positively, i.e., without a shadow of doubt, the common features that are found in the three states, is worshipped and adored in the world. He is a knower  of Brahman.

Karika, verse 1.23
Having identified the quarters of Atman with the sounds (letters) of Aum, on account of the common features stated above, he who realises the nature of the sound Aum, described above, and meditates upon it, attains to Viśva through the help of A. The meaning is that he who meditates on Aum having  for his support A becomes Vaiśvānara.  Similarly the meditator of U becomes Taijasa. Again the sound M leads its meditator to Prajna. But when M too disappears, causality itself is negated. Therefore about such Aum, which thus becomes soundless, no attainment can be predicated.

Upanishad Verse 12
The amātroḥ (soundless) is that which has no parts (sounds, etc., or letters). This partless Aum which is the fourth, is nothing but Pure Atman. It is incomprehensible, because both speech and mind which correspond to the name  and the object disappear or cease; the name and the object (that is indicated by the name) which are only forms of speech and mind cease or disappear (in the partless Aum), It is the cessation  of the (illusion of) phenomena and all  bliss and is identical with non-duality.  Aum, as  thus understood, has three sounds which are the same as the three quarters and therefore Aum is identical  with Atman. He who knows this merges his self in the Self which is the Highest Reality. Those who know Brahman, i.e., those who realise the Highest Reality merge into Self, because in their case the notion of the cause which corresponds to the third quarter (of Atman) is destroyed (burnt). They  are not born again, because Turiya is not a cause. For, the illusory snake which has merged in the rope on the discrimination of the snake from the rope, does not reappear as before, to those who know the distinction between them, by any effort  of the mind (due to the previous impressions). To the men of dull or mediocre intellect who still consider themselves as students of philosophy, who having renounced the world, tread on the path of virtue and who know the common features between the sounds (mātrāḥ) and the quarters (or parts) as described above,—to them Aum, if meditated upon in a proper way, becomes a great  help to the realisation of Brahman. The same is indicated in the Kārikā later on thus: “The three inferior stages of life, etc” (Māṇḍūkya Kārikā, Advaita Chapter, 16.)

Karika, verse 1.24
Here are, as before, the following verses:
Aumkāra should be known along with the quarters; for the quarters  are identical with sounds (letters) because of their common features described before. Having  thus understood Aumkāra, no other object, seen or unseen, should be thought of; for, the knower of Aumkāra has all his desires fulfilled.

Karika, verse 1.25
The word Yuñjīta means to unify, i.e., to absorb. The mind should be absorbed in Aum, which is of the nature of the Supreme Reality, as explained before. The Aum is Brahman, the ever-fearless. He who is always unified with Aum knows no fear whatever; for the Śruti says, “The knower of Brahman is not afraid of anything”.

Karika, verse 1.26
Aum is both the Lower  Brahman and the Supreme TuriyaWhen from the highest standpoint, the sounds and quarters disappear (in the soundless Aum) it is verily the same as the Supreme Brahman. It is without cause because no cause can be predicated of it. It is unique because nothing else, belonging to any other species-separate from it, exists. Similarly nothing else exists outside it. It is further not related to any effect (because it is not the cause of anything). It is without cause and exists everywhere, both inside and outside, like salt in the water of the ocean.

Karika, verse 1.27
Aum  is the beginning, middle and end of all; that is, everything originates from Aum, is sustained by it and ultimately merges in it. As  the magician, etc. (without undergoing any change in themselves) stand in relation to the illusory elephant, (the illusion of) snake-rope, the mirage and the dream, etc., so also is the sacred syllable Aum to the manifested manifold such as Ākāśa (ether), etc. The meaning is that he who knows thus, the Aum, Atman, which, like the magician, etc., does not undergo any change, at once becomes unified with it.

Karika, verse 1.28
Know Aum as the Isvara present in the mind, which is the seat  of memory and perception, of all things. The man of discrimination realising Aumkāra as all-pervading  like the sky, i.e., knowing it as the Atman, not bound by the law of transmigration, does not grieve; for, there is no cause  of misery for him. The Scriptures also abound in such passages as, “The knower of Atman goes beyond grief.”

Karika, verse 1.29
Amātra or soundless Aum signifies Turiya Mātrā means “measure”; that which has infinite measure or magnitude is called Anantamātra. That is to say, it is mot possible to determine its extension or measure by pointing to this or that. It is ever-peaceful on account of its being the negation of all duality. He who knows Aum, as explained above, is the (real) sage because he has realised the nature of the Supreme Reality. No one else, though he may be an expert in the knowledge of the Scriptures, is a sage.
Kena Upanishad Bhasya / CHAPTER 4
« Last post by Commentary on April 07, 2019, 05:32:41 PM »
4.1 Sa, She; uvaca ha, said, 'Brahma iti, It was Brahman. Brahmanah vai vijaye, in the victory of God, indeed: The devils were conquered only by God, and you were mere instruments there. In the victory that was really His, you mahyadhvam, became elated, you attained glory.' The word etat, in this way, is used adverbially (to modify the verb). 'But yours is this vaingloriousness: "(Asmakam eva ayam vijayah, asmakam eva ayam mahima)-ours is this victory, ours is this glory"' (III. 2). Tatah ha eva, from that, from that utterance of Uma, to be sure; Indra, vidamcakara, learned; brahma iti, that It was Brahman. The emphatic limitation; implied in tatah ha eva, from that alone, to be sure, implies (that he came to learn) not independently.

4.2 Since these gods-Fire, Air, and Indra-approached Brahman through conversation, visualization, etc., tasmat, therefore; ete devah, these gods; atitaram iva, surpassed greatly, through their own excellence, i.e. good luck comprising power, quality, etc.; anyan devan, the other gods. The word iva is meaningless or is used for the sake of imphasis. Yat agnih vayuh indrah, for, (the gods) viz Fire, Air and Indra; te, they, those gods; hi, indeed, nedistham pasparsuh, [A different reading is pasprsuh.] most proximately, intimately, touched; enat, this Brahman, through the process of conversation etc. with Brahman, as described earlier. Hi, because, because of the further reason that; te they; being prathamah (should be prathamah) first, i.e. being prominent; vidamcakara, (should be vidamcakruh), knew; enat, It Brahman,-that 'this is Brahman.'

4.3 Since even Fire and Air knew from the words of Indra alone, and since Indra heard frist from Uma's words that It was Brahman, tasmat vai indrah atitaram iva, therefore, Indra did excel (the other deities). Hi sah enat nedistham pasparsa, for he thouched It most proximately; sah hi enat prathamah vidamcakara brahma iti-this senentece has been already explained.

4.4 Tasya, of the Brahman under discussion; esah adesah, this is the instruction through analogy. That analogy through which the instruction about the incomparable Brahman is imparted is called adesah. What is that? Yat etat, that fact, which is well known among people as the flash of lighting. Since vidyutah vyadyutat, cannot mean that Brahman flashed (vyadyutat) (by borrowing Its light) from lightning, (Vidyutah) ['The meaning, "It flashed from lightning" ' is inadmissible, for Brahman being self-effulgent, Its effulgence cannot be dependent on others. The meaning, "It performed the flashing of lightning," is unacceptable, since the flash that belongs to something cannot be produced by another.'-A.G.] therefore the meaning has to be assumed to be 'the flash of lightning.' A, like, is used in the sense of comparison. The meaning is: 'It is like the flash of lightning'; and (this meaning is acceptable) since it is seen in a different Vedic text, 'Comparable to a single flash of lightning' (Br. II. iii. 6); for Brahman disappeared after revealing Itself but once to the gods like lightning. Or the word tejah (brilliance) has to be supplied after the word vidyutah (of lightning). Vyadyutat (in this case) means, flashed; (and) a means as it were. The purport is: It was as though, the brilliance of lightning flashed but once. The word iti is meant to call back to memory the word adesa; (so the meaning is): This is the adesa, the analogy. The word it is used for joining together. (So the sense is) : Here is another analogy for It. What is that one? Nyamimisat, winked, as the eye did the act of winking. The causative form (in nyamimisat) is used in the same sense as the root itself. The a is used here, too, in the sense of comparison. The meaning is: And it was like the opening and shutting of the eye with regard to its object. Iti adhidaivatam, this is by way of showing analogies of Brahman in a divine context.

4.5 Atha, after this; is being told the analogical instruction adhyatmam, in the context of the soul, with regard to the indwelling Self. Yat etat, that which is a known fact; viz that etat, to this Brahman; gacchati iva ca manah, though the mind goes, as it were, the mind enters into Brahman, as it were, encompasses It as an object. And the fact that anena, by that mind; the spiritual aspirant; abhiksnam, repeatedly; upasmarati, remembers intimately; etat, this Brahman; and the sankalpah, thought of the mind with regard to Brahman. Since Brahman has got the mind as Its limiting adjunct, It seems to be revealed by such states of the mind as thought, memory, etc., by which It seems to be objectified. Therefore this is an instruction about Brahman, through analogy, in the context of the soul. In the divine context, Brahman has the attribute of revealing Itself quickly like lightning and winking ['The winking of the eye is rapid-this is well known; similar is Brahman's power of acting quickly. Its attribute in the divine context is the power to act quickly with regard to creation etc., since there is an absence of obstruction and efforts. The light of lightning covers the whole world at once. Similarly Brahman is unsurpassingly bright by nature, and It accomplishes creation etc. of everything quickly, and It is possessed of supreme glory.'-A.G.]; and in the context of the soul, It has the attribute of manifesting Itself simultaneously with the states of the mind. ['One should meditate thus: "Towards this Brahman, that is of the nature of light, my mind proceeds and there is rests." The instruction in this form is the instruction in the context of the individual soul. The indwelling Brahman becomes revealed to one who meditates thus: "The thoughts in my mind constantly revolve round Brahman."'-A.G.] This is the instruction about Brahman through analogy. The need for this teaching about Brahman through analogy is that It becomes easily comprehensible to people of dull intellect when instruction is thus imparted. For the unconditioned Brahman, as such, cannot be comprehended by people of dull intellect.

4.6 Further, tat, that Brahman; is ha, certainly; tadvanam nama: tadvanam is derived from the words tasya, his, and vanam, adorable; It is adorable to all creatures, since It is their indwelling Self. Therefore Brahman is tadvanam nama, well known as the one to be adored by all beings. Since it is tadvana, therefore tadvanam iti, through this very name, tadvana, which is indicative of Its quality; It is upasitavyam, to be meditated on. The text states the results of meditation [In place of 'upaswasya, of meditation', some read 'upasakasya, to the meditator'.] through this name; sah yah, anyone who; veda, meditates on; etat, the aforesaid Brahman; evam, thus, as possessed of the qualities mentioned above; sarvani bhutani, all beings; ha, certainly; enam, to him, this meditator; abhisamvanchanti, pray, as (they do) to Brahman.

4.7 After being instructed thus, the disciple said to the teacher, 'Bhoh, sir; bruhi, speak of upanisadam, the secret thing that is to be thought about'; iti. To the student who had spoken thus, the teacher said, 'Te to you; upanisad, the secret knowledge; ukta, has been spoken of.' 'What is that again?'-to such a question he answers, 'Te, to you; upanisadam vava abruma iti, I have spoken this very secret; brahmim, relating to Brahman, to the supreme Self- since the knowledge already imparted relates to the supreme Self.' For the sake of (distinguishing) what follows, the teacher delimits (his teaching) thus: 'The Upanisad that I have told you consists of nothing but what has already been presented as the Upanisad of the supreme Self.'

Objection: What motive could have prompted the disciple, who had heard the Upanisad about the supreme Self, to put this question: 'Sir, speak of the Upanisad'? If, now, the question related to what had beeen already heard, then it is useless, isasmuch as it involved a repetition like the grinding over again of what had already been ground. If, again, the earlier Upanisad was incomplete, then it was not proper to conclude it by mentioning its result thus: 'Having turned away from this world, the intelligent ones become immortal' (II. 5). Hence the question is surely improper even if it relates to some unexplained portion of the Upanisad already presented, inasmuch as no remainder was left over. What then is the intention of the questioner?
Answer: We say that this is the intention (of the disciple) : 'Does the secret teaching already imparted need anything as an accessory, or does it not need any? If it does, tell me of the secret teaching with regard to that needed accessory. Or if it does not, then like Pippalada make the clinching assertion; "There is nothing beyond this" (Pr. VI. 7).' Thus this clincher of the teacher; 'I have told you the Upanisad' is justified.

Objection: May it not be urged that this is not a concluding remark, inasmuch as the teacher has something more to add in the statement: 'Concentration, cessation from sense-objects, rites, etc. are its legs' etc. (IV. 8).
Answer: It is true that a fresh matter is introduced by the teacher; but this is not done either by way of bringing in something as an attributive constituent (sesa) of the Upanisad or as an accessory (sahakari) to it, ['By the word sesa is implied an attributive part contributing to the production of the effect (of the main rite). By the word sahakari is implied something that need not necessarily be a constituent, but can be combined (with the principal rite).'-A.G. Both have a bearing on the result.] but rather as a means for the acquisition of the knowledge of Brahman, because tapas (concentration) etc., occurring as they do in the same passage along with the Vedas and their supplementaries, are given an equal status with the latter, and because neither the Vedas nor the science of pronounciation and euphony (siksa) etc., which are their suppliementaries, can directly be either attributive constituents of the knowledge of Brahman or its helpful accessories.

Objection: Should not even things that occur in the same passage be put to separate uses according to their appropriateness? Just as the mantras, occurring at the end of a sacrifice, in the form of a hymn meant for the invocation of (many) deities, are applied with respect to the individual deities concernedc, similarly it can be imagined that concentration, self-control, rites, truth, etc., will either be attributive constituents of the knowledge of Brahman or be helpful accessories (in accordance with their respective appropriateness). [At the end of all sacrifices, the deities are invoked with the hyman beginning with: Now although in this hymn many deities are mentioned, still, it is proper to invoke at the end the diety to whom any particular sacrifice is made, the hymn itself has to be applied in accord with that propriety. Similarly concentration etc., will themselves be used as attributive constituents of knowledge.'-A.G.] As for the Vedas and their subsidiaries, they are means for either knowledge of the Self or rites by virtue of their respective meanings (ideas). In this way this division becomes appropriate when significance of words, relation (of things denoted), and reason are taken into consideration. Suppose we advance such an argument?
Answer: No, because this is illogical. This division does not certainly accord with facts, because it is not reasonable that the knowledge of Brahman, which repels all ideas of distinction of deeds, doers and results, should have dependence on any attributive constituent, or any relation with any helpful accessory, and because the knowledge of Brahman and its result, freedom, are concerned only with the Self which is unassociated with any object. 'He who wants emancipation should for ever give up all works together with their instruments, becuase it is known only by the man of renunication. The state of the supreme Reality that is the same as the indwelling Self is attained by the man of renunciation.' Therefore knowledge cannot reasonably have work either as an accessory or as a complement. Therefore the division of (concentration etc.) on the analogy of the invocation through hymn, occurring at the end of a sacrifice, is quite inappropriate. Hence it is proper to say that the question and the answer are meant for fixing a limit thus: 'The secret teaching that has been imparted extends thus far only; it is adequate for the attainment of knowledge without depending on anything else.'

4.8 Concentration etc. are the means for the acquisition, tasyai, (should be tasyah), of that secret teaching (Upanisad), regarding Brahman which I thus spoke before you. Tapah, the concentration of the body, the senses, and the mind; damah, cessation (form sense objects); karma, rites, Agnihotra etc. (are the means); for it is found that the knowledge of Brahman arises in a man who has attained the requisite holiness by means of purification of the heart through these. For it is a matter of experience that, even though Brahman is spoken of, there is either non-comprehension or miscomprehension in the case of one who has not been purged of his sin, as for instance, in the cases of Indra and Virocana (Ch. VIII. vii-xii). Therefore knowledge, as imparted by the Vedas, dawns on one whose mind has been purified by concentration etc., either in this life or in many past ones, as is mentioned by the Vedic verse: 'These things get revealed when spoken to that high-sould man who has supreme devotion towards the Effulgent One, and the same devotion to his teacher as to the Effulgent One' (Sv. VI. 23). And this is borne out by the Smrti, 'Knowledge dawns on a man on the eradication of sinful acts.' (Mbh. Sa. 204.8). The word iti is used to draw attention to a synecdoche; tha is to say, by the word iti are suggested other factors, beginning with these, which are helpful to the rise of knowledge, such as 'Humility, unpretentiousness,' etc. (G. xiii. 7). (Concentration etc. are the) pratistha, two legs, stands as it were, of this (Upanisad); for when these exist, knowledge of Brahman stands firm and becomes active, just as a man does with his legs. Vedah, the four Vedas; and sarvangani, all the six subsidiaries beginning with the science of pronunciation and euphony (siksa) (are also the legs).
The Vedas are the legs because they reveal the rites and knowledge; and all the angani, subsidiaries, are so because they are meant for the protection of the Vedas. Or since the word pratistha has been imagined to imply the two legs (of the knowledge), the Vedas are its sarvangani, all the other limbs beginning with the head. In this case, the subsidiaries, such as the sicience of pronunciation and euphony, are to be understood to have been mentioned by the word Vedas; because when the principal factor is mentioned, the subsidiaries are mentioned ipso facto, they being dependent on the principal. Satyam ayatanam, satya is the ayatana, the dwelling place where the secret teaching resides. Satya means freedom from deceit and crookedness in speech, mind, and body; for knowledge abides in those who are free from deciet and who are holy, and not in those who are devilish by nature and are deceitful, as the Vedic text says, 'those in whom there are no crooknedness falsehood and deceit' (Pr. I. 16). Therefore satya (truth) is imagined as the abode. Although by implication, truth has already been mentioned as legs, along with concentration etc., still its allusion again as the abode is for indicating that, as a means (for the acquisition of knowledge) it excels others, as the Smrti says, 'A thousand horse-sacrifices and truth are weighed in a balance: and one truth outweighs a thousand horse sacrifices' (V. Sm. 8).

4.9 Yah vai, anyone who; veda evam, realizes thus- as spoken; etam, this thing, this blessed knowledge of Brahman which has been already spoken of in the text beginning with 'Willed by whom' (I. 1), which has been eulogized in the text beginning with, 'It was Brahman indeed' (III. 1), and which is 'the basis of all knowledge' (Mu. I. i. 1)-. Notwithstanding the presentation of the fruit of the knowledge of Brahman in 'Because thereby one gets immortality' (II. 4), it is mentioned at the end by way of a formal conclusion:-(Such a knower) apahatya papmanam, dispelling sin, shaking off the send of mundane existence constituted by ignorance, desire, and work; pratitisthati, remains firmly seated; anante, in the boundless; svarge loke: Svarge loke means in Brahman who is all Bliss. Being qualified by the word ananta, boundless, the word svarga does not mean heaven. Lest the word boundless (ananta), be taken in any secondary sense, the text says jyeye, in the higher, that which is greater than all, in one's own Self which is boundless in the primary sense. The purport is that he does not again return to this world.
Kena Upanishad Bhasya / CHAPTER 3
« Last post by Commentary on April 07, 2019, 05:22:27 PM »
3.1 After hearing the text, 'unknown to those who know well, and known to those who do not know' etc. (II.3), some people of dull intellect may have this kind of delusion: 'It is seen that whatever exists is known through the valid means of cognition; and whatever does not exist remains unknown, is like the horns of a hare, and abosolutely non-existent. Similarly this Brahman, being unknown, is certainly nonexistent.' Lest there be this delusion, this story is begun. For the subsequent passages are seen to be leading to this conclusion: 'Since that very Brahman is the ruler in every way, the supreme Deity of even the deities, the supreme Lord over the lordly beings, inscrutable, the cause of the victory of gods, and the cause of the defeat of the devils, therefore, how can It be non-existent?' Or the story is meant to eulogize the knowledg of Brahman. How? By saying that it was surely by virtue of the knowledge of Brahman, that Fire and other gods attained supremacy over the gods, and Indra got still greater pre-eminence. Or (through the story) it is shown that Brahman is inscrutable, inasmuch as Fire and others, powerful though they are, knew Brahman with sheer difficulty, and so also did Indra, even though he is the ruler of the gods. Or the whole thing is meant to enjoin and injunction regarding the secret teaching (bout meditations) that will follow ['The realization of the Self as Brahman, which is meant for the most advanced ones and which is not an object of knowledge, has been spoken of earlier. Later will be stated the meditation on the qualified Brahman which is for the less advanced people. The following passages present that meditation, since the injunction for it is clearly to be seen (in IV.6-7). so the real significance lies in this. As for the other interpretations (advanced by Sankara), they are merely by way of showing posibilities.'-A.G.] (IV. 4-7). Or the story is meant to show, that apart from the knowledge of Brahman, all notions of agentship etc. that creatures possess, as for instance the conceit of the gods with regard to victory etc., are false. Brahma, the supreme Brahman already spoken of; ha, verily; devebhyah, for the sake of the gods; vijigye, achieved victory. In a fight between the gods and the devils, Brahman, after conquering the devils, the enemies of the world and transgressors of divine rules, gave to the gods the victory and its results for ensuring the stability of the world. Tasya ha Brahmanah vijaye, in that victory which has, indeed, Brahman's; devah, the gods, Fire etc.; amahiyanta, became elated.

3.2 Then, not knowing that this victory and this glory belonged to God who sits in the hearts as the indwelling Self-omniscient, dispenser of the fruits of all works of all creatures, omnipotent, and desirous of encompassing the stability of the world-te, they, those gods; aiksanta, thought; 'Ayam- vijayah, this victory; is eva asmakam, indeed ours, is of ourselves, who are limited by our personalities as Fire and others. Asmakam eva, ours indeed, and not of God as our indwelling Self. is ayam mahima, this glory evidenced by such states as of Fire, Air, Indra, etc. which is experienced by us as the result of victory. This has not been achieved by God who is our indwelling Self.' Brahman ha, surely; vijajnau, knew; tat, that, that erroneous deliberation of those whose thoughts were being directed by a false self-conceit; for Brahman is omnicient by virtue of being the director of the senses of all creatures. Noticing this false idea of the gods, and thinking, 'In order that the gods may not be thus defeated like the devils, as a consequence of their vainglory, I shall, out of grace for them, favour the gods by removing their presumptuousness'-with this idea, It, ha, indeed; for their sake, pradurbabhuva, appeared as an object of perception; tebhyay, to the gods; through an unprecedentedly wonderful and astonishing form created by Brahman's own power of Maya, ['The yoga, or the combination of attributes-Sattva, Rajas, and Tamas is Maya. Through the power of that.'-A.G.] It appeared as an abject of perception to the senses of the gods. The gods na vyajanata, did not comprehend; tat, that , the Brahman which had become manifest; kim iti, as to what; idam yaksam, this venerable, great Being, might be.

3.3 Te, they-those gods who failed to know, It, and were desirous of knowing It, but had fear in their hearts; abruvan, said; agnim, to Fire, (lit.) who goes ahead (of all); and who is jataveda, almost omniscient: [Agni precedes all other deities (agre gacchati) in receiving oblations at sacrifices; and Jataveda is one who knows (veda) all that is created (jata).] O jataveda, you being powerful among us; vijanihi, thoroughly find out about; etat, this Yaksa that is in our view; kim etat yaksam iti, as to what this Yaksa (venerable Being) is.

3.4 Saying, 'Tatha, so be it', iti, this much; Fire abhiadravat, approached, moved, towards It, tat, towards that Yaksa. Tam, to him, to Fire, who had approached and was desirous of asking, but had become silent becasue of absence of arrogance in Its presence; the Yaksa, abhyavadat, said; 'Kah asi iti, who are you?' Thus being asked by Brahman, Fire said, 'Agnih vai, I am Fire (agni) by name, and am also familiarly known as Jataveda, showing thereby his self-importance consisting in his being well known through the two names.

3.5 To him who had spoken thus, Brahman said, 'Tasmin tvayi, in you who are such. who possess such famous names and attributes; kim viryam, what power, what ability, is there?' He replied, 'Daheyam, I can burn up, redcue to ashes; idam sarvam, all this creation that moves and does not move; prthivyam, on this earth;' The word prthivyam is used illustratively (to indicate everything), for even things that are in the region above the earth are surely consumed by fire.

3.6 Tasmai, for him who had such presumption; Brahman trnam nudadhau, placed a straw, in front of Fire. Being told by Brahman, 'Etat, this mere straw; daha, burn, in my front. If you are not able to burn it give up your vanity as a consumer everywhere., (Fire) tat upapreyaya, went near that straw; sarvajavena, with the speed born of the fullest enthusiasm. Going there, tat, that thing; na sasaka dagdhum, he could not burn. That Fire, being unable to burn the straw and becoming ashamed and foiled in his promise, silently nivavrte, withdrew; tatah eva, from that Yaksa; and went back towards the gods (to tell them), 'Na asakam, I did not succeed; vijnatum, in knowing fully; etat, this Yaksa: yat etat yaksam, as to what this Yaksa is.'

3.7 Sri Sankaracharya did not comment upon this mantra.
3.8 Sri Sankaracharya did not comment upon this mantra.
3.9 Sri Sankaracharya did not comment upon this mantra

3.10 Atha, after that; they said to Air; 'O Air, find out' etc. bears the same meaning as before. Vayu (air) is so, called because it blows, goes, or carries smell. Matarisva means that which travels (svayati) in space (matari). Idam sarvam api, all this; adadiya, I can take up, blow away. Yad idam, prthivyam etc. is just as explained earlier.

3.11 Atha indram abruvan maghavan etat vijanihi etc. is to be explaned as before. Indra, who is a great Lord and is called Maghava because of strength, tat abhyadravat, approached that Yaksa. Tasmat, from him, from Indra who had approached Itself (Yaksa); that Brahman, tirodadhe, vanished from sight. Brahman did not so much as grant him an interview, so that Indra's pride at being Indra might be totally eradicated.

3.12 The space, or the part of the space where that Yaksa vanished after revealing Itself, and the space where Indra also was at the time of the desappearance of Brahman, tasmin eva akase, in that very space; sah, he, Indra, stayed on, deliberating in his mind, 'What is this Yaksa?' He did not return like Fire etc. Understanding his devotion to Yaksa, Knowledge (of Brahman) made Her appearance as a woman, in the form of Uma. Sah, he, Indra, ajagama, approached; tam, Her, Uma; who was bahusobhamanam, superbly charming-Knowledge being the most fascinating of all fascinating things, the attribute 'superbly charming' is appropriate for it. He approached her, haimavatim, who was as though attired in dress of gold, i.e. exquistiely beautiful. Or, Uma Herself is Haimavati, the daughter of Himavat (Himalayas). Thinking that, since She is ever in association with the omniscient God, She must be able to know, Indra approached Her; (and) tam, to Her, to Uma; uvaca, said, 'Tell me, kim etat yaksam iti, what is this Yaksa-that showed Itself and vanished?'
Kena Upanishad Bhasya / CHAPTER 2
« Last post by Commentary on April 07, 2019, 05:14:18 PM »
2.1 Fearing that the disciple, to whom has been brought home the conviction, 'You are the Self, which is opposed to the acceptable and, the unacceptable, and which is Brahman', may jump to the conclusion, 'I know myself well enough that I, indeed, am Brahman', the teacher, with a view to dispelling that notion of the disciple, says, 'If you think,' etc.

Objection: Is not such a firm conviction as, 'I know well enough', desirable?
Answer: True, a firm conviction is desirable but not such a one as, 'I know It well enough.' That knowable thing alone that falls within the range of cognition can be known thoroughly, just as an inflammable substance becomes consumable to a fire that burns it, but not so the essence itself of the fire. The well-ascertained purport of all the Upanisads is that the personal Self of each knower is Brahman. Here, too, the same fact has been established in the form of an answer to questions, in the text beginning with, 'That which is the Ear of the ear' etc. (1.2); and the same has been specifically affirmed in the text, 'That which is not uttered by speech' (I. 5). Besides, the positive conclusion of the (traditional) line of knowers of Brahman has been adduced in the text: 'That is surely different from the known; and again, It is above the unknown' (I. 4). And the topic will be concluded thus: 'It is unknown to those who know well, and known to those who do not know' (II. 3). Hence it is proper to dispel the disciple's notion: 'I know well enough.' For the knower cannot be known by the knower, just as fire cannot be consumed by the consuming fire; and there is no other knower different from Brahman to whom Brahman can become a seperate knowable. A separate knower is denied by the Vedic text: 'There is no other knower but this' (Br. III. viii. 11). Therefore the conviction, 'I know Brahman well
enough', is certainly false. Hence the teacher has justifiably said, 'If you think,' etc.

Yadi, if perchance; manyase, you think; su veda iti, 'I know Brahman well enough.' Although the entity may be inscrutable, yet some one who is possessed of real wisdom and who is free from defects, may at some time comprehend It as it was heard of, whereas some one else may not; hence the teacher says with hesitation, 'If you think,' etc. And it has been noticed that when it was declared, ' "The person that is perceived in the eye-is this Self'", so said he (Prajapati). "This is immortal, fearless-this is Brahman"' (Ch. VIII. vii. 4), Virocana, though he was a son of Prajapati, and a scholar, and a king of the demons, still, owing to his natural defects, understood contary to what was taught, an opposite object, viz the body, to be the Self. Similarly,, Indra, the king of the gods, who could not comprehend when instructed once, twice, and thrice, did, at the fourth stage, when his natural defects had been removed, realize the same Brahman that was spoken of at the very initial stage (Ch. VIII. vii-xii). In ordinary life also it is seen that, of the disciples hearing from the same teacher, some one understands accurately, some one inaccurately, some one contrarily, and some one nothing at all. What more need one speak with regard to (the knowledge of) the real nature of the Self which is beyond the senses? In this matter, indeed, all dialecticians, whether they believe in (the) existence or non-existence (of the Self), have got their misconceptions. Therefore though the statement, 'Brahman has been realized', has been made with firm conviction, still the teacher's apprehensive remark, 'If you think,' etc., is quite appropriate in view of the comprehension being difficult. Tvam, you; vettha, know; nunam, certainly; daharam [A different reading is dabhram, having the same sense.] rupam eva api, the very little from (i.e. expression), brahmanah, of Brahman.

Objection: Are there many forms of Brahman, great and small, because of which it is said, 'very little form' etc.?
Answer: Quite so, Many, indeed, are the aspects of Brahman created by the adjuncts of name and form, but not naturally. From Its own standpoint, forms, together with words are denied thus: 'That which is without sound, touch, form, and destruction; likewise tasteless, eternal and odourless' (Ka.I. iii. 15; Nr. 9; Muk.II. 72).

Objection: Is it not a fact that the very attribute by which a thing is determined is its own nature? Therefore that very distinctive feature by which Brahman is defined must be Its nature. Hence it is argued that since consciousness cannot be an attribute of any one of (the elements), earth etc., nor can it be of all of them in their transformation (as body), and as it is not an attribute of either of (the senses such as) the ear etc., or of the internal organ (mind), therefore it is a feature of Brahman; and thus is Brahman defined by consciousness. Thus it has been said, 'Knowledge, Bliss, Brahman' (Br. III. ix. 28. 7), 'Pure intelligence only' (Br. II. iv. 12), 'Brahman is Truth, Knowledge, Infinite' (Tai. II. i. 1), 'Brahman is consciousness' (Ai. V. 3)-thus, too, is the feature of Brahman determined in the Vedic texts.
Answer: Truly this is so. But even so, that aspect is indicated by such words as consciousness, not from the instrinsic point of view, but merely with reference to the limiting adjuncts-mind, body, and senses-, because of Its correspondence with those things, in accordance as the body etc. undergo expansion, contraction, disruption, destruction, etc. But in reality, the conclusion will be: 'unknown to those who know well, and known to those who do not know' (II.3).

The expression, yat, asya, should be construed with the preceding expression, brahmanah rupam (the aspect of Brahman), (meaning thereby: that form of Brahman which ....). Not only do you know very little of the expression of that Brahman that is conditioned by the human personality, but the expression of Brahman as conditioned by divine adjuncts, which you devesu vettha, know among the gods, that too, as known to you, is very little indeed.
This is how I think. Whether the expression be in the human personality or whether it be among the gods, it does not become freed from insignificance, since it is conditioned by adjuncts. The purport is that the Brahman, that is free from all distinctions, that is one without a second, and that is known as Bhuma (great) and eternal, cannot be known as a fully comprehended object. Since this is so, atha, nu, therefore; manye, I think; te, for you; even now, Brahman is mimamsyam eva, certainly to be deliberated on. The disciple having been told so by the teacher, sat in solitude with his mind concentrated, deliberated on the traditional teaching as imparted by the teacher together with its purport, ascertained it by a process of reasoning, made it a matter of personal, experience, approached the teacher, and said 'Now manye, I think; (Brahman) is viditam, known.'

(Teacher):'How (is Brahman known to you)?' (Disciple) : 'Listen!'-

2.2 Na aham manye suveda iti, I do not think, 'I know Brahman well enough.' Being told (by the teacher), 'Then Brahman is not certainly known by you', (the disciple) replies, 'No na veda iti, veda ca, not that I do not know Brahman: and I know, too.' Form the use of the word ca, (and) in the expression veda ca, we are to understand, 'Na veda ca, and I do not know, as well.'
(Teacher): It is not contradictory (to say), 'I do not think, "I know (Brahman) well enough,",' and 'Not that I do not know; I know and I do not know as well'? If you do not consider, 'I know well enough', then how can you consider, 'I know too'? Again if you consider, 'I do not know', then why do you not consider, 'I know well enough'? Leaving out of consideration doubt and false knowledge, it is a contradiction to say that the very same thing which is known by a man is not known well enough by him. Nor can a restrictive rule be laid down to the effect that Brahman is to be known as an object of doubt or false knowledge. For doubt and false knowledge are, indeed, everywhere known to be the causes of harm. Though the disciple was thus given a shaking by the teacher, he remained unmoved. Moreover, revealing his own firm conviction in the knowledge of Brahman, he boldly declared with the strength derived from the traditional knowledge as imparted by the teacher in the sentece, 'It is different from the known and is also above the unknown', as also from the strength derived from reasoning and (personal) realization. How (did he declare)? That is being said; 'Yah, anyone who; nah, among us, among my co-disciples; veda, knows in reality; tat, that, that sentence uttered (by me); he veda, knows; tat, that Brahman.' (Teacher): 'What again is your assertion?' To this the answers: 'No na veda iti veda ca, not that I do not know; I know and I do not know as well.' With a view to showing his concurrence with the idea of the teacher and counteracting the comprehension of people of dull intellect, the disciple repeated with conviction in another language, viz 'Not that I do not know; I know and I do not know as well', the very same thing which was presented in the sentence, 'It is different from the known and it is above the unknown'; and in doing so, he associated with this his own inference and realization. Thus the exclamation, 'He among us who understands that utterance knows that (Brahman)', becomes justifiable. Stepping aside from the dialogue between the teacher and the taught, the Upanisad, speaking for itself, presents in these words yasyamatam etc., the whole of the conclusion arrived at through the dialogue:

2.3 To that knower of Brahman, yasya, to whom; (It is) amatam, unknown-whose view, conviction, is that Brahman is not known; tasya, to him; matam, is known, Brahman is fully known-that is the meaning. Again, yasya, he to whom; (It is) matam, known- he who has the conviction, 'Brahman is known to me'; sah, he; na veda, does not know, to be sure; he does not know Brahman. The two views of the man of knowledge and the man of ignorance, which are thus presented, are being distinctly affirmed (in the second line), avijnatam vijanatam etc. Avijnatam, not known; Brahman is in fact unknown to vijanatam, to the people who know-that is to say, to those who have fully realized. Brahman is vijnatam, known; avijanatam, to those who do not know, to those who have not full realization-that is to say, to those who identify the Self merely with the senses, the mind, and the intellect, but not to those whose intelligence is extremely primitive, (these latter being left out of consideration), for the latter do not have the consciousness, 'Brahman is known by us'. The error involved in the idea, 'Brahman is known by us'. The error involved in the idea, 'Brahman is known to us', is possible for those, however, who, by reason of nondiscrimination between Brahman and the limiting adjuncts, and because of their familiarity with the limiting adjuncts such as the intellect, consider the senses, the mind and the intellect as the Self. Hence the incomplete knowledge is presented as a view to be refuted in the text, 'known to those who do not know'. Or the latter half (of the verse viz) avijnatam etc., is adduced as a reason (for the first half). ['Just as is common experience it is well known that to the people, aware of the nature of the mother of pearl, the silver superimposed on it remains unknown (on that mother of pearl), but to the ignorant alone, the superimposed silver is known (as silver), similarly, knowableness being a thing superimposed on Brahman, the men of realization do not consider that Brahman as known.'-A.G.]
It has been ascertained that Brahman is unknown to those who know. If Brahman be wholly unknown, then there remains no distinction between the ordinary people and the knowers of Brahman. Besides, the statement, 'unknown to those who know', is self contradictory. How then can Brahman be known adequately? To explain this the Upanisad says:

2.4 Pratibodha-viditam, known with reference to each state of intelligence. By the word bodha are meant the cognitions acquired through the intellect. The Self, that encompasses all ideas as Its objects, is known in relation to all these ideas. Being the witness of all cognitions, and by nature nothing but the power of Consciousness, the Self is indicated by the cognitions themselves, in the midst of cognitions, as pervading (all of) them. There is no other door to Its awareness. Therefore when Brhman is known as the innermost Self (i.e. witness) of cognitions, then is It matam, known, that is to say, then there is Its complete realization. Only by accepting Brahman as the witness of all congnitions can it be established that It is by nature a witness that is not subject to growth and decay, and is eternal, pure in essence, the Self, unconditioned, and one in all beings, ['Since the reality of my consciousness, by virtue of which I am the witness, exists equally in all, I am not a mere witness in a single body. And since difference, origination, etc; do not inhere in the witness, therefore the non-duality, eternality, etc. of the witness are also established.'-A.G.] just as it is in the case of akasa (space), because of the nondifference of its characteristics despite its existence in pots, caves, etc. The purport of that very traditional text, 'It is different from the known, and again It is above the unknown' (I. 4), which is thus clarified, is concluded here. For (in support of this) there is the other Vedic text: 'The Witness of vision, the Hearer of hearing, the Thinker of thought, the Knower of knowledge' (Br. III. iv. 2).
Again, if the explanation of pratibodhaviditam be, 'The Self being the agent of the act of knowing, one infers It to be agent of the action from the fact of the cognitive act itself, just as one knows that to be the wind which moves a tree', then the Self is a substance possessed of the power of knowing, but It is not knowledge itself; and as for knowledge, it originates and dies; when knowledge originates, the Self becomes modiified by it; and when knowledge dies, the Self becomes nothing but an unmodified substance with its intelligence destroyed. In such a case, one cannot avoid the objection that the Self (thereby) becomes changeable, composed of parts, non-eternal, impure, etc.
As for the (following) view of the school of Kanada, 'Knowledge, arising from the contact of the soul and the mind, inheres in the soul; hence is the sould endowed with knowership. But it is not changeable; it is merely a substance just like a pot in which colour inheres'-since according to this veiw, too, Brahman is a mere substance without consciousness, it contradicts such Vedic text as, 'Knowledge, Bliss, Brahman' (Br. III. ix. 28.7), 'Brahman is Consciousness' (Ai. V. 3). And as the soul is partless and hence has no locality in it, and as the mind is ever in contact with it, the consequent illogicality of admitting any law regarding the origination of memory becomes insurmountable. Besides, one has to imagine that the Self can have the attribute of coming in contact with others, which idea is repugnant to the Vedas and the Smrtis; for such are the two Vedic and Smrti texts: 'Unattached, for It is never attched' (Br. III. ix. 26), 'It is unconnected, and is the supporter of all' (G. XIII. 14). Moreover, since logic demands that a thing that has attributes, and is not of a different category, can come into contact with another having attributes, therefore it is illogical to hold that the Self which is attributeless, undifferentiated, and distinct from everything else, can come into contact with anything whatsoever that does not belong to the same category. Hence if the Self is the witness of all cognitions, then and not otherwise is established the idea that the Self, which is an effulgence that is in reality enternal and undecaying knowledge, in Brahman. Therefore the expression pratibodha-viditam has the meaning as explained by us.

As for the explanation, 'The expression, pratibodha-viditam means that the Self is known to oneself, it is possible where difference is imagined in a context in which the Self appears as a conditioned thing through identification with the limiting adjunct, intellect, so as to have such apparent activities as knowing the Self by the self (referred to in the texts) : 'Sees the Self in his own self.' (Br. IV. iv.23), 'O Purusottama (lit. Supreme Purusa, i.e. Being), you yourself know your Self through the self (G. X. 15). But in a context where the unconditioned Self is one, there can neither be knowing by oneself nor by another. Besides, It being by nature Consciousness Itself, there can be no dependence on another consciousness, just as a light does not depend on another light.
If the fact of being known to oneself is held in accordance with the Buddhist theory, then knowledge becomes momentary and is left without a Self (Reality); and this will contradict such Vedic texts as: 'For the knower's function of knowing can never be lost, because it is immortal'. (Br. IV. iii. 30), 'Eternal, multiformed, all-pervading' (Mu. I. i. 6), 'That great birthless Self is undecaying, immortal, undying, fearless' (Br. IV. iv. 25).

Others, again, imagine that by the word pratibodha is meant the uncaused knowledge as in the case of a sleeping man; according to still others, pratibodha is the knowledge that flashes but once. ['Once the unchanging Self is realized, there can no more be any knowership and therefore, no possibility of furthor knowledge. Hence the knowledge that flashes but once and becomes the cause of immediate emancipation is called pratibodha,'-A.G.] (To this we say): Whether it be caused or uncaused, and whether it flashes once or twice, it is pratibodha to be sure.
Hi, becasue; vindate, (one) attains; amrtatvam, immortality, existence in one's own Self, emancipation- by virtue of the aforesaid pradibodha, i.e. from the knowledge of the Self as appearing with reference to (i.e. as the witness of) each state of consciousness, therefore, the idea is that the Self is truly known when It is known along with each state of consciousness. Besides, consciousness, as having the indwelling Self as its content, is alone held to be the cause of immortality. Immortality does not surely consist in the Self becoming a non-Self. Immortality being the very nature of the Self, it is certainly without any cause. And thus mortality consists in the Self being perceived as the non-Self through ignornace.

How, again, is immortality attained through the aforesaid knowledge of the Self? This is being answered. Atmana, through one,s own Self; vindate, (one) attains; viryam, strength, capacity. The strength got from wealth, friend, incantation, medicine, asuterity, or Yoga cannot conquer death, for it is produced by impermanent things. But the strength, consequent on the knowledge of the Self, is acquired through the Self alone and not through anything else. Thus, since the strength resulting from the knowledge of the Self is independent of any means of acquistion, that strength alone is able to conquer death. Since the strength produced by the knowledge of the Self is thus attained through the Self, therefore, vidyaya, through knowledge about the Self; (one) vindate, attains; amrtam, immortality. In the Upanisad of the Atharva Veda it is said, 'This Self is not attained by one who has no strength (resulting from steadfastness in the Self)' (Mu. III. ii.4). Therefore the statement of the reason, 'because thereby one attains immortality', is quite appropriate.
Pitiable, indeed, it is to suffer through ignorance, birth, old age, death, disease, etc., among multitudce, birth, old age, death, disease, etc., among multitudes of beings such as gods, men, animals, ghosts, etc., in whom there is an abundance of misery natural to transmigratory existenc. Therefore,

2.5 Cet, if- a man having scriptural sanction and ability; avedit, has known-the Self as defined and in the manner already explained; iha, here, indeed; atha, then; asti satyam, there is truth, there subsist in this human birth the values consisting in long life, wealth, and holiness, ['This is said by way of eulogy. (The idea is that) even worldly reality (or value), comprising long life (avinasa), wealth (Arthavatta), holiness (sadbhava), and fame, comes to the knower of Brahman (as a by-product). In reality, the result consisting in being established in Brahman follows as a necessary consequence.' -A.G.] or supreme reality. Iha, here, even while living, cet, if; a competent man na avedit, has not realized; then there is mahati, great interminable; vinastih, destruction, transmigratory existenc consisting in non-cessation of a continuous succession of birth, old age, death, etc. Therefore the dhirah, wise, Brahmanas (the knowers of Brahman), who are thus familiar with merits and demerits; vicitya, having known, realized, the one reality on the Self; bhutesu bhutesu, in all beings, moving and unmoving; pretya, turning away, desisting; asmat lokat, from this world of ignorance-the world consisting of 'I am mine'- i.e. having attained the non-dual state consisting in beoming identified with the Self of all; amrtah bhavanti, become immortal, become Brahman indeed- this is idea; as it has been said in the Vedic text: 'He who knows that supreme Brahman becomes Brahman indeed' (Mu. III. ii. 9).
Kena Upanishad Bhasya / CHAPTER 1
« Last post by Commentary on April 07, 2019, 05:06:17 PM »
1.1 Kena, by what agent; being isitam, willed, directed; manah, the mind; patati, goes, goes towards its own object-this is the construction. Since the root is cannot be taken here to imply either repetition or going; ['Since the intention here is not to make the mind an object of the concept of either repeated occurrence or going, and since the desire is for knowing some special director of the mind.'-A.G.] it must be understood that the present form of the root is in its sense of desiring. The form in which the suffix it is used in the word isitam is a Vedic licence [The correct form should have been 'esitam.'-A.G.]. Presitam is a form of the same root, with pra prefixed to it, in the sense of directing. If the word presitam alone were used (without isitam) there would arise such an inquiry about the particular kind of director and the direction as; 'By what particular director? And how is the direction?' But the attribute isitam being there, both the questions are set at rest, because thereby is ascertained a special meaning, viz 'directed (presitam) through whose mere will ?' [' By mere presence that involves no effort.'-A.G.]

Objection: If this be the meaning intended, the purpose is served by the expression willed by alone, and the expression directed need not be used. Moreover, since it is reasonable that an additional word should imply an additional meaning, it is proper to understand some special sense as: 'By what is it directed-by will, act, or speech?'
Answer: This cannot be so because of the trend of the question. For the reasonable conclusion derived from the trend (of the question) is that the inquiry is made by a man who has become disgusted with the ephemeral works and their results, such as the assemblage of the body, senses, etc., and seeks to know something other than these, which is unchangeable and eternal. If it were not so, the question would be surely meaningless, since the directorship of the group of body etc. (over the mind) through will, word, and act is a familiar fact.

Objection: Even so, the sense of the word directed is not certainly brought out.
Answer: No, since the word directed can reasonably convey a special sense, viz that it is the question of a man in doubt. Both the adjectives isitam (willed) and presitam (directed), in the sentence willed by whom the directed mind goes, are justifiable as implying: 'Does the directorship belong to the aggregate of body and senses, which is a well-known fact; or does the directorship through mere will, over the mind etc., belong to some independent entity which is different from the aggregate?'

Objection: Is it not a well-known fact that the mind is free and goes independently to its own object? How can the question arise with regard to that matter?
The answer is this: If the mind were independent in engaging and disengaging itself, then nobody would have contemplated any evil. And yet the mind, though conscious of consequences, wills evil; and though dissuaded, it does engage in deeds of intensely sorrowful result. Hence the question, kenesitam patati etc., is appropriate. Kena, by whom; Pranah, the vital force; being yuktah, engaged, directed; praiti, goes, towards its own activity? Prathamah, first, should be an adjective of the vital force, for the activities of all the organs are preceded by it. Imam vacam, this speech, consisting of words; which ordinary people vadanti, utter; kena isitam, by whom is it willed (during that utterance)? Similarly, kah u devah, which effulgent being; yunakti, engages, directs towards their respective objects; caksuh srotram, the eyes and the ears? To the worthy disciple who had asked thus, the teacher said, 'Hear what you have asked for in the question, "Who is that effulgent being who is the director of the mind and other organs towards their own objects, and how does he direct?"'

1.2 Srotrasya srotram, the Ear of the ear. The srotram is that by which one hears, the instrument for the hearing of sound, the organ of hearing which reveals words. He about whom you put the question, 'Who is the effulgent being who directs the eyes and the ears?'-is the Ear of the ear.

Objection: Is it not incongruous to answer, 'He is the Ear of the ear', when the reply should have been, 'So-and-so, with such and such attributes, directs the ears etc.'?
Answer: This is no fault, because His distinction cannot be ascertained otherwise. If the director of the ears etc. could be known as possessed of His own activity, independently of the activities of the ears etc. just as it is in the case of the wielder of sickle etc., then this answer would be incongruous. But as a matter of fact, no director of ears etc., possessed of his own activity, is apprehended here like a mower possessed of a sickle etc. But He can be known (as existing unmixed with the ear etc.) from the logical necessity that such activities as deliberation, volition, determination, of those very composite things, viz the ear etc., must be meant for some one,s benefit. Just as in the case of a house, so also (in this case) there does exist some one, standing outside the conglomeration of ears etc., by whose necessity is impelled the group of ears etc. Thus from the fact that composite things exist for the need of some one else, a director of the ears etc. can be known (i.e., inferred). ['Ears etc. are subsidiary to some one different from themselves, for they are composite things, like a house etc.-by this inference the master of the ears etc. can be known. If he, too, should be a part of the combination, then he will be insentient like the house etc. Then we shall have to imagine another master for him, and so also a third for this. Thus to avoid an infinite regress, a Consciousness that is not a part of the combination is apprehended.'-A.G.] Hence the reply, 'He is the Ear of the ear', etc. is quite appropriate.

Objection: What, again, can there be in the significance here of the expression, 'The Ear of the ear' etc? For just as a light has no need
for another light, so in this context the ear can have no need for another ear.
Answer: There is no such fault. The significance here of the expression is this: The ear, to wit, is seen to be able to reveal its own object. This ability of the ear to reveal its own object is possible only when the eternal non-composite, all-pervading light of the Self is there, but not otherwise. Hence the expression, 'Ear of the ear' etc. is justifiable. To the same effect there are other Vedic texts: 'It is through the light of the Self that he sits' (Br. IV. iii. 6), 'Through His light all this shines' (Ka. II. ii. 15; Sv. VI. 14; Mu. II. ii. 10), 'Kindled by which light the sun shines' (Tai. B. III. xii. 9.7), etc. And in the Gita, '(Know that light to be mine), which is in the sun and which illumines the whole universe' (XV. 12), and '(As the one sun illumines the whole universe), so does He who reside in the body, O descendant of Bharata, illumine the whole body' (XIII. 33). So also in the Katha Upanisad, 'the eternal among the ephemeral, the the consciousness among all that is conscious' (II. ii. 13). It is a commonly accepted belief that the ears etc. constitute the Self of all, and that these are conscious. This is being refuted here. There does exist something which is known to the intellect of the men of realization, which dwells in the inmost recesses of all, which is changeless, undecaying, immortal, fearless, and unborn, and which is the Ear etc., of even the ear etc., i.e. the source of their capacity to act. Thus the answer and significance of the words can certainly be justified.

Similarly, manasah, of the mind, of the internal organ; (He is) the manah, Mind; because the internal organ is not able to perform its own functions-thinking, determination, etc.-unless it is illumined by the light of consciousness. Therefore He is the Mind of the mind, too. Here the mind and the intellect are jointly mentioned by the word manah (mind). Yad vaco ha vacam: the word yat, used in the sense of because, is connected with all such words as srotra (ear) in this way: because He is the Ear of the ear, because He is the Mind of the mind, and so on. The objective case in vaca ha vacam is to be changed into the nominative in consonance with the expression pranasya pranah (the Life of life).

Objection: In conformity with vaco ha vacam, why should not the conversion be into the objective case thus; pranasya pranam?
Answer: No, for it is reasonable to conform to the majority. So in consonance with the two words, (sah and pranah), in sah u pranasya pranah (where they are in the nominative case), the implication of the word vacam is vak, for thus is the reasonable conformity with the majority maintained. Moreover, a thing asked about should properly be denoted in the first (nominative) case. He, of whom you ask, and who is the Life of prana-of that praticular function called life, by Him, indeed, is ensured the capacity of the vital force to discharge its functions of sustaining life, and this is because there can be no sustaining of life by anything that is not presided over by the Self, in accordance with the Vedic texts: 'Who, indeed, will inhale, and who will exhale, if this Bliss (Brahman) be not there in the supreme Space (within the heart)?' (Tai. II. vii. 1), 'Who pushes the prana upward and impels the apana inward' (Ka. II. ii. 3), etc. Here, too, it will be said, 'That which man does not smell with prana (the organ of smell), but that by which prana is implelled, know that to be Brahman' (1.9).

Objection: Is it not proper to understand prana as the sense of smelling (and not life) [The word prana is used in different senses in different contexts. It may mean vital force, exhaling, sense of smell, etc.] in a context which deals with the senses-ears etc.?
Answer: This is true. But the text considers that by the mention of prana (meaning the vital force) the sense of smell is referred to ipso facto. The meaning intended in the context in this: That for whose purpose occurs the activity of all the (motor and sensory) organs is Brahman.
So also He is the caksusah caksuh, the Eye of the eye; the capacity to perceive colour that the eye, the organ of sight, possesses is merely by virtue of its being presided over by the consciousness of the Self. Hence He is the Eye of the eye. Since a questioner's desire is to know the thing he asks for, the expression, 'having known has to be supplied thus: 'Having known Brahman, as the Ear etc. of the ear etc., as indicated before.' This (addition) is also necessary, because the result is stated thus, 'They become immortal' (II. 5), and because the result is stated thus, 'They become immortal' (II. 5), and because immortality is attained through realization. From the fact that a man becomes free after getting realization, it follows (that he becomes immortal) by giving up, (through the strength of knowledge), the group of organs beginning with the ear; that is to say, since by identifying the Self with the ear etc. a man becomes conditioned by these and takes birth, dies, and transmigrates, therefore having realized, as one's Self, the Brahman that is defined as the 'Ear of the ear' etc., and atimucya, giving up selfidentification with the ear etc.-(he becomes immortal). Those who give up self-identification with the ear etc. are the dhirah, intelligent, because the selfidentification with the ear etc. cannot be given up unless one is endowed with uncommon intellect. Pretya, desisting; asmat lokat, from this world of emperical dealings involving ideas of 'I and mine' with regard to sons, friends, wives, and relatives; i.e. having renounced all desires; (they) bhavanti, become; amrtah, immortal, immune from death. This is in accordance with the Vedic texts: 'Not by work, not by progeny, not by wealth, but by renunciation some (rare ones) attained immortality, (Kai. 1.2), 'The self-existent Lord destroyed the outgoing senses; hence one perceives the external things and not the Self within. A rare, discriminating man, longing for immortality, turns his eyes away and then sees the indwelling Self (Ka. II. i. 1), 'When all desires that cling to one's heart fall off, ....then one attains Brahman here' (Ka. II. iii. 14), etc. Or, renunciation of desires being implied in the expression atimucya (giving up) itself, asmat lokat pretya means separating from this body, dying.

1.3 Since Brahman, as the Ear etc. of the ear etc., is the Self of those organs, therefore, tatra, there, to that Brahman; caksuh, the eye; na gacchati, does not go; for it is not possible to go to oneself. Similarly na vak gacchati, speech does not go. When a word, as expressed by the organ of speech, reveals its own idea, speech is said to go to its object. But Brhaman is the Self of that word, as also of the organ that utters it; therefore speech does not go. Just as fire, which burns and illumines, does not burn or illumine itself, similarly is this so. No manah, nor the mind. Though the mind thinks and determines other things, it does not think or determine itself; for of it, too, Brahman is the Self. A thing is cognized only by the mind and the senses. As Brahman is not an object of perception to these, therefore, na vidmah, we do not know, 'That Brahman is of this kind'. Hence na vijanimah, we are not aware of; yatha, the process by which; etat, this Brahman; anusisyat, should be taught, instructed to a disciple-this is the significance. For, a thing that is perceived by the senses can be taught to another through categories denoting class, quality, and action. Brahman is not possessed of these categories, viz class etc.; hence it is very difficult to convince the disciples about It through instruction. In this way the Upanisad shows the necessity of putting forth great effort in the matter of imparting instruction and comprehending its meaning.

The contingency of the total denial of any process of instruction having arisen from the text, 'We do not know Brahman, and hence we are not aware of any process of instructing about It', an exception to this is being stated in the next verse. True it is that one cannot impart knowledge about the Highest with the help of such means of valid knowledge as the evidence of the senses; but the knowledge can be produced with the help of tranditional aurthority. Therefore traditional authority [The word used by Sankara is agama, which leterally means traditional knowledge which has come down through the line of teachers and pupils. By quoting traditional teaching one does not expose one-self to the charge of speaking about something that defies speech.] is being quoted for the sake of imparting instruction about It:

1.4 Anyat eva, different indeed; is tat, that which is the topic under discussion and which has been spoken of as the Ear etc., of the ear etc., and as beyond their reach. It is, indeed, different from the known. The known is very much within the grasp of the act of knowing, that which is the object of the verb, 'to known'. Inasmuch as everything is known somewhere by somebody, all that is manifested is certainly known. The idea is that, It (Brahman) is different from that. Lest, in that case, It should be unknown, the text says, (It is,) atho, again; different aviditat, from the unknown, from what is opposed to the known, from that which consists of the unmanifested ignorance, which is the seed of the manifested. The word adhi, used in the sense of 'above', means 'different' by a figure of speech; for it is well-known that anything that exists above another is different from that other. Whatever is known is limited, mortal, and full of misery; and hence it is to be rejected. So when it is said that Brahman is different from the known it amounts to asserting that It is not to be rejected. Similarly, when it is affirmed that It is different from the unknown, it amounts to saying that It is not a thing to be obtained. It is for the sake of getting an effect, indeed, that somebody different from it acquires some other thing to serve as a cause. For this reason, too, nothing different (from the Self) need be acquired to serve any purpose distinct from the knower (Self). Thus the statement, that Brahman is different from the known and the unknown, having amounted to Brahman being denied as an object to be acquired or rejected, the desire of the disciple to know Brahman (objectively) comes to an end, for Brahman is nondifferent from the Self. (Or, according to a different reading-the desire of the disciple to know a Brahman different from the Self, comes to an end). [The expression concerned is svatmano' nanyatvat brahmavisaya jijnasa, or svatmano' nyabrahmavisaya jijnasa.] For nothing other than one's own Self can possibly be different from the known and the unknown. Thus it follows that the meaning of the sentence is that the Self is Brahman. And this also follows from such Vedic texts as: 'This Self is Brahman' (Ma. 2; Br. II. v. 19, IV. iv. 5), 'that Self which is untouched by sin' (Ch. VIII. vii. 1), 'the Brahman that is immediate and direct-the Self that is within all' (Br. III. iv. 1), etc. In this way, the text, 'Thus we heard' etc., states how through a succession of preceptors and disciples, was derived the purport of the sentence which establishes as Brahman that Self of all which is devoid of all distinguishing features, and is the light of pure consciousness. Moreover, Brahman is to be known only through such a traditional instruction of preceptors and not through argumentation, nor by study (or exposition), intelligence, great learning, austerity, sacrifices, etc. -iti, such (was what) ; susruma, we heard; purvesam, of the ancient teachers; the teachers ye, who; vyaccaksire, explained, taught clearly; nah to us; tat, that Brahman.

The idea that the Self is Brahman having been established through the sentence, 'That is surely different from the known, and again, that is above the unknown', the hearer has this doubt: 'How can the Self the Brahman? For the Self is familarly known to be that which is entitled to undertake rites and meditation and which, being subject to birth and death, seeks to attain either the gods headed by Brahma (Creator ) or heaven by undertaking the practice of rites or meditation. Therefore some adorable being other that that (Self), e.g. Visnu, Isvara (Siva), Indra, or Prana (vital force or Hiranyagarbha) may well be Brahman, but not so the Self; for this is opposed to common sense. Just as other logicians say that the Self is different from the Lord, so also the ritualists worship other gods saying, "Sacrifice to that one", "Sacrifice to that one". Therefore it is reasonable that, that should be Brahman which is known and adorable; and the worshipper should be one who is different from this.' Having noticed this doubt either from the looks or the words of the disciple, the teacher said, 'Don't be in doubt thus;'-

1.5 Yat, that-whose essence consists of Consciousness alone-, which; (is not uttered) vaca, by speech-. Vak (speech) is the organ which, clinging to the eight localities, viz the root of the tongue etc. [Chest, throat, head, root of the tongue, teath, nose, lips, and palate.] , and being presided over by (the god of) Fire, expresses the letters. The letters, too, as limited in their number and as subject to a certain sequence, in conformity with the meaning intended to be conveyed, are also called vak. [The word gau (cow), for instance, consists of the letter g and au which are fixed as regards their sequence so as to be able to express the meaning cow. This is the view of the Mimamsaka school.] Thus also the soud expressible by them, which is the pada (sphota), [This is the view of the Sphotavadi grammarians. 'Sphota is derived from the root sphut in the sense of that which is manifested by letters, i.e., that which imparts definite knowledge of word (pada), sentence, etc. Their idea is that this (pada-) sphota has to be admitted since a unified idea (conveyed by the word) cannot be contingent on a multiplicity of letters.'-A.G.] is called vak. this is in accordance with the Vedic text: 'The letter a, indeed, is all speech. ['That power of Consciousness is vak which is indicated by Om, in which a predominates. (Om is a combination of a, u, m), and this Om is called sphota,-A.G.] And that speech, being manifested as the sparsa letters, the antahstha letters (semi-vowels), and usma letters (aspirates), [Sparsa-25 consonants from ka to ma; antahstha-y, r, l, v; usma-s, s, s, h.] becomes many and multifarious' (Ai. A. II. iii. 7. 13). (Yat, that which) is anabhyuditam, not expressed, not uttered; vaca, by vak, by speech, which has these modifications, viz regulated (material, Rk), non-regulated (prose Yujuh), musical (Sama), true, and false-by that vak which becomes defined as words and to which the organ of speech is subordinate; ['The power of speech that human beings have, is established in sounds and letters, for it is expressed by these.'] yena, that by which-that Brahman, the light of Consciousness, by which-; vak, speech, together with its organs; abhyudyate, is uttered, is expressed, that is to say, is used in relations to the desired meaning-. That which has been spoken of here as 'the Speech of speech' (1.2), and as 'When It speaks, It is called the organ of speech' (Br. I. iv. 7), and 'He who controls the organ of speech from within' (Br. III. vii. 17), etc., in the Brhadaranyaka Upanisad, and about whom the question has been raised thus, 'The (power of) speech that is found in men, is established in sounds. Does any Brahmana know it?', and the answer has been given by saying, 'That by which one speaks is dream is speech,- that eternal power of speech which a speaker has is vak which is in essence, the light of Consciousness. And this follows from the Vedic text, 'For the speaker's power of speech can never be lost' (Br. IV. iii. 26). Tat eva, that indeed, that Self in its true nature; tvam, you; viddhi, know; as brahma, Brahman-(so called) because of its extensity (or unsurpassability)-that which is allsurpassing and is called Bhuma, great (Ch. VII. xxiii. 1). The significance of the word eva is this: Know the Self alone to be the unconditioned Brahman after eradicating all such adjuncts as speech because of which there occur such empirical expressions, with regard to the transcendental, unconditioned, unsurpassable, and equipoised Brahman, as 'It is the Speech of speech', 'the Eye of the eye', 'the Ear of the ear', 'the Mind of the mind', the agent, the enjoyer, the knower, the controller, governor. 'Consciousness, Bliss, Brahman' (Br. III. ix. 28.7), etc. Na idam, this is not; brahma, Brahman; Yat, which; people upasate, meditate on; as idam, this, (as a limited object) possessed of distinctions created by limiting adjuncts-as a non-Self, e.g. God, etc. Although in the sentence, 'Know that alone to be Brahman', it has already been stated that the non-Self is not Brahman, still with a view to enounciating as explicit rule (that leaves no scope for option) the idea is repeated in the sentence, 'This is not Brahman'; or this may be with a view to excluding the identification of Brahman with what is not Brahman.
[In Mimamsa philosophy Niyama-vidhi pins one down to one thing only when alternatives are possible. Here the possibilities are, thinking of both Brahman and non-Brahman as Brahman. And the rule fixes us to the pursuit of Brahman only. Parisankhyavidhi merely excludes something-here the thought of non-Brahman as Brahman. So the text may be interpreted from either point of view.]

1.6 Manas means the internal organs, mind and intellect being taken as one entity. The word manas, derived from the root man in the sense of that by which one thinks, is common to all organs, since, it embraces all objects. In accordance with the Vedic text, 'Desire, deliberation, doubt, faith, want of faith, steadiness, unsteadiness, shame, intelligence, and fear-all these are but the mind' (Br. I. v. 3), mind is that which has desire etc. as its functions. Yat, that-the light of Consciousness illumining the mind-, which; one na manute, does not think nor determine, with that mind, because It rules the mind by virtue of being the enlightener of the mind-. Since the Self, indeed, constitutes the essence of everything, therefore the mind cannot act with regard to its own Self. The mind can think only when it is illumined by the light of Consciousness within. That Brahman, yena, by which;-they, the knowers of Brahman, ahuh, say-; manas, the mind, together with its modes; matam, is tought of, encompassed-. Therefore viddhi, know, tat eva, that very one, the Self of the mind, the internal illuminator, as Brahman. Na idam, etc. is to be understood as before.

1.7 Yat, that which; caksusa, with the eye, associated with the functions of the internal organ; na pasyati, (a man) does not see, does not make an object of perception; yena, that by which; man pasyati; sees, perceives, encompasses, through the light of Consciousness; caksumsi, the activities of the eye-diversified in accordance with the modes of the internal organ-. Tat eva, etc., as before.

1.8 Yat srotrena na srnoti, that which man does not hear with the ear, that is presided over by the deity of the quarters, that is produced from akasa, and that is connected with the activity of the mind; yena, that by which, by which light of Consciousness; idam srotram srutam, this will-known ear is encompassed-. Tat eva, etc., as before.

1.9 Pranena, by the organ of smell, produced from earth, existing in the nostrils, and associated with the activities of the internal organ and the vital force; yat, that which; man na praniti, does not smell, does not comprehend like smell; yena, that light of the Self by which; pranah, the organ of smell-being illumined as an object; praniyate, is impelled-towards its own object-. All the rest, tat eva etc., is just like what has gone before.

Kena Upanishad Bhasya / Introduction
« Last post by Commentary on April 07, 2019, 05:01:58 PM »
Since the Upanishad commencing with Kenesitam and revealing the supreme Brahman has to be spoken of, the ninth chapter [The Kena Upanisad forms part of the Upanisad Brahmana of the Talavakara branch of the Sama-Veda.] begins. Earlier than this, rites have been exhaustively dealt with, and the (different) meditations on the vital force as the basis of rites, as also the meditations on the (Various) Samas [A Sama song is divided into parts-five or seven.

This Sama as also each of its parts has to be thought of variously. For such meditation see Ch. I. and II.], forming parts of rites, have been spoken of. After that is stated the meditation on the Gayatra Sama, (thought of as the vital force), which ends with a succession of teachers and pupils and which relates to effects of action. If all these rites and meditations, as enjoined, are properly observed, they become the cause of purification of the mind of one who is free from desires and longs for emancipation. But in the case of one who cherishes desires and has no enlightenment (i.e. meditation on or knowledge of gods), the rites by themselves, as enjoined in the Vedas and Smrtis, become the cause for the attainment of the Southern Path and for returen to this world. But through activity prompted by natural impulses that are repugnant to the scriptures, there will be degradation into lower beings ranging from beasts to the motionless ones (trees etc.) in accordance with the Vedic text. '(If one does not perform rites or meditation), then one does not proceed by either of these Paths (Northern or Southern). They become these little creatures (mosquitioes etc.) that are constantly subject to birth and death following the (divine) order "Be born and die." This is the third state' (Ch.V.x.8); and in accordance with the words of the other text: 'Three kinds of beings [Born from the womb, egg, or earth.] followed a course that deviates (from these Northern and Southern Paths)' [And thereby they tread a path of sorrow.] (Ai. A. II. i. 1. 4).

The longing for the knowledge of the indwelling Self arises only in that desireless man of pure mind who has renounced all transitory, external means and ends by virtue of the emergence of a special kind of tendency (in his mind) created by works done in this life or in previous ones. This fact is being shown in the form of questions and answers by the Vedic text beginning with Kenesitam. In the Katha Upanisad, too, it is said, 'The selfexistent Lord destroyed the outgoing senses; therefore one sees the outer things and not the Self within. A rare discriminating man, desiring immortality, turns his eyes away and then sees the indwelling Self' (Ka. II. i. 1) etc. And in the (Mundaka) Upanisad of the Atharva-Veda it is said, 'Having examined the worlds attainable by work thus:
"The unproduced (everlasting emancipation) is not to be produced by work", the Brahmana should resort to renunciatin. In order to know that Reality fully, he must go, with sacrificial faggots in hand, only to a teacher versed in the Vedas and is established in Brahman' (Mu. I. ii. 12). In this way alone, does a man of detachment acquire the competence to hear, meditate on, and realize the knowledge of the indwelling Self, and not otherwise. Besides, as a result of this realization of the indwelling Self as Brahman, there comes the total cessation of ignorance which is the seed of bondage and the cause of the emergence of desire and activity, in accordance with the verse: 'What sorrow and what delusion can there be for that seer of oneness?' (Is.7); and also in accordance with the Vedic texts: 'The knower of the Self transcends sorrow' (Ch. VII.1.3); 'When the One that is both cause and effect is realized the knot of the heart (of the seer) gets untied, all (his) doubts are resolved, and all karma is consumed' (Mu. II. ii. 8) etc.

Objection: May it not be argued that this result can be attained even from Knowledge [The word jnana occurs in two senses: (i) Vedantic knowledge and (ii) knowledge about gods or meditation on them. Jnana in the second sense can be combined with rites and duties, but not Vedantic jnana.] coupled with rites and duties?
Answer: No, because in the Vajasaneyaka (Brhadaranyaka) Upanisad that (combination of rites and meditation) has been spoken of as the cause of a different result. Starting with the text, 'Let me have a wife' (Br. I. iv. 17), the Vajasaneyaka shows in the text, 'This world of man is to be won through the son alone, and by no other rite; the world of the Manes through rites; and the world of the gods through meditation' (Br. I. v. 16), how rites and duties lead to the attainment of the three worlds that are different from the Self And there (in that Upanisad itself), again, the reason for embracing renunciation is adduced thus: 'What shall we achieve through children, we to whom the Self we have attained is the goal?' (Br. IV. iv. 22). The explanation of that reason is this: What shall we do with progeny, rites, and meditation combined with rites, which are the means for the attainment of worlds other than that of the Self, and are the causes for the attainment of the three worlds of men, Manes, and gods? Nor are the three worlds-transitory and attainable by means as they are-desirable to us, to whom is desirable the world that is natural, 'birthless, undecaying, immortal, fearless' (Br. IV. v. 25), that 'neither increases nor decreases through work' (Br.IV.iv.23), and is eternal. And being eternal, it is not to be secured by any means other than the cessation of ignorance. Hence the only duty is to renounce all desires after the realization of the unity of the indwelling Self and Brahman. Besides, the knowledge of the identity of the indwelling Self and Brahman militates against its co-existence with work, because the realization of the identity of the Self and Brahman, which eradicates all dual ideas, cannot reasonably coexist with work which presupposes the ideas of the difference of agent and results; for the object (of knowledge) being the deciding factor, the realization of Brahman is not determined by human effort. ['An object of injunction is that which has to be achieved by effort consequent on the injunction. Knowledge is not of that kind'-A.G. The object is the determining factor as regards the content of any valid knowledge. Neither injunction nor any accessory has any effect here.]

Therefore this desire to know the indwelling Self, in the case of a man who has renounced all seen and unseen results attainable by external means, is being shown by the Vedic text beginning with Kenesitam. But the object (of the inquiry) being subltle, the presentation in the form of questions and answers of the student and teacher leads to easy comprehension; and it is also shown that the object is not realizable through mere dialectics. Moreover, in accordance with the Vedic text, 'This wisdom is not to be attained through dialectics' (Ka. I. ii. 9), and the obligation about taking a teacher implied in the Vedic and Smrti texts, 'One who has a teacher acquires knowledge' (Ch. VI. xiv. 2), 'Such knowledge alone as is acquired from a teacher becomes the best' ['Leads to the acquisition of the best result.'-A.G.] (Ch. IV. ix. 3). 'Learn that through obeisance' (G. IV. 34), it can be imagined that someone, having found no refuge in anything other than the indwelling Self, and having a longing for the fearless, eternal, auspicious, and unshakable (Brahman), approached a teacher who is established in Brahman, and asked:
Katha Upanishad Bhasya / CHAPTER 2 - SECTION 3
« Last post by Commentary on April 07, 2019, 04:43:33 PM »
As in the world the root of a (silk-cotton) tree can be taced by coming to know its cotton, [By seeing the cotton of the silk-cotton tree etc. one can infer that it comes from a tree which, though unseen, is rooted somewhere. Similarly, since the effect, the world, is seen, therefore its cause. Brahman, though unseen, must be there.] similarly the sixth canto is commenced in order to ascertain the real nature of Brahman through the determination of the tree which is the effect that the world is, of which Brahman is the root:

2.3.1. Urdhvamulah, that which has its roots above-the root that is the state of supreme Visnu. This tree of the world, comprising everything from the Unmanifested to the immovables, has its root above. It is called vrksa (tree) because (of the root-meaning) of being felled. It consists of many evils, such as birth, old age, death, sorrow, etc.; it changes itself every moment, inasmuch as no sooner as it seen than its nature is destroyed like magic, water in a mirage, a city in the sky, etc.; and it ceases to exist ultimately like a tree; it is without any heart-wood like the stem of a plantain tree; it is subject to hundreds of doubts in the minds of sceptics; its reality is determined in its true colour by the seekers of truth [Or, according to another reading, 'Its nature cannot be fixed as such and such by the seekers of truth.']; its essence lies in its root, the supreme Brahman, ascertained in Vedanta; it grows from out of the seed of ignorance, [Superimposition.] desire, action, and the unmanifested; it has for its sprout Hiranyagarbha, the inferior Brahman, comprising the two powers of knowledge and action; it has for its trunk the diverse subtle bodies of all creatures; its vigour of growth results from the sprinkling of the water of desire; it has for its tender sprouts the objects of the senses of knowledge; Its leaves are the Vedas, the Smrtis, logic, learning, and instruction; Its lovely flowers are the many deeds such as scrifice, charity, austerity, etc.; Its various tastes are the experience of happiness and sorrow; its innumerable fruits are the means of subsistence of beings; it has its secondary roots well developed, entwined, and firmly fixed through the sprinkling of the water of desire (for those fruits) [Desires for works develop from desires for results; they get entwined and mixed up with various dispositions-sattvika, rajasika, and tamasika (calm, active, and lazy).] it has for its nests the seven worlds beginning from the one called Satya, built by the birds which are the living beings from Brahma downwards; it has its uproar, rendered tumultuous through the various sounds arising from dancing singing, instrumental music, disport (play, jest, etc.), chapping on the arms, laughing, pulling, crying, exclaiming 'Alas, alas!,' 'Leave me, leaveme!', induced by mirth and grief arising from the enjoyment and pain of living beings; and it is felled by the weapon of detachment consisting of the realization of the identity of Brahman and the Self as inculcated by Vedanta. This tree of the world is an asvatthah [Lit. a, not; sthata, existing; svas, tomorrow, impermanent.]-its nature is ever unsteady, like the peepul tree, shaken as it is by the wind of desire and deeds; it is avaksakhah-downwards are its branches, consisting of heaven, hell, and states of beasts and ghosts; (it is) sanatanah, existing from time immemorial, having no beginning. Tat eva, that very thing-which is the root of the tree of the world-is; sukram, white, pure, resplendent-being in reality the light of the Self which is Consciousness; tat brahma, that, indeed, is Brahman, being the greatest of all; tat eva, that indeed; ucyate, is called; amrtam, indestructible by nature, being true. All else is false, being 'mutable, existing as mere name dependent on speech' (Ch VI. i. 4), and hence it is mortal. Tasmin, on him, on Brahman that is absolutely true; sarve, all; lokah, the worlds-which are comparable to a city in the sky, or water in a mirage, or jugglery, and which vanish on the realization of the supreme Truth; sritah, are fixed-during creation, existence, and dissolution. Kah cana na, nothing whatsoever-no modification; atyeti, transcends; tat u, that-that Brahman; just as the products like pot etc. do not transcend (their material) earth etc. This verily is that. It may be said that the very root of the world, Brahman, by realizing which it is stated that people become immortal, does not exist, and that this (universe) has emerged out of nothing. But this is wrong:

2.3.2. Prane (Sati), the supreme Brahman ['Brahman, being the source of activity of even the vital force (prana), is figuratively referred to by the word prana'-A.G.] (being there); yat idam kim ca jagat sarvam, all this universe that there is; nihsrtam (sat), having emerged; ejati, moves -acts regularly. That Brahman which is thus the cause of the orgination etc. of the world is mahat bhayam, greatly terrifying-bhayam being derived in the sense of that from which one gets fear; vajram udyatam, like an upraised thunderbolt. The idea imparted is that just as servants finding their master in front with an uplifted thunderbolt, methodically follow his command, similarly this universe consiting of the sun, the moon, the planets, the constellations, and the stars, continues methodically without even a moment's respite because it has a God. Ye, those who; viduh etat, know this-the Brahman as the witness of all the activities of their minds; te, they; bhavanti, become; amrtah, possessed of deathlessness; The text says how out of fear of Him the world behaves:

2.3.3. Bhayat, from fear; (asya, of Him)-of the supreme Lord; agnih tapati, Fire burns; bhayat, from fear; tapati; shines; suryah, the Sun; bhayat indrah, from fear, Indra; ca, and; vayuh, Air; mrtyuh ca, and Death; pancamah, the fifth; dhavati, runs. For unless there was a ruler, like one with an uplifted thunderbolt in hand, over these protectors of the world who themselves are lordly and powerful, there would not have been any regulatged activiy as that of servants trembling out of fear for their master.

2.3.4. Cet, if; (one) being competent; asakat, i.e. saknoti, succeeds; boddhum, in knowing-knows that Brahman which is the cause of this fear; even iha, here-while still living; prak sarirasya visrasah, before the disintegration, falling off, of the body; then one becomes free from the bondage of the world. If one does not succeed in knowing, them tatah, because of that non-realization; sargesu lokesu, in the worlds of creatable things-on earth etc., the word sarga being derived from the root srj, in the sense of the places where creatable beings are created; kalpate, one becomes fit; sariratvaya, for embodiment; the idea is that one assumes a body (in those worlds). Hence effort is to be made for the realization of the Self before the falling off of the body, for here alone it is possible for the vision of the Self to be as clear as that of a face in a mirror, whereas this is not possible in other worlds apart from that of Brahman, which however, is difficult to attain. How? This is being answered:

2.3.5. Yatha, as-as one sees oneself very distinctly reflected; adarse, in a mirror; tatha, similarly; here atmani, in one's own intellect-the idea is that, when the intellect has become spotless like a mrror, there springs a distinct vision of the Self. Yatha svapne, as in a dream-the vision arising from the impressions of the waking state is indistinct; tatha, similarly; indistinct is the vision of the Self pitrloke, in the world of the manes-because of being entangled in the enjoyment of the results of work. Yatha apsu, as in water; one's form pari iva dadrse-is equivalent to paridrsyate iva-appears to be without clear demarcation of the parts (hazy); tatha, similarly; indistinct is the vision of the Self gandharvaloke, in the world of the Gandharvas. It is known from the authority of the scriptures that similar is the case in other worlds as well. Only in one, viz brahmaloke, in the world of Brahma, is the vision very distinct; chaya-atapayoh iva, as (it is) in the case of shade and light. But that world is difficult to attain, being the result of many special kinds of work and knowledge (i.e. of rites and meditation). Therefore, efforts should be made for the realization of the Self here itself. This is the idea. How is He to be known and what is the need of His knowledge? This is being answered:

2.3.6. Indriyanam, of the senses-such as ear etc.; prthak utpadyamananam, that are separately produced-from their sources, akasa etc., for the purpose perceiving their own respective objects; matva, knowing-through discrimination; their prthagbhavam, difference-thier nature of being essentially dissimilar to the nature of the Self that is extremely pure, absolute, and consciousness alone; similarly (knowing their) udayastamayau, (rising and setting) creation and dissolution-in relation to the waking and sleeping states-as belonging to them only and not to the Self; dhirah, the intelligent man; na socati, does not grieve; for the constantly uniform nature of the Self being unchageable, the Self cannot be the cause of sorrow. Similar is another Vedic text: 'The knower of the Self crosses over sorrow.' (Ch. VII. i.3) The Self, in relation to which the dissimilarity of the senses has been pointed out, is not to be realized outside, for It is the inmost Self of all. How can that be? This is being said:

2.3.7. The sense-objects, belonging to the same class as the snese, are understood to be enumerated by the mention of the senses. The rest is as before (in I. iii. 10). By the word sattva, the intellect is referred to here.

2.3.8. Avyaktat tu parah, the Purusa is superior to the Unmanifested; and he is vyapakah, pervasive-for He is the source even of all pervasive things such as space etc.; alingah-linga, derivatively means that sign through which anything is comprehended, i.e. intellect etc.-He who has not that linga, intellect etc., is indeed alingah; that is, He is devoid of all worldly attributes; eva, indeed. Yam jnatva, having known whom-from the teacher and the scriptures; jantuh, a man; mucyate, becomes freed-even while living-from the bondages of the heart, such as ingnorance etc.; and when the body falls he gacchati amrtatvam ca, attains immortality as well. This part is to be constructed with the earlier thus: He, the alingah (incomprehensible) Purusa, by knowing whom a man becomes free and attains immortality, is superior to the Unmanifested. How can there, then, be any possibility of the vision of the incomprehesible? This is being said:

2.3.9. Asya rupam, His form-the form of this inmost Self; na tisthati, does not exist; samdrse, as an object of vision. Therefore, na kah cana, nobody; pasyati, sees, perceives; enam, this Self-that is being considered; caksusa, through the eyes-i.e. through any of the senses, for the word caksuh (eyes) is used here suggestively for all the senses. How, then, He is to be seen is being said: hrda, by that which is in the heart; manisa, by the intellect-manit being that which, as the controller, rules (iste) the mind (manas) characterized by thought. Abhiklrptah, when (It is) confirmed, i.e. revealed; by that (intellect), the ruler of the mind, which is in the heart and is free from occupation with objects; manasa, through the adequate vision consisting in deliberation; then 'the Self can be realized'-this should be supplied to complete the sentence. Ye, those who; viduh, know; etat, this, this fact that the Self is Brahman; te, they; amrtah bhavanti, become immortal. How can the ruler in the heart be attained? For that purpose yoga is being inculated:

2.3.10. Yada, at the time when; panca jnanani, the five senses of knowledge-such as ear etc., which are called jnana (knowledge), being meant for it; saha manasa, together with the mind, which the senses follow-together with the internal organ (mind) which is (now) weaned away from (its functions of) thinking etc.; avatisthante, are at rest-in the Self alone, after desisting from their objects; ca buddhih, and the intellect-characterized by determination; na vicestate, [An alternative reading is vicestati.] does not engage in its own activities; tam, that (state); ahuh, they call; paramam gatim, the highest state.

2.3.11. Manyante, they consider; tam, that state-which is such; viz sthiram intriyadharanam, the steady control of the senses, i.e. keeping the inner and outer organs steady; yogam iti, as yoga (joining)-though in reality it is disjunction, for this state of the yogi consists in the cessation of the contact with all evils, and in this state, indeed, is the Self established in Its own nature, free from the superimposition of ignorance. Bhavati, one becomes; apramattah, unerring-ever careful about the concentration of mind; tada, at that time-at the very time that one commences yoga, which meaning follows from the implication of the context; for when the intellect etc. cease to function, there can be no possibility of carelessness; therefore, the carefulness is enjoined even before the cessation of the activities of the intellect etc. Or, since unimpeded vigilance is possible only when the senses are kept steady, therefore, it is stated, 'One becomes unerring at that time.' Why? Yogah hi prabhavapyayau, for yoga is subject to growth and decay-this is the meaning. Therefore, vigilance is needed for avoiding decay. [The sentence 'Therefore' etc., follows up the first interpretation, where the Upanisad gives an injunction about the need of vigilance, the word 'becomes' being transformed into 'should become'. The second interpretation, starting with 'Or, since' is a statement of fact.]
This is the idea.

If Brahman be an object of the activities of the intellect etc., then It should be specifically apprehended as 'This is such and such'; and since It cannot be perceived on the cessation of the intellect etc., there being then no instrument for cognition, Brahman should surely have no existence (then). It is a well-known fact in the world that a thing exists so long as it is within the range of an instrument of cognition, and the contrary one is non-existent. Hence yoga is useless; or Brahman is to be perceived as non-existing inasmuch as It cannot be cognized. This contingency having arisen, this is the reply:

2.3.12. It is true na eva vaca, neither through speech; na manasa, nor through mind; na caksusa, nor through eye; nor even through the other senses; praptum sakyah, can It be attained. This is the idea. Still though It is devoid of all attributes, It does exist, since It is known as the root of the universe; for the denial of effects presupposes some existence as their ultimate, limit. Similarly, this effect (in the form of the universe) when traced back in an ascending order of subtleness, makes one apprised of the idea of existence as its ultimate resort. Even when the intellect is being attenuated through the sublation of objects, the intellect dissolves only as pregnant with a concept of existence. And reason, indeed, is the proof for us in ascertaining the real nature of the existent and the non-existent. If the world had no root, this creation would be filled with non-existence and would be perceived as non-existent. But in fact, this is not so; it is perceived as 'existing', just as a pot etc., produced from earth etc., are perceived as permeated with earth. Therefore the Self, the root of the universe, is to be realized as existing. Why? Asti iti burvatah, apart from the faithful one who, following the scriptures, speaks of existence; katham, how; can tat, that Brahman; upalabhyate, be known; anyatra, anywhere else-in the one who holds the theory of non-existence, in the one who thinks perversely in this way: The root of the world, the Self, does not exist; this effect is causeless, and it gets dissolved into non existence as its end'? The idea is that It is not perceived in any way.

2.3.13. Therefore, eschewing the devilish company of those who advance the theory of non-existence, astiti eva upalabdhavyah, the Self should be realized as existing (i.e. immanent in all)-as productive of effects in which existence inheres, and as having the intellect etc. as Its limiting adjuncts. But when the Self is devoid of all that and is not subject to changes -and effects do not exist apart from their cause, because of the Vedic text, 'All transformation has speech as its basis, and it is name only. Earth as such is the reality' (Ch. VI. i. 4)-then, of that unconditioned, attributeless Self that is free from becoming an object of such concepts as existence and non-existence; tattvabhavah, the true (transcendental) nature-(bhavati) is revealed. (Tattvabhavena), in that (truly revealed) form too-'is the Self to be realized', this much is to be supplied. The sixth (genitive) case in ubhayoh is used to imply selection. Ubhayoh, of the two (aspects), again-of the conditioned and the unconditioned, of the aspects of immanence and transcendence; the tattvabhavah, the real (transcendental) aspect; asti iti eva upalabdhasya of that very Self which was earlier realized as existing [The Self which was inferred as existing from the fact of Its being the cause of all the effects that are perceived as existing.] (as immanent), i.e. which was known through the idea of existence called up by the limiting adjuncts that are themselves the effects of an existing entity; (that real aspect of that very Self) prasidati, becomes favourably disposed for revealing Itself later on-i.e. to the man who had realized It earlier as existence; the real aspect being that from which all limiting adjuncts have vanished, which is different from the known and unknown, is non-dual by nature, and is ascertained by such Vedic text as, 'not this, not this' (Br. II. iii. 6, III. ix. 26), 'not gross, not subtle, not short' (Br. III. viii. 8), 'in the changeless, bodiless, inexpressible, unsupporting' (Tai. II. vii. 1), etc.

2.3.14. Thus, of the man who has realized the supreme Reality, yada, when; sarve kamah, all desires; pramucyante, fall off, are borken to pieces, owning to the obsence of anything else to be desired; ye, the desires which; hrdi sritah, clung to the heart; asya, of that man of knowledge, before his enlightenment-the intellect, and not the Self, being the seat of the desires, which fact is also supported by another Vedic text, 'desire; thought, (doubt, etc., all these are but the mind)' (Br. I. v. 3); atha, then; he who was before enlightenment martyah, mortal; amrtah bhavati, becomes immortal, after enlightenment-by virtue of the elimination of death constituted by ignorance, desire, and deeds; death, which causes departure, having been destroyed, there remains no possibility of departure, and hence atra, here itself; owing to the cessation of all bondage, like the blowing out of a lamp, samasnute brahma, (he) attains Brahman, i.e. (he) becomes Brahman Itself. When again will the desires to totally uprooted? This is being said:

2.3.15. Yada, when; sarve granthayah, all the knots-i.e. all concepts arising from ignorance, that bind one fast like knots; hrdayasya, of the intellect; prabhidyante, get shattered, are destroyed; iha, here-even while a man is living. The concepts arising from ignorance are, 'I am this body', 'This wealth is mine', 'I am happy and unhappy', etc. When the bondages of ignorance are destroyed by the rise of the opposite knowledge of the identity of the Self and Brahman, in the form, 'I am Brahman indeed, and am not a transmigrating soul', then the desires originating from the knots become totally eradicated. Atha martyah amrtah bhavati, then a mortal becomes immortal. Etavat hi, this much only is-there should not be any anticipation that there is more; anusasanam, the instruction; the expression, 'of all the Upanisads', should be supplied to complete the sentence.

By asserting 'He attains Brahman here' (II. iii. 14), it has been declared that there is no going for an enlightened man of whom all the knots of ignorance become destroyed on the realization of the identity of the Self with the all-pervading and absolutely attributeless Brahman, and who becomes Brahman even while living, which fact is also supported by another Vedic text: 'Of him the organs do not depart. Being but Brahman he is merged in Brahman.' (Br. IV. iv. 6) But for those who are not much advanced in the knowledge of Brahman, who are engaged in other kinds of knowledge (i.e. in worship and meditation), and who are fit for the world of Brahma, as also for those others who are ther opposite of these and are fit for worldly existence, this particular kind of path is stated with a view to eulogizing the superior result of the knowledge of Brahman that is being treated here.
Moreover, the knowledge of Fire had been questioned about and was imparted. The process of the attainment of the fruit of that knowledge has also to be described. Hence this verse is begun. As to that,

2.3.16. The nerves that issue out of the heart of a man are satam, a hundred in number; ca eka, and one-called susumna. Tasam, of these; eka, the one-the susumna; abhinihsrta, goes out; by piercing through murdhanam, (the crown of) the head. At the time of death one should bring one's mind under control through that (susmna) nerve, and get it concentrated in the heart. Taya, through that nerve; urdhvam ayan, going up-along the Path of Sun (uttara-marga); one eti, attains; amrtatvam, immortality-which is relative because of the Smrti, 'The place (i.e. Brahmaloka) that lasts till the absorption of all the elements (i.e. cosmic dissolution) is called immortality.' (V. P. II. viii. 97) Or, after having enjoyed incomparable pleasures abounding in the world of Brahma, he attains immortality, in the primary sense of the word, along with Hiranyagarbha (brahma), in due course of time. Visvak anyah, the other nerves that branch out (otherwise), in different directions; become the causes utkramane, of death, i.e. for the attainment of the worldly state alone. Now, with a view to concluding the purport of all the cantos the Upanisad says:

2.3.17. Angusthamatrah purusah antaratma sada jananam hrdaye, in the heart as related to men; samnivistah-all this is an has been already explained (vide II. i. 12-13). Tam, Him; pravrhet, one should raise, should pull out, i.e. should separate; svat sarirat, from one's own body. like what? That is being said: Dhairyean, unerringly; isikam iva munjat, like a stalk from the Munja grass, that is inside it. Vidyat, one should know; tam, that thing-the absolute Consciousness that has been separated from the body; to be sukram amrtam, pure and immortal-to be the Brahman previously described. The repetition (of 'Him one should......,' etc.), as also the word iti, is to show that the Upanisad is concluded. Now this conclusion of the purport of the story is being stated with a view to eulogizing the knowledge:

2.3.18. Naciketa, labdhva, having attained-from Death, through the granting of boons; mrtyuproktam etam vidyam, this knowledge of Brahman imparted by Death-as stated above; yogavidhim ca krtsnam, and the process of yoga in its entirety, i.e. together with all its accessories and results. What happened to him after that? Brahmapraptah abhut, (he) attained Brahman, i.e. became free. How? By having already become, virajah, free from virtue and vice; (and) vimrtyuh, free from desire and ignorance, through the acquistition of knowledge. Not only Naciketa, but anyah api, anyone else, too-becomes like Naciketa (a knower of Brahman) by attaining the Self, existing in the context of the body, as one's own innermost reality in Its absoluteness, and not in any form other than as the indwelling Self. He who knows adhyatmam eva, the Self that exists in the context of the body-in the manner as described; who is an evamvit, a knower of this kind; 'he, too, having become virajah, (free from virtue and vice); becomes vimrtyuh (free from desire and ignorance) [In this context some translate vimrtyuh as 'immortal'.]-by knowing Brahman'-this (sentence) is to be added to complete the idea.
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