Author Topic: CHAPTER 2 - SECTION 1  (Read 273 times)


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« on: April 09, 2019, 09:47:36 PM »
2.1.1 From that Brahman indeed, which is this Self, was produced space. From space emerged air. From air was born fire. From fire was created water. From water sprang up earth. From earth were born the herbs. From the herbs was produced food. From food was born man. That man, such as he is, is surely a product of the essence of food. Of him this indeed, in the head; thsi is the southern (right) side [Paksah is interpreted as 'wing' by A. G. and S.]; this is the northern (left) side; this is the self; this is the stabilizing tail. He also is a verse pertaining to that very fact:

Brahmavit, the knower of Brahman: Brahman is that whose characteristics will be stated and who is called Brahman because of (the etymological sense of) brahattamattva, being the greatest. He who vetti, knows, that Brahman is brahmavit. He apnoti, attains; param, the absolutely highest. That very Brahman (that occurs as the object of the verb, vid, to know) must be the highest (goal as well), since the attainment of something does not logically follow from the knowledge of something else and since another Vedic text, viz 'Anyone who knows that supreme Brahman becomes Brahman indeed' etc., (Mu. III. ii. 9), clearly shows the attainment of Brahman Itself by the knower of Brahman.

Objection: The Upanisad will say that Brahman permeates everything and is the Self of all; hence It is not attainable. Moreover, one thing is seen to be attained by another-one limited thing by another limited thing. And Brahman is unlimited and indentical with all; hence Its attainment-as of something that is limited and is different from one's Self-is incongruous.
Answer: This is no fault.
Objection: How?
Answer: Because the attainment or non-attainment of Brahman is contingent on Its realization or nonrealization. The individual soul, though intrinsically none other than Brahman, still identifies itself with, and becomes attached to, the sheaths made of food etc., which are external, limited, and composed of the subtle elements; and as (in the story) a man, whose mind is engrossed in the counting of others, misses counting himself, though that personality is the nearnest to him and supplies the missing number, [Ten men, after crossing a river, were faced with the question, 'Have we lost one of us in the stream?' So they went on counting themselves. But each one missed taking himself into account and concluded that they were only nine, one having actually been drowned. They then began wailing, when a passerby found out their foolishness, counted them one by one, and then turning to the last counter said, 'You are the tenth.' That reassured them.] just so, the individual soul, under a spell of ignorance characterized by the nonperception of one's own true nature as Brahman, accepts the external non-Selves, such as the body composed of food, as the Self, and as a consequence, begins to think, 'I am none other than those non-Selves composed of food etc.' In this way, even though Brahman is one's Self, It can remain unattained through ignorance. Just as through ignorance, there is a non-discovery (in the story) of the individual himself who makes up the requisite number, and just as there is the discovery of the selfsame person through knowledge when he is reminded of that personage by someone, similarly in the case of one, to whom Brahman in Its own nature remains thus unattained owing to his ignorance, there can quite reasonably be a discovery of that very Brahman by realizing that omnipresent Brahman to be none other than one's own Self-a realization that comes through enlightenment consequent on the instruction of the scriptures. The sentence, 'The knower of Brahman attains the highest', is a statement in brief of the purport of the whole part (II). The idea involved in quoting a Rg-mantra with the words, 'Tad esa abhyukta-here is a verse uttering that very fact', are (as follows) : (First) It is sought to determine the true nature of Brahman through the presentation of a definition that is capable of indicating the totally free intrinsic nature of that very Brahman which was briefly referred to as a knowable entity in the sentence, 'The knower of Brahman attains the highest', but of which any distinct feature remained undetermined; (secondly) the knowledge of that Brahman having been spoken of (earlier) in an indefinite way, it is now sought to make that very Brahman, whose definition is going to be stated, realizable specifically as non-different from one's own indewelling Self; (and lastly) the idea is to demonstrate that the attainment of supreme Brahman by a knower of Brahman- which (attainment) is spoken of as the result of the realization of Brahman-is really nothing but identity with the Self of all, which is Brahman Itself transcending all worldly attributes. Tat, with regard to what has been said by the brahmana portion (of the Upanisad); esa, this Rk (mantra); is abhyukta, uttered-.

The sentence satyam jnanam anantam brahma - Brahman is truth, knowledge, infinite - is meant as a definition of Brahman. For the three words beginning with satya are meant to distinguish Brahman which is the substantive. And from the fact that Brahman is intended to be spoken of as the thing to be known, it follows that Brahman is the substantive. Since Brhaman is sought to be presented as the chief object of knowledge, the knowable must be the substantive. And just because (Brahman and satya etc.) are related as the substantive and its attributes, the words beginning with satya have the same case-ending, and they stand in apposition. Brahman, being qualified by the three adjectives, satya, etc., is marked out from other nouns. Thus, indeed, does a thing become known when it is differentiated from others; as for instance, in common parlance, a particular lotus is known when it is described as blue, big, and sweet-smelling.

Objection: A noun can be distinguished only when there is the possibility of its ruling out some other adjective (that does not belong to it), as for instance a blue or red lotus. An adjective is meaningful when there are many nouns which belong to the same class and which are capable of having many adjectives; but it can have no meaning with regard to a single noun, wher there is no possibility of any alternative adjective.
There is single Brahman, just as there is a single sun; there do not exist other Brahmans from which It can be distinguished, unlike a blue lotus that can be (marked out from a red one).
Answer: No, there is nothing wrong, since the adjectives are used by way of definition (also).
Objection: How?
Answer: Since the adjectives (here) bear only a predominatingly defining sense and not a predominatingly qualifying sense.
Objection: What again is the difference betweeen the two relations-(1) that existing between the definition and the thing defined; and (2) that between the quality and the thing qualified?
The answer is: An adjective distinguishes a noun from things of its own class, whereas a definition marks it out from everything else, as for instance, (the definition-) akasa is that which provides space. And we said that the sentence (under discussion) stands for a definition. The words satya etc. are unrelated among themselves, since they subserve something else; they are meant to be applied to the substantive only.

Accordingly, each of the attributive words is related with the word 'Brahman', independently of the others thus: satyam brahma, jnanam brahma, anantam brahma. As for satya a thing is said to be satya, true, when it does not change the nature that is ascertained to be its own; and a thing is said to be unreal when it changes the nature that is ascertained to be its own. Hence a mutable thing is unreal, for in the text, 'All transformation has speech as its basis, and it is name only. Earth as such is the reality' (Ch. VI.i.4), it has been emphasised that, that alone is true that exists (Ch.VI.ii.1). So the phrase satyam brahma (Brahman is truth) distinguishers Brahman from mutable things. From this it may follow that (the unchanging) Brahman is the (material) cause (off all subsequent chages); and since a material cause is a substance; it can be an accessory as well, thereby becoming insentient like earth. Hence it is said that Brahman is jnanam. Jnana means knowledge, consciousness. The word jnana conveys the abstract notion of the verb (jna, to know); and being an attribute of Brahman along with truth and infinitude, it does not indicate the agent of knowing. If Brahman be the agent of knowing, truth and infinitude cannot justly be attributed to It. For as the agent of knowing, It becomes changeful; and, as such, how can It be true and infinite? That, indeed, is infinite which is not seperated from anything. If it be the agent of knowing, It becomes delimited by the knowable and the knowledge, and hence there cannot be infinitude, in accordance with another Vedic text: 'The Infinite is that where one does not understand anything else. Hence, the finite is that where one understands something else' (Ch. VII.xxiv.1).
Objection: From the denial of particulars in the (above) statement, 'One does not understand anything else', it follows that one knows the Self.
Answer: No, for the sentence is intended to enunciate a definition of the Infinite. The sentence, 'in which one does not see anything else' etc., is devoted wholly to the presentation of the distinguishing char. acteristics of Brahman. Recognizing the wellknown principle that one sees something that is different form oneself, the nature of the Infinite is expressed in that text by declaring that the Infinite is that in which that kind of action does not exist. Thus, since the expression, 'anything else', is used (in the above sentence) for obviating the recongnized fact of duality, the sentence is not intended to prove the existence of action (the act of knowing) in one's self. And since there is no split in one's Self, cognition is impossible (in It). Moreover, if the Self be a knowable, there will remain no one else (as a knower) to know It, since the Self is already postulated as the knowable.

Objection: The same self can exist both as the knower and the known.
Answer: No, this cannot be simultaneously, since the Self is without parts. A featureless (indivisible) thing cannot simultaneously be both the knower and the known. Moreover, if the Self can be cognized in the sense that a pot is, (scriptural) instruction about Its knowledge becomes useless. For if an object is already familiar, just as a pot for instance is, the (Vedic) instruction about knowing it can have no meaning. Hence if the Self be a knower, It cannot reasonably be infinite. Besides, if It has such distinctive attributes as becoming the agent of knowing, It cannot logically be pure existence. And pure existence is truth, according to another Vedic text, 'That is Truth' (Ch. VI.viii.7). Therefore the word jnana (knowledge), having been used adjectivally along with truth and infinitude, is derived in the cognate sense of the verb, and it is used to form the phrase, jnanam brahma (Brahman is knowledge), in order to rule out (from Brahman) any relationship [A noun may be related wiht a verb by way of becoming the agent, object, instrument, receiver, possessor, or locus.] between noun and verb as that of an agent etc., as also for denying non-consciousness like that of earth etc. From the phrase, jnanam brahma, it may follow that Brahman is limited, for human knowledge is seen to be finite. Hence, in order to obviate this, the text says, anantam, infinite.

Objection: Since the words, satya, (truth) etc., are meant only for negating such qualities as untruth, and since the substantive Brahman is not a well-known entity like a lotus, the sentence beginning with satya has nothing but a non-entity as its content, just as it is the case with the sentence, 'Having bathed in the water of the mirage, and having put a crown of sky flowers on his head, there goes the son of a barren woman, armed wiht a bow made of a hare's horn.'
Answer: No, for the sentence is meant as a definition. And we said that even though satya etc. are attributive words, their chief aim is to define. Since a setence, stating the differentia of a non-existing substantive, is useless, and since the present sentence is meant to define, it does not, in our opinion, relate to a nonentity. Should even satya etc. have an adjectival sense, they certainly do not give up their own meanings. ['Etymologically, the word satya indicates an existing entity that is not sublated; the word jnana means the self-revealing cognition of things; and the word ananta is used with regard to something pervasive, as (in the expression) "the sky is infinite", etc. Hence they negate opposite ideas by the very fact of their imparting their own meanigs to the substantives. Therefore they cannot be reduced to mere negation.'-A.G.] If the words satya etc. mean a non-entity, they cannot logically distinguish their substantive. But if they are meaningful, as having the senses of truth etc., they can justifiably differentiate their substantive Brahman from other substantives that are possessed of opposite qualities. And the word Brahman, too, has its own individual meaning. [Derived from the root brh, having the sense of growth, vastness, Brahman is that which is not limited by time, space or causation. Thus the word has its own positive import and cannot refer to a void.] Among these words, the word ananta becomes an adjective by way of negating finitude; whereas the words satya and jnana become adjectives even while imparting their own (positive) senses (to the substantive). Since in the text, 'From that Brahman indeed which is this Self, (was produced this space)' (II. i. 1), the word Self (atma) is used with regard to Brahman Itself, it follows that Brahman is the Self of the cognizing individual;and this is supported by the text, 'He attains this Self made of bliss' (II. viii. 5), where Brahman is shown to be the Self. Moreover, it is Brahman which has entered (into men); the text, 'having created that, (He) entered into that very thing' (II. vi), shows the entry of that very Brahman into the body as the individual soul. Hence the cognizer, in his essential nature, is Brahman.

Objection: If thus Brahman be the Self, It becomes the agent of cognition, since it is a well-known fact that the Self is a knower. And from the text, 'He desired' (II. vi), it stands established that the one who desires is also an agent of cognition. Thus, Brahman being the cognizer, it is improper to hold that Brahman is consciousness. Besides, that (later conclusion) leads to Its impermanence. For even if it be conceded that jnana (cognition) is nothing but consciousness, and thus Brahman has (only) the cognate sense (- knowledge-) of the verb (to know, and not the verbal sense of knowing), It (Brahman) will still be open to the charge of impermanence and dependence. For the meanings of verbs are dependent on the (grammatical) cases (of the nouns). And knowledge is a sense conveyed by a root (dependent on a noun). Accordingly, Brahman becomes impermanents as well as dependent.
Answer: No, since without implying that knowledge is separable from Brahman, it is referred to as an activity by way of courtesy.
To explain: Knowledge, which is the true natue of the Self, is inseparable from the Self, and so it is everlasting. Still, the intellect, which is the limiting adjunct (of the Self) becomes transformed into the shape of the objects while issuing out through the eyes etc. (for cognizing things). These configurations of the intellect in the shape of sound etc., remain objectively illumined by the Consciousness that is the Self, even when they are in an incipient state; and when they emerge as cognitions, they are still enlightened by that Consciousness. [In the incipient stage, they have the fitness to be illumined; and after emergence, they remain soaked in consciousness.] Hence these semblances of Consciousness- a Consciousness that is really the Self are imagined by the non-discriminating poeple to be referable by the word knowledge bearing the root meaning (of the verb to know); to be attributes of the Soul Itself; and to be subject to mutation. But the Consciousness of Brahman is inherent in Brahman and is inalienable from It, just as the light of the sun is from the sun or the heat of fire is form fire. Consciousness is not dependent on any other cause (for its revelation), for it is by nature eternal (light). And since all that exists is inalienable from Brahman in time or space, Brahman being the cause of time, space, etc., and since Brahman is surpassingly subtle, there is nothing else whether subtle or screened or remote or past, present or future which can be unknowable to It. Therefore Brahman is omniscient. Besides, this follows from the text of the mantra: 'Though He is without hands and feet, still He runs and grasps; though He is without eyes, still He sees; though He is without ears, still He hears. He knows the knowable, and of Him there is no knower. Him they called the first, great Person' (Sv. III. 19). There are also such Vedic texts as: 'For the knower's function of knowing can never be lost, because It is immortal; but (It does not know, as) there is not that second thing, (separated from It which It can know)' (Br. IV. iii. 30).

Just because Brahman's nature of being the knower is inseparable and because there is no dependence on other accessories like the sense-organs, Brahman, though intrinsically identical with knowledge, is well known to be eternal. Thus, since this knowledge is not a form of action, it does not also bear the root meaning of the verb. Hence, too, Brahman is not the agent of congnition. And because of this, again, It cannot even be denoted by the word jnana (knowledge). Still Brahman is indicated, but not denoted, by the word knowledge which really stands for a verisimilitude of consciousness as referring to an attribute of the intellect; for Brahman is free from such things as class etc., which make the use of the word (knowledge) possible. Similarly, Brahman is not denoted even by the word satya (truth), since Brahman is by nature devoid of all distinctions. In this way, the word satya, which means external reality in general, can indirectly refer to Brahman (in such expressions) as 'Brahman is truth', but it cannot denote It. Thus the words truth etc., occurring in mutual proximity, and restricting and being restricted in truns by each other, distinguish Brahman from other objects denoted by the words, truth etc., and thus become fit for defining It as well. So, in accordance wiht the Vedic texts, 'Failing to reach which (Brahman), words, along with the mind turn back' (II. iv. 1), and '(Whenever an aspirant gets fearlessly established in this changeless, bodiless,) inexpressible, and unsupporting Brahman' (II. vii), it is proved that Brahman is indescribable, and that unlike the construction of the expression, 'a blue lotus', Brahman is not to be construed as the import of any sentence. [Brahman cannot be comprehended through the common relationship of words and things denoted by them. Nor can It be denoted through the relationship of substance and quality.] Yah veda, anyone who knows-that Brahman, described before; as nihitam, (hidden) existing; parame vyoman (i.e. vyomni), in the supreme space (which permeates its own effect, the intellect)-in the space which is called the Unmanifested (i.e. Maya), that, indeed, being the supreme space in accordance with the Vedic text, 'By this Immutable (Brahman), O Gargi, is the (Unmanifested) space (akasa, i.e. Maya) pervaded' (Br. III. viii. 11), where akasa occurs in the proximity of aksara (Immutable) ['The Unmanifested called vyoma (space, akasa) is inherent in the intellect (guha), which is the effect of former. In that Unamanifested is placed Brahman. The element called akasa is not accepted here as the meaning of vyoma, since the element akasa cannot be called parama (supreme), it being an effect of Unmanifested akasa. Besides, in the Brhadaranyaka, the Unmanifested akasa and not the element akasa, occurs in the proximity of Immutable Brahman (aksara)'. -A.G.]; guhayam, in the intellect. Guha, being derived from the root guha in the sense of hiding, means the intellect, because in that intellect are hidden the categories, viz knowledge, knowable and knower; or because in this intellect are hidden the two human objectives, enjoyment and liberation. Or, from the apposition (of guha and vyoma) in the expression, guhayam vyomni, the Unmanifested space (Maya) itself is the guha (cavity); for in that, too are hidden all things during the three periods (of creation, existence, and dissolution), it being their cause as well as more subtle. In that (Maya) is hidden Brahman. It is, however, reasonable to accept the space circumscribed by the cavity of the heart as the supreme space, for the text wants to present space here as a part of knowledge. [Brahman is placed, i.e. manifest as the witness, in the cavity of the intellect that is loged in the space circumscribed by the heart, and It is directly perceived there as such. If, however, Brahman is placed in the Cosmic Unmanifested, i.e. in the principle called Maya, It will become an object of indirect perception. And an indirect realization cannot negate the direct superimposition that a man suffers from.] The space within the heart is well known as the supreme space from the other Vedic texts: 'The space that it outside the individual (Ch. III. xii. 7) ... is the same as the space within the individual (Ch. III. xii. 8) (and that again) is the same as the space within the heart' (Ch. III. xii. 9). (Thus the meaning of the sentence is:) Within the cavity that is the intellect, which is within the space defined by the heart, is nihitam, lodged, placed , Brahman; in other words, Brahman is perceived clearly through the function of that intellect; for apart from this perception, Brahman can have no connection, (in the sense of being lodged in), with any particular time or space, Brahman being all-pervasive and beyond all distinctions.

Sah, he, one who has known Brahman thus-what does he do?
The answer is-asnute, he enjoys; sarvan, all without any exception; kaman, desires, i.e. all enjoyable things. Does he enjoy the sons, heavens, etc. in sequence as we do? The text says: No; he enjoys all the desirable things, which get focussed into a single moment, saha, simultaneouslythrough a single perception which is eternal like the light of the sun, which is nondifferent from Brahman Itself, and which we called 'truth, knowledge, infinite'.

That very fact is described here as brhamana saha, in identification with Brahman. The man of knowledge, having become Brahman, enjoys as Brahman, all the desirable things simultaneously; and he does not enjoy in sequence the desirable things that are dependent on such causes as merit etc. and such sense-organs as the eyes etc., as does an ordinary man identified with the wordly self which is conditioned by limiting adjuncts, and which is a reflection (of the supreme Self) like that of the sun on water. How then does he enjoy? As identified with the eternal Brahman which is omniscient, all-pervasive, and the Self on all, he enjoys simultaneously, in the manner described above, all the desirable things that are not dependent on all such causes as merit etc., and that are independent of the organs like the eyes etc. This is the idea. Vipascita means 'with the intelligent One, (i.e.) with the Omniscient; for, that indeed is true intelligence which is omniscience. The idea is that, he injoys in his identity with that all-knowing Brahman. The word iti is used to indicate the end of the mantra.

The entire purport of the chapter is summed up in the sentence, 'The knower of Brahman attains the highest', occurring in the brahmana portion. And that pithy statement (aphorism) is briefly explained by the mantra (the Rk verse). Since the meaning of that very statement has to be elaborately ascertained again, the succeeding text, tasmad va etasmat etc., is introduced as a sort of a gloss to it. As to that , it has been said at the beginning of the mantra that Brahman is truth, knowledge, and infinite. As to that, there are three kinds of infinitude-from the standpoint of space, time, and objects. To illustrate: The sky is unlimited from the point of view of space, for it is not limited in space. But the sky is not infinite as regards time or as regards (other) objects. Why? Since it is a product. Brahman is not thus limited in time like the sky, since It is not a product. For, a created thing is circumscribed by time, but Brahman is not created. Hence It is Infinite from the point of view of time as well. Similarly, too, from the point of view of objects. How, again, is established Its infinitude from the point of view of objects? Since It is non-different from the point of view of objects? Since It is non-different from everything. A thing that is different acts as a limitation to another. Indeed, when the intellect gets occupied with something, it becomes detached from something else. That (idea), because of which another idea becomes circumscribed, acts as limit to the (latter) idea. To illustrate: The idea of cowhood is repelled by the idea of horsehood; hence horsehood debars cowhood, and the idea (of cowhood) becomes delimited indeed. That limitation is seen in the case of distinct objects. Brahman is not differentiated in this way. Hence It has infinitude even from the standpoint of substances.

How, again is Brahman non-different from everything?
The answer is: Because It is the cause of everything. Brahman is verily the cause of all things-time, space, etc.

Objection: From the standpoint of objects, Brahman is limited by Its own effects.
Answer: No, since the objects that are effects are unreal. For apart from the cause, there is really no such thing as an effect by which the idea of the cause can become delimited. This is fact is borne out by another Vedic text which says that 'All transformation has speech as its basis, and it is name only. Earth (inhering in its modifications), as such, is the reality' (Ch. VI. 1. 4); similarly, existence (i.e. Brahman that permeaters everything) alone is true (Ch. VI. ii. 1). Brahman, then is spatially infinite, being the cause of space etc. For space is known to be spatially infinte; and Brahman is the cause of that space. Hence it is proved that the Self is spatially infinte. Indeed, no all-pervading thing is seen in this world to originate from anything that is not so. Hence the spatial infinitude of Brahman is absolute. Similarly, temporally, too, Brahman's infinitude is absolute, since Brahman is not a product. And because there is nothing different from Brahman, It is infinte substantially as well. Hence Its reality is absolute. By the word tasmat, from that, is called to mind the Brahman that was aphoristically stated in the first sentence; and by the word etasmat, from this, is called to memory the Brahman just as It was defined immediately afterwards in the mantra. Atmanah, from the Self-from Brahman that was enunciated in the beginning in the words of the brahmana portion, and that was defined immediately afterwards as truth, knowledge, infinite (in the mantra); (i.e.) from that Brahman which is called the Self, for It is the Self of all, according to another Vedic text, 'It is truth, It is the Self' (Ch. VI. vii-xvi). Hence Brahman is the Self. From that Brahman which is identical with the Self, akasah, space; sambhutah, was created. Akasa means that which is possessed of the attribute of sound and provides space for all things that have forms. Akasat, from that space; vayuh, air-which has two attributes, being possessed of its own quality, touch, and the quality, sound, of its cause (akasa). The verb, 'was created', is understood. Vayah, from that air; was created agnih, fire-which has three attributes, being possessed of its own quality, colour, and the two earlier ones (of its cause, air). Agneh, from fire; was produced, apah, water-with four attributes, being endowed with its own quality, taste, and the three earlier ones (of fire). Adbhyah, from water; was produced prthivi, earth-with five attributes, consisting of its own quality, smell, and the four earlier qualities (of its casue, water). Prthivyah, from the earth; osadhayah, the herbs. Osadhibhyah, from the herbs; annam, food. Annat, from food, transformed into human seed; (was created), purusah, the human being, possessed of the limbs-head, hands etc. Sah vai esah purusah, that human being, such as he is; annarasamayah, consists of the essence of food, is a transformation of the essence of food. Since the semen, the seed, emerging as it does as the energy from all the limbs, is assumed to be of the human shape, therefore the one that is born from it should also have the human shape; for in all classes of beings, the offsprings are seen to be formed after the fathers.

Objection: Since all beings without exception are modifications of the essence of food and since all are equally descendants of Brahma, why is man alone specified?
Answer: Because of his pre-eminence.
Objection: In what, again, does the pre-eminence consist?
Answer: In his competence for karma and knowledge. For man alone, who is desirous (of results) and possessed of learning and capacity, is qualified for rites and duties as also for knowledge, by virtue of his ability, craving (for results), and non-indifference (to results). (This is proved) by the evidence of another Vedic text: 'In man alone is the Self most manifest, for he is the best endowed with intelligence. He speaks what he knows, he sees what he knows; he knows what will happen tomorrow; he knows the higher and lower worlds; he aspires ot achieve immortality through mortal things. He is thus endowed (with discrimination), while other beings have consciousness of hunger adn thirst only' (Ai. A. II. iii. 2.5) etc. The intention here is to make that very human being enter into the inmost Brahman through knowledge. But his intellect, that thinks of the outer particular forms, which are not selves, as selves, cannot without the support of some distinct object, be suddenly made contentless and engaged in the thoughts of the inmost indwelling Self. Therefore, on the analogy of the moon on the bough, [Though the moon is far away, it is at times spoken of as 'the moon on the bough', because she appears to be near it. The point is that, the idea of something which escapes ordinary comprehesion is sought to be communicated with the help of something more tangible, though, in reality, the two are entirely disparate.] the text takes the help of a fiction that has an affinity with the identification of the Self and the perceived body; and leading thereby the intellect inward, the text says, tasya idam eva sirah: tasya, of that human being who is such and who is an modification of the essence of food, idam eva sirah, this is verily the head-that is well known. The text, 'This is verily the head', is stated lest somebody should think that the head is to be imagined here just as it is in the case of the vital body etc., where things that are not heads are imagined to be so. Similar is the construction in the case of the side etc. Ayam, this, the right hand of a man facing east. is the daksinah paksah, the southern side. Ayam, this-the left hand; is the uttarah paksah, the northern side. Ayam, this-the middle portion (trunk) of the body; is the atma, self, soul of the limbs, in accordance with the Vedic text, 'The middle of these limbs is verily their soul'. Idam, this-the portion of the body below the navel; is the puccham pratistha, the tail that stablizes. Pratistha derivatively means that by which one remains in position. The puccha (here) is that which is comparable to a tail, on the anology of hanging down, as does the tail of a cow. On this pattern is established the symbolism in the case of the succeeding vital body etc., just as an image takes its shape from molten copper poured into a crucible. Tat api, as to that also, illustrative of that very idea contained in the brahmana portion; esah bhavati slokah, here occurs a verse- which presents the self made of food.
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