Author Topic: CHAPTER 2 - SECTION 6  (Read 249 times)


  • Global Moderator
  • Sr. Member
  • *****
  • Posts: 341
    • View Profile
« on: April 09, 2019, 10:34:20 PM »
2.6.1 Sah he; bhavati, becomes; asan eva, non-existing indeed-like something non-existent; just as a nonentity has no relation wiht any human objective, similarly, he remains dissociated from the human objective (viz liberation). Who is that? He who, cet, perchance; veda, knows; brahma, Brahman; asat iti, as non-existing. As opposed to that, cet veda, if he known; That-that Brahman, which is the basis of all diversification and the seed of all activity, though in Itself It is devoid of all distinctions; asti iti, does exist, (then the knowers of Brahman consider him as existing).

Why, again, should there be any apprehension of Its non-existence?
We say that (this is so, because) Brahman is beyond all empirical relationships. The intellect that is prone to think of existence with regard to only the empirical objects having speech alone as their substance, may assume nonexistence with regard to anything that is opposed to this and is transcendental. For instance, it is well-known that a pot, comprehended as a thing that man can deal with, is true, while anything of an oppsite natural is false. Thus, by a parity of reasoning, there may arise here also an apprehension of the non-existence of Brahman. Therefore it is said, 'If anyone knows that Brahman does exist'.

What again, will happen to one who knows Brahman as existing?
That is being answered: Tatah, because of that realization of exisence; the knowers of Brahman viduh, know; enam, this one-who has this realization; as santam, existing- identified with the Self that is absolutely real,-, by virtue of his having become one with the Brahman that exists. The idea is that he becomes worthy to be known by others, just as Brahman is. Or (the alternative meaning is): If a man thinks, 'Brahman is nonexistence', then that man, because of his faithlessness the entire righteous path consisting of the scheme of castes, stages of life, etc., becomes non-existent inasmch as that path is not calculated to lead him to Brahman. Hence this atheist is called asat, unrighteous-in this world. As opposed to such a man, if anyone knows that 'Brahman does exist', then, he, because of his faith, accepts properly the righteous path comprising the scheme of castes, stages of life, etc. and leading to the realization of Brahman. Since this is so, tatah, therefore; the good people know this one as santam, treading the righteous path. The purport of the sentence is: Because of this fact, Brahman is to be accepted as surely existing. Tasya purvasya, of the preceding one-of the cognitive one; esah eva, this one, indeed; is sarirah atma, the self existing in the body made of knowledge. Which is that? Yah esah, that which is this one-the self made of bliss. As to this self there is no apprehension of non-existence. But Brahman's non-existence may be suspected, since It is devoid of all distinctions, and since it is common to all. [Since Brahman pervades eveything, Its utility should be perceptible at every turn. But actually this is not so. Hence Its existence can be questioned. But the anandamaya's (the blisful self's) existence is not doubted in this sense. Hence anandamaya is not the subject-matter of the verse quoted above.]

Since this is so, atah, therefore; atha, afterwards; there are these anuprasnah: prasnah means questions, by the disciple who is the hearer, and anu means after; the questions after what the teacher has spoken are the anuprasnah. Brahman, being the cause of space etc., is equally common to the man of knoweldge and the ignorant. Therefore, it may be suspected that the ignorant. Therefore, it may be suspected that the ignorant man, too, reaches Brahman. Uta has the meaning of api (used in introducing a question). Cana is used in the sense of api (implying even). Pretya, departing, from here; does kah cana avidvan, evev one who is ignorant; gacchati, reach; amum lokam, that world-the supreme Self? The question, 'Or does he not go?' is implied because of the use of the plural number in 'anuprasnah, questions put after the teacher's instruction.' The remaining two questions are with regard to the inlightened man. It the ignorant man fails to reach Brahman, though It is the common source of all, then the attainment of Brahman by an enlightened man may as well be doubted. Hence with regard to him is the question: Aho vidvan etc. Does kah cit, someone; who is a vidvan, an enlightened man, a knower of Brahman; pretya, departing, from here; amum lokam samasnute, reach the other world? In the expression samasnute u, the e (in te) is replaced by ay, of which the y having been dropped out, the a becomes lengthened, and the expression becomes samasnuta u. And the letter u, occuring later, should be transferred from the bottom and the letter ta should be detached from uta, occuring earlier, (to form a new word uta). Placing this (new) uta before the word aho, the question is being put: 'Uta aho vidvan.... Or does the enlightened man attain the other world?' The other question is: 'Or does the enlightened man not attain it, just as the ignorant man does not?'

Alternatively, there are only two questions relating to the enlightened and the unenlightened men. But the plural occurs with reference to other questions that may crop up by implication. From hearing, 'If one knows Brahman, as nonexisting', and 'If one knows that Brahman does exist', the doubt arises as to whether It exists or does not exist. From that, by implication, crops up this first question after the teacher's instruction: 'Does Brahman exist or does It not?' The second one is: 'Since Brahman is impartial, does the unenlightened man reach It or does he not?' Even if Brahman is equal to all, Its non-attainment in the case of the enlightened man can be suspected as much as much as in the case of the unelightened one; and hence the third question following on the teacher's instruction, is, 'Does the man of knowledge attain or does he not?' The succeeding text is introduced for answering these questions. Apropos of this, existence is being first spoken of. It remains to be explained as to what kind of truth is meant in the assertion that was made thus: 'Brahman is truth, knowledge, infinite'. Hence it is being said: Brahman's truth is affirmed by speaking of Its existence; for it has been asserted that the existing is the true (an echo of Ch. VI. ii. 1).

Therefore, the very affirmation of existence amounts to an avowal of reality. How is it known that this text bears such as import? From the trend of the words of this text. For the succeeding sentences such as, 'They call that (Brahman) Truth' (II. vi), '(Who indeed will inhale and who exhale) if this Bliss (Brahman) be not there in the supreme space (within the heart)?', are connected with this very purport.

Objection: While on this topic, the suspicion arises that Brahman is surely non-existent. Why? Because whatever exists is perceived as possessed of distinctive attributes, as for instance a pot etc. Whatever is nonexistent is not perceived, as for instance the horn of a hare etc. Similarly, Brahman is not perceived. So It does not exist, since It is not perceived as possessed of distinguishing attributes.
Answer: This is not tenable, since Brahman is the cause of space etc. It is not a fact that Brahman does not exist. Why? Since all the products issuing from Brahman, such as space etc., are perceived. It is a matter of common experience in this world that any thing from which something is produced does exist, as for instance, earth, seed, etc., which are the causes of a pot, a sprout, etc. So Brahman does exist, since It is the cause of space etc. And, no effect is perceived in this world as having been produced from a nonentity. If such effects as name and form had originated from a nonentity, they should not have been perceived since they have no reality. But they are perceived. Hence Brahman exists. Should any effect originate from a nonentity, it should remain soaked in unreality even while being perceived. But facts point otherwise. Therefore Brahman exists. Pertaining to this another Vedic text - 'How can a thing that exists come out of a thing that does not?' (Ch. VI. ii. 2)-points out logically the impossiblity of the creation of something out of nothing. Therefore, it stands to reason that Brahman is verily a reality.

Objection: Should that Brahman be a cause like earth, seed, etc., It will be insentient.
Answer: No, since It is capable of desiring. Certainly it is not a matter of experience that one who can desire can be insentient. We have said that Brahman is indeed omniscient; and so it is but reasonable that It should be capable of desiring.

Objection: Since Brahman has desires, It has unfulfilled desires like ourselves.
Answer: Not so, for It is independent. Such defects as desire cannot impel Brahman (to action) just as they do others by subjecting them to their influence. What then are these (desires of Brahman)? They are by nature truth and knowledge, and they are pure by virtue of their identity with Brahman. [Brahman, as reflected on Maya, is the material cause of the world, and It is possessed of desires that are the modifications of Maya. But these modifications are not distinguishable from truth and knowledge, since they are permeated by Consciousness that is not subject to ignorance etc.; and they are pure, since they are untouched by unrigtheousness etc. by virtue of their non-distinction from Brahman.'-A.G.] Brahman is not impelled to action by them. But Brahman ordains them in accordance with the results of actions of the creatures. Therefore, Brahman has dependence with regard to desires. So Brahman has no want. And this follows also from the fact of Brahman's non-dependence on any other means. Further, Brahman has no dependence on accessories etc., as others have whose desires are not identified with themselves but are dependent on such causes as righteousness, and require the extraneous body and senses as their instruments. How do they exist then (in Brahman)? They are non-different from Itself. ['Since Maya, as possessed of the impressions of desires, has identity with Brahman (through superimposition), the desires, too, that are the modifications of this Maya, have identity with Brahman. Therefore, there is no need for a physical body etc. (for making possible the existence of desires in Brahman, as it is in our case)'-A.G.] That fact is stated in sah akamayata: sah, the Self from which space originated; akamayata, desired. How? Bahu syam: syam, I shall become; bahu, many.

Objection: How can the One become many, unless It enters into something else?
The answer is, 'prajayeya, I shall be born'. The multiplication here does not refer to becoming something extraneous as one does by begetting a son. How then? Through the manifestation of name and form that are latent in Itself. When name and form existing latently in the Self get manifested, they evolve-by retaining their intrinsic nature as the Self under all conditions-in time and space which are inseparable from Brahman. Then that evolution of name and form is (what is called) the appearence of Brahman as the many. In no other way is it possible for the partless Brahman to become either multiple or finite; as for instance, the finitude and plurality of space are surely the creations of extraneous factors. Hence the Self becomes multiple through these alone. For no such subtle, disconnected and remote thing exists as a non-Self, in the past, present, or future, which is different from the Self and separated from It by time or space. Therefore, it is only because of Brahman that name and form have their being under all circumstances, but Brahman does not consist of them. They are said to be essentially Brahman, since they cease to exist when Brahman is eliminated. And, conditioned by these two limiting adjuncts, Brahman becomes a factor in all emperical dealings involving such words as knower, knowable and knowledge, as also their implications etc. Having such a desire, sah, He-that Self; tapah, atapyata: by tapah is meant knowledge since another Vedic text says, 'He whose tapah consists of knowledge' (Mu.I.i.9), and since the other kind of tapah (austerity) is out of place in one in whom all desires remain fulfilled. That kind of tapah, knowledge; he atapyata, practised. The idea is that the Self reflected on the plan etc. of the world being created. Sah tapah taptva, He, having reflected thus; asrjata, created, in consonance with such contributory factors as the results of actions of creatures; idam sarvam, all this; yat idam kim ca, whatever there is, without any exception-this universe, together with space, time, name, and form as He perceived it, and as it is perceived by all beings under various circumstences. Brahman, srstva, having created; tat, that, this world; -what did He do? the answer is-tat eva, into that very world, which had been created; anupravisat, He entered. With regard to this, it is a matter for consideration as to how He entered. Did the Creator enter in that very form of His or in some other form? Which is the reasonable position?

Pseudo-Vedantin: From the use of the suffix ktva(-ing), it follows that the Creator Himself entered. [Grammar indicates that the finite verb and the verb ending with ktva (- ing), in the same sentence, refer to the same nominative.]
Objection: Is that not illogical, since on the supposition that Brahman is a (material) cause in the same sense as clay is (of pot etc.), the effects are non-different from Brahman? For it is the cause that becomes transformed into the effect. Hence it is illogical that, after the production of the effect, the cause should enter over again into the effect as a separate entity, as though it had not done so already. [The action denoted by the verb having the suffix ktva precedes the action of the finite verb. This is not possible here, since the production of the effect and the entry of the cause into it are simultaneous.] Apart from being shaped into a pot, the clay has no other entry into the pot, to be sure.
Pseudo-Vedantin: Just as earth, in the form of dust, enters into a pot (made of earth), similarly, the Self can enter into name and form under some other guise. And this also follows from another Vedic text, 'By entering in the form of the soul of each individual being....' (Ch. VI. iii. 2).

Objection: This is not proper, since Brahman is one. In the case of earth, however, it is possible to enter into a pot in the form of dust, since lumps of earth are many and have parts, and since powder of earth has places still unoccupied by it. In the case of the Self, however, there cannot possibly be any entry, since It is one at the same time that It has no dimension and has nowhere to enter into.
Pseudo-Vedantin: What kind of entry will it be then? And, the fact of entry has to be upheld in view of the Upanisadic statement: 'He entered into that very thing.' That being so, Brahman may as well have dimensions, and having dimensions, it is but proper that Brahman's entry in the form of an individual soul into name and form should be like that of a hand into the mouth.

Objection: No, since there is no empty space. For Brahman, which has become transformed into effects, has no other space-apart from that occupied by the effects, consisting of name and form-which is devoid of It and into which It can enter as an individual soul. Should It (i.e. Brahman as the individual soul) enter into the cause (viz Brahman as name and form), [Brahman is the common cause of eveything including the individual souls. Now, the individual soul may enter into Brahman which, though transformed as name and form, is still its cause.], It will cease to be an individual soul, just as a pot ceases to be a pot on entering into (i.e. on being reduced to) earth. Hence the text, 'He entered into that very thing', cannot justifiably imply into the cause.
Pseudo-Vedantin: Let (the entry be into) another effect. The text, 'He entered into that very thing', means that one effect, viz the individual soul, entered into another effect made of name and form.

Objection: No, since this involves a contradiction; for a pot does not become merged into another pot. Besides, this runs counter to the Vedic texts that speak of their distinction; so, the Vedic texts that reaffirm the difference of the individual soul from the effect, name and form, will be contradicted. Furthermore, if the soul merges into name and form, liberation will be impossible. It does not stand to reason that one merges into what one tries to get freed from. A chained thief does not enter into fetters. [The freedom of a thief, when captured, does not lie in his entering into the fetters.]
Pseudo-Vedantin: Suppose Brahman is transformed into two parts, external and internal. To explain, that very Brahman which is the cause, has become diversified as the receptacle in the shape of body etc., and as the thing contained in the shape of the embodied soul.

Objection: No, for entry is possible only for what is outside. Not that a thing which is (naturally) contained within another is said to have entered there. The entry should be of something that is outside, for the word entry (pravesa) is seen to carry that sense, as for instance in the sentence, 'He entered into the house after erecting it.'
Pseudo-Vedantin: The entry may be like that of the reflections of the sun etc. in water.

Objection: No, since Brahman is not limited, and since It has no configuration. A distinct thing that is limited and has features can be a production of reflection on something else which is by nature transparent, as for istance, the sun etc. can be reflected on water; but of the Self there can be no reflection, since It has no form. Moreover, the entry of the Self in the form of a reflection is not possible, since the Self is all-pervasive, being the cause of space etc., and since there is no other substance which can hold the Self's reflection by being placed somewhere unconnected with the Self. This being so, there is no entry whatsoever. Nor do we find any other interpretation possible for the text, 'He entered into that very thing.' And a Vedic text is meant to enligthen us about supersensuous realities. But from this sentence, not even diligent people can derive any enlightenment. Well, then, this sentence, 'Having created it, He entered into that very thing,' has to be discarded, since it conveys no meaning.
Vedantin's answer: No, (it need not be discarded). As the sentence bears a different meaning, why should there be this discussion that is out of context? You should remember the other meaning which is implied in this sentence and which is the subject under discussion here, as stated in the text: 'The knower of Brahman attains the highest......Brahman is truth, knowledge and infinite....He who knows (that Brahman) as existing in the intellect (lodged in the supreme space in the heart)' (II. i). The knowledge of that Brahman is sought to be imparted, and that is also the topic under discussion. And the effects, beginning with space and ending with the body made of food, have been introdued with a view to acquiring the knowledge of the nature of that Brahman, and the topic started with is also the knowledge of Brahman. Of these, the self made of the vital force indwells and is different from the self made of food; within that is the self made of mind and the self made of intellect. Thus (by stages) the Self has been made to enter into the cavity of the intellect. And there, again, has been presented a distinct self that is made of bliss. After this, through the comprehension of the blissful self which acts as a pointer (to the Bliss-Brahman), one has to realize, within this very cavity (of the heart), that Self as the culmination of the growth of bliss, which is Brahman (conceived of) as the stabilizing tail (of the blissful self), which is the support of all modifications and which is devoid of all modifications. it is with this idea that the entry of the Self is imagined. Inasmuch as Brahman has no distinctive attribute, It cannot be realized anywhere else. It is a matter of experience that knowledge of a thing is dependent on its particular associations. Just as the knowledge of Rahu arises from its associations with the distinct entities, the sun, and the moon, [Rahu is a mythological being that has no limb except a head. During eclipses it swallows the sun or the moon, and then alone we are conscious of its existence] similarly, the association of the Self with the cavity of the internal organ causes the knowledge of Brahman, for the internal organ has proximity (to the Self) and the nature of illumination. Just as pot etc. are perceived when in contact with light, so also the Self is perceived when in contact with the light of intellectual conviction. [A thing becomes illumined with the light of knowledge, only when the internal organ is in contact with it, but not otherwise. A reflecting medium must be transparent enough to catch an image properly. The intellect alone can reflect the Self best. Again, light removes darkness, though both are insentient, similarly, intellectual conviction removes ignorance, though both are insentient. The intellect cannot reveal Brahman objectively.] Hence, it suits the context to say that the Self is lodged in the cavity of the intellect which is the cause of Its experience. In the present passage, however, which is a sort of elaboration of that theme, the same idea is repeated in the form, 'Having created it, He entered into that very thing.' Tat, that very Brahman Itself-which is the cause of space; and which, srstva, after creating the effect, has entered into the creation, as it were, is perceived within the cavity of intellect, as possessed of such distinctions as being a seer, a hearer, a thinker, a knower, etc. That, indeed, is Its entry. Hence Brahman, as the cause of this (phenomenon), must exist.

Accordingly, just because It exists, It should surely be apprehended as such. What did It do after entering the creation? It abhavat, became; sat ca, the formed (gross); tyat ca, and the formless (subtle). The formed and the formless, existing in the Self in their state of unmanifested name and form, are manifested by the indwelling Self; and even when manifested and known as the formed and the formless, they still continue to be inseparable from the Self in time and space. Having this fact in view, it is said that the Self became these two. Moreover, the (Self became) niruktam and aniruktam ca, the definable and the undefinable. Nirukta is that which is definable as 'this is that', by distinguishing it from things of its own class as also from things of other classes, and by associating it with a certain time and space. Anirukta is its opposite. Nirukta and anirukta, too, are but attributes of the formed and the formless. Just as the formed and the formless are the visible and invisible, so also are the nilayanam ca anilayanam ca, the sustaining and the non-sustaining. Nilayana means a nest, that which supports; and this is an attribute of the formed. Anilayana, a non-supporting thing-is opposed to that (nilayana) and is an attribute of the formless. Though 'invisible', 'undefinable', and 'nonsupporting' are the attributes of the formless, they relate only to the manifested state, for they are referred to in the Vedas as occuring after creation. By tyat, the formless, are meant the vital force etc. which are inexpressible, and it is non-sustaining as well. So, all these adjectives belonging to the formless, relate to the manifested (created). Vijnanam is sentient, and avijnanam is devoid of that (sentience), insentient stone etc. It follows from the context that satyam is truth falling within the range of the empirical, and not absolute truth. For the absolute truth is only one, which is Brahman. But here the relative truth, as found in the empirical world, is referred to; as for instance, water is said to be true in comparison with the water in a mirage which is false. Anrtam, untruth, is the opposite of that. Again, what is it that abhavat,became, all this? That which is satyam, the absolute truth. What is that, again? It is Brahman; for it is Brahman that has been introuced as the topic of discussion by the sentence, 'Brahman is truth, knowledg, infinite.'

The knowers of Brahman acaksate, call It; satyam, truth; because it is the one Brahman, called satya, truth, that abhavat, became; yat kim ca idam, all this that there is-all modifications, without any exception, starting with the visible and the invisible, all of which are the features of the formed and the formless-, there being no existence for any of these modifications of name and form apart form that Brahman. The question that was mooted after the teacher's instruction concerned existence and nonexistence. As an answer to this, it has been said that the Self desired, I shall become many.' After creating, in accordance with His wish, such products as space etc. which are characterized as the visible and invisible etc., and then entering into them, He became many through His acts of seeing, hearing thinking, and knowing. Hence it is implied thereby that this Self must be accepted as existing, since It is the cause of space etc., exists in this creation, is lodged in the supreme space within the cavity of the heart, and is perceived through Its diverse reflections on the mental concepts. [The mental concepts are 'I am a doer', 'I am an enjoyer', etc.; and these, again, being the different appearances of the light of the Self, reveal the Self in Its conditioned form, and not in Its unconditioned essence.] Tat, pertaining to this-concerning this idea expressed in the brahmana portion; esah slokah bhavati, occurs this verse. Just as in the preceding five chapters occured verses expressive of the selves, counting from the one constituted by food, so, too, is there this verse which indicates through Its effects the existence of the Self as the inmost of all.
« Last Edit: April 09, 2019, 10:49:41 PM by Commentary »